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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the efforts of different regimes to establish their authority 
over the Pashtun ethnic group.  The Pashtun are at the heart of the conflict in 
Afghanistan, which also reaches into northwestern Pakistan.  They provide both an 
important and current example of why “ungoverned spaces”—geographic regions beyond 
the reach of central authority—have become such important topic among many of the 
world’s countries.  People that exist within a sovereign state’s borders and outside the 
state’s authority present a potentially dangerous problem to both the state itself and the 
international community. 
To address the challenges facing a state attempting to establish its authority over 
the Pashtun, this thesis identifies normative and organizational structures associated with 
rural Pashtun tribes and discusses how these factors impede the creation of central state 
authority.  These factors are applied to three cases—concerning Britain, Pakistan, and the 
Soviet Union—which involved a modern government’s efforts to establish its authority 
over the Pashtun.  In almost every case, the state failed when it either misunderstood the 
importance of these structural factors or willfully ignored them to pursue other interests.  
The most successful case occurred when the government of Pakistan focused on 
integrating the Pashtun through providing education, transportation and health services.  
The intent was to bring the Pashtun into Pakistan’s mainstream society.  Unfortunately, 
this effort was short-lived due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Looking beyond the Pashtun case, the research in this thesis suggests that policies 
focused purely on suppression, isolation, or accommodation are destined to fail in 
establishing state authority.  The common failing of these three policies occurs when the 
state fails to understand the difference between establishing order and establishing 
authority.  Most often, a policy focused on a give and take relationship with a tribe, 
leaning slightly towards more giving than taking, appeared to work best.  Finally, the 
state must seriously consider its capacity to expand its authority—the lower the capacity, 
the longer it will take and the more accommodating (but not purely accommodating) the 
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH “UNGOVERNED SPACES” 
I believe these areas [ungoverned spaces] will play an increasingly 
important role in the war on terrorism as al Qaeda, its associated groups 
and other terrorist organizations use these areas as bases for operations. 
 Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby 
 Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed a significant number of 
violent conflicts resulting from ethnic differences and a lack of state authority over its 
territory.  As of 2006, the United States is heavily involved in two theaters of operations 
(Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan), Russia continues to battle resistance forces in Chechnya, 
there is a growing disparity between Beijing and the Muslims living in the Xinjiang 
province of China, Kashmir remains an unsettled and largely ungovernable region, the 
Balkans continue to be unstable due to ethnic differences, and the examples in Africa are 
almost too numerous to count.  In each of these cases, states are struggling to establish 
the authority of a central government over ethnically fragmented societies.   
Historically, the most troublesome areas exist where tribal societies, especially 
those with deeply entrenched tribal customs, live outside or resist the state’s rule of law.  
The presence of these “ungoverned spaces” (regions not governed by central authority) 
within a state’s borders challenges the state’s authority and its exclusive, legitimate right 
to violence.  Therefore, the conflicts between ethnic groups or tribes take on a violent, 
often uncontrollable character that negatively affects the entire state.  This becomes even 
more salient when ethnically motivated regimes (e-g., Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic) 
come into power and begin to prey upon the weaker ethnic groups.  Such actions often 
demand intervention by the international community and hasten the failure of the states in 
which they take place. 
An additional consequence has been the migration of trans-national terrorist 
networks into areas lacking central authority, such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
demonstrated the continuing lethality of such networks.  Therefore, it has become more 
important than ever to understand why these areas exist and how to supersede tribal 
custom with a state’s central rule of law.   
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A key concern then is how states can establish their authority over the different 
ethnic groups and/or tribal regions within their borders when each is governed by 
different customs.  This thesis, focusing on three different cases involving the Pashtun 
ethnic group and three separate central governments, develops the argument that the 
expansion of state authority is intimately connected to the state’s ability to establish a 
central body of law that prevails over competing customary laws.  One argument is that a 
state which is able to establish its authority (especially with respect to the exclusive use 
of violence) and successfully integrate its population under a common body of law will 
drive ethnic groups and/or tribes to turn to the state to settle intra-state conflicts.   A 
second argument is that the population’s acceptance of state authority will provide the 
state the necessary penetration to eliminate areas which would otherwise be beyond its 
control.  Therefore, the question one must ask is, “Under what conditions can state 
authority successfully supersede tribal custom?” 
A. WHY STATES SEEK TO ENFORCE A RULE OF LAW 
Joel Midgal claims the relationship between a state (especially a new state) and its 
society is typically characterized by a battle to determine “who will set the rules”.1  In 
this context “law is power” and the ability to say, with authority, what is and is not legal 
becomes a vehicle for instituting change in and control over a society.2  Therefore, a state 
typically faces strong opposition when it attempts to institute its own laws over top of 
tribal customary law as the primary rule of law.3  
The acceptance of a rule of law by its people gives the state authority.  Therefore, 
a state usually seeks to create and enforce all forms of law within its territory to clearly 
define its authority.  The presence of a competing rule of law challenges that authority.  
States are especially concerned with the case of criminal law due to its close connection 
to the use of violence; to remain viable, the state must maintain a monopoly on the 
                                                 
1 Joe Midgal, “Strong Societies, Weak States: Power and Accommodation,” in Understanding Political 
Development, eds. Samuel Huntington, Myron Weiner and Gabriel Almond. Boston: Little, Brown (1987): 
391 – 437. 
2 Lawrence Rosen.  “Law and Social Change in the New Nations.”  Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, 20, no. 1 (1978): 3-4. 
3 Olaf K. Caroe.  The Pathans.   New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc (1958); John C. Griffiths.  .  New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers (1967); Louis Dupree.  Afghanistan.  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press (1978); Rosen, 1978.  
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legitimate use of violence.4  It is also important for a state to maintain order within its 
borders to appear strong and prevent the likelihood of intervention by other states.   
To understand why it is difficult for a state to gain authority through the 
acceptance of its laws, one must look at the source of both the state’s laws and the 
existing tribal customary law.  Natural law theorists argue that it is morality which 
dictates a legitimate body of law.  In this sense, if the state and the tribe have different 
definitions of moral behavior, then each will have different views on what law or custom 
should allow.  Positivists argue that it is the institution—unconstrained by morality—that 
determines a legitimate body of law.  Again, both the state and the tribe are likely to be 
vastly different institutions with different opinions on how law or custom should shape an 
individual’s behavior.  The case presented in this thesis represents a “hard case” because 
Pashtun tribal customary law is a well-established institution that defines what is right 
and wrong and is therefore both moral and legitimate.   
Pashtunwali also represents a set of ideas that are directly linked to the tribe’s 
identity.  Therefore, it is no surprise that many scholars have noted that Pashtuns strongly 
resist any effort by a central authority to supersede or alter its tribal customs for fear that 
it would threaten their independence and their identity.5   
B. EXPLANATIONS FOR RESISTANCE 
Though there are many different ways to explain why a group or individual resists 
authority, this thesis uses three general explanations and one narrow, case specific 
explanation, which relates directly to the Pashtun ethnic group, to explain why a tribe or 
ethnic group resists the establishment of a central rule of law that supersedes customary 
law.  The generalizable arguments used in this thesis are “Glue Theory”, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s “Prospect theory”, and Weber’s discussion about legitimate domination.  The 
case specific argument is supported by Charles Lindholm’s research on the Pashtun and 
includes his explanations of segmentary societies and the differences between nomadic 
and sedentary groups.  These explanations provide the foundation to the theoretical 
framework (discussed in the next section) that will be used in this thesis. 
                                                 
4 Max Weber. “Politics as a Vocation,” excerpt from Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, Essential 
Readings in Comparative Politics, New York: W.W. Norton & Company (2004): 34; Rosen, 5.   
5 Caroe, 1958; Griffiths, 1967; Dupree, 1978; Rosen, 1978.  
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Glue theory is an anthropological theory that suggests the ways of the past greatly 
influence an individual’s current behavioral norms inclines them to resist normative 
change.  Glue theory therefore provides a logical argument that a tribe or ethnic group’s 
customs impede state authority.6   
Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect theory also supports the idea that normative 
factors can impede the establishment of state authority.  Prospect theory suggests that 
“the pain of loss exceeds the pleasure from gains.”  People are less willing to get 
involved in situations where some form of loss is possible, despite an equal opportunity 
for some form of gain.7   
Another element of Prospect theory suggests that “people adjust to gains more 
rapidly than losses.  They re-normalize their reference point (what they consider to be the 
norm at that particular moment) after gains but not after losses.”8  This applies to both 
material and normative gains or losses.  For example, a man who receives a raise in his 
paycheck and then subsequently loses the raise a week later will become angry due to a 
cut in his pay.  A man who loses half his salary due to company cutbacks will not be 
satisfied when he is later offered a 50% increase in his current pay, because it will still be 
25% less than his original pay.  From a normative perspective, a group that is used to 
governing its own affairs will be unhappy when the state no longer allows it.  Later, when 
the state changes its policy and allows the group to govern itself within certain 
boundaries established by the state, the group will still be dissatisfied because they will 
not be wholly independent to govern themselves, as they had been in the past.   
Finally, Prospect theory recognizes concessions made while bargaining are 
equivalent to losses and compensations are equivalent to gains.  Therefore, concessions 
are far more difficult to make than compensation, and will never be perceived evenly.9  
An example of this aspect is demonstrated by the unwillingness of the British to simply 
                                                 
6 Nina Swidler.  “Brahui Political Organization and the National State,” in Pakistan’s Western 
Borderlands: The Transformation of Political Order, ed. Ainslie T. Embree.  New Delhi: Vikas Publishing 
House PVT, Ltd (1977): 109. 
7 Jack S. Levy.  “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from 
Prospect Theory,” Handbook of War Studies II, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky.  Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press (2000): 194. 
8 Levy, 195. 
9 Ibid, 209. 
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give territory it had fought for and won back to the Pashtun to get them to stop raiding 
British settlements.  At the same time, the Pashtun did not want to submit to British rule 
of law in exchange for their protection.  On both sides, the gains were always too small to 
warrant accepting the losses. 
Charles Lindholm’s characterization of segmentary societies (such as Pashtun 
tribes) supports the theory that tribal organizational factors impede the establishment of 
state authority.  Lindholm defines segmentary societies as “a subtype of what are 
technically known as “acephelous” or headless societies.”10  They differ from purely 
headless (non-hierarchical) societies in that they do have some internal organization and 
stratification.  Often these positions of leadership are hereditary, as are the religious 
leaders (mullahs) in the different Pashtun tribes or clans.11  In every case, these men are 
only allowed to lead so long as they act in the interests of the tribe.  Therefore, it is nearly 
impossible for the state to engage a tribe or clan through one representative.  The state is 
nearly forced to deal with each male member of the tribe individually, which requires a 
tremendous amount of time and resources, both of which are often in short supply. 
Segmentary societies also possess normative factors that inhibit a state from 
successfully establishing centralized authority.  Because segmentary societies are so 
independent, they differ from other forms of society in that they unite only when they feel 
they are losing influence over their own way of life.  The interests of society are defined 
as preserving existing social structure and organization.  Segmentary societies do not 
respond to a stagnant economy or society.  Rather, preventing social change and 
maintaining the social status quo are actually the goals of a segmentary society.12  This 
severely hampers a state’s ability to offer social or economic progress as an incentive to 
accept state authority, and presents the state with a more cohesive enemy when 
attempting to supersede tribal custom with its own rule of law. 
                                                 
10 Charles Lindholm.  “The Segmentary Lineage System: Its Applicability to Pakistan’s Political 
Structure,” in Pakistan’s Western Borderlands: The Transformation of Political Order, ed. Ainslie T. 
Embree.  New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT, Ltd (1977): 41-66. 
11 James W. Spain.  People of the Khyber: The Pathans of Pakistan.  New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
Inc (1963): 49. 
12 Lindholm, 60.   
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Lindholm also describes two subsets of the segmentary societies: nomadic and 
sedentary tribes.  Both cases can be found within different Pashtun tribes.  Nomadic 
tribes, which typically consist of shepherds, tend to be more conservative and very 
distrustful of outsiders, which has led to a protective form of arranged marriages between 
first cousins.  This keeps tribal alliances within the trusted network of the father’s 
immediate family (his son marries his brother’s daughter).  As a result, nomadic tribes are 
rarely subjected to new ideas and become deeply entrenched in their beliefs.  These 
characteristics create both organizational and normative barriers to state authority.  
Because they are highly mobile, have fewer possessions, and tighter family relationships, 
they are better prepared to resist State authority.  The State will have a difficult time 
penetrating the tight family structure to negotiate or influence them and the state has little 
to offer them in exchange for their acceptance of state authority.   
Sedentary Pashtun tribes are often farmers (raising both crops and livestock) who 
are somewhat tied to their land and are thus more territorial.  Their livelihood cannot be 
picked up and moved in response to a threat.  People in these tribes have to be able to get 
along with their neighbors since they are unable or unwilling to move away.  The need 
for collective defense of the tribal area and the fact that farmers often work together 
promotes a much more accepting and progressive atmosphere. Lindholm also suggests a 
divide among the sedentary Pashtun based on the interaction between nomadic and 
sedentary tribes.13  In between purely nomadic tribes and purely agrarian sedentary tribes 
living on the plains are sedentary Pashtun tribes living in the hills.  The key difference 
between these two groups stems from their exposure to outside influences.  Hill tribes are 
far more isolated, and far more inaccessible to outside influence, than plains tribes.  This 
makes sedentary plains tribes less capable of resisting state policies aimed at gaining 
authority than either the nomads or the sedentary hill tribes.  Although geography aids 
both the nomadic and the sedentary hill tribes, normative factors which are responsible 
for determining each tribe’s dedication to its customary law will likely impede state 
efforts to replace that law with the state’s own laws at all levels of Pashtun society. 
Max Weber’s theory of “legitimate dominance” explains how normative factors 
can affect authority and how it applies to a state and its people.  According to Weber, 
                                                 
13 Lindholm, 43-46. 
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authority reflects the state’s ability to rightfully or legitimately (in the eyes of its people) 
uses its power over its citizens.14  Though the state may have the ability to exert its power 
(violence) over its people without their consent, its authority only continues so long as 
the people are sufficiently accepting of that power.  Therefore, states seek to establish 
authority in order to minimize the amount of force necessary to maintain order within its 
territory. 
Weber divides authority into three types.  The first is labeled “traditional 
domination.”  It defines the authority that is given to a leader (representing the State) 
simply because the people are accustomed to this role.  The leader has always had this 
authority, so there should be no reason to question it.  Because the authority was not 
given to the leader, there is very little legitimacy associated with this type.  This 
particular type of authority is only valid until the people become dissatisfied with the 
leader’s performance.  Once this occurs, a shift typically occurs to Weber’s second type 
of authority: “charismatic domination”. 
Charismatic domination means the leader has been given authority based on his 
personal qualities or actions.  Charismatic domination represents a conscious choice by 
the people to give the leader authority over them.  Because it was a conscious choice, a 
leader with authority based on this category maintains a higher form of legitimacy than 
the previous category.   
The third category is “domination by virtue of legality.”  This category reflects a 
leader who has been given authority by a society based on a common set of laws.  The 
leader is given authority because he has demonstrated or convinced the people that he is 
qualified to lead them in accordance with the laws governing society.  This category also 
reflects a highly legitimate form of authority, hence the name “legal domination.”15 
Because states have little hope of gaining charismatic domination over ethnically 
fragmented or tribal societies, they are typically forced to pursue Weber’s third 
category—legal domination.  Therefore, states are often confronted with impeding 
organizational and normative factors.  Organizational factors come into play when the 
state attempts to engage the tribe.  These factors should influence how that engagement is 
                                                 
14 Weber, 35. 
15 Ibid, 35. 
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conducted because in the past they have often determined how effective the state’s 
policies were at gaining the tribe’s or different ethnic groups’ acceptance of its authority.  
Normative factors are involved because these determine how the state policies will be 
received by tribal members.  If the state does not appear to be helpful to the tribe or 
appears as though it would change the tribe’s culture, then the tribe will not be 
encouraged to support the state’s bid for authority. 
In the next section, this thesis establishes a number of different propositions 
relating to both normative and organizational factors that hinder a state’s ability to 
establish its authority.  These propositions make up the theoretical framework used in this 
thesis to analyze the three different case studies presented in Chapters III, IV, and V. 
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Three systematic and comparative case studies are presented in this thesis, each 
focusing on the interaction between the Pashtun ethnic group and a different central 
government, Great Britain (1849-1947), Pakistan (1947-Present), and the Soviet Union 
(1979-1989).  The research presented here assumes that a state’s attempt to exercise its 
authority over tribal societies is constrained by two structural factors: tribal 
organizational factors and tribal normative factors.  These structural factors generate a 
number of propositions which should govern the success of state policy directed at 
establishing the state’s authority in tribal regions.   
Two propositions are associated with tribal organizational factors.  First, 
government policy based on the tribe’s social organization is more likely to be considered 
legitimate than those that disregard it because it allows the tribe to identify with the state 
and minimizes the possibility that the state will engage the tribe in a manner that is 
offensive to the tribe’s culture or counterproductive because it deals with the wrong 
individuals.  Second, government policy aimed at segregating or isolating tribes is likely 
to undermine the state’s authority.  Policies using segregation or isolation cultivate 
restive outsiders and/or spoilers who become accustomed to operating outside the state’s 
authority.  These policies also encourage support networks among the members of a tribe 
or ethnic group because they have shared cultural connections. 
Tribal normative factors also generate two propositions.  First, government policy 
that takes into account the tribe’s perception of social justice is more likely to be 
9 
perceived as legitimate than that which does not.  If the tribe’s perception of the state’s 
policy is unfair in terms of the tribe’s customs and culture, then the tribe will likely resist.  
Second, customary norms, not religious beliefs, are what impede state authority as it is 
these norms that more concretely define the tribe.16   
These four propositions represent the theoretical framework to be used in this 
thesis for analyzing state policies to establish authority in tribal regions.  A section in 
each case study discusses the particular state policies that either violated or adhered to 
these propositions.  These sections provide evidence that either confirms or rejects the 
validity of the framework and its effectiveness at evaluating state policy directed at tribal 
societies. 
D. WHY THE PASHTUN PRESENT A RELEVANT CASE STUDY 
Rural Pashtuns live in tribal societies and offer an excellent example of an ethnic 
group deeply committed to and defined by its custom.  Their code, Pashtunwali, 
represents a form of legal and traditional authority.  Pashtuns therefore represent a “hard 
case” for any government seeking to establish its central authority over tribal areas.  
Historically, rural Pashtuns have avoided being subjugated or integrated by a larger 
nation.  However, this success does not indicate the Pashtun are unified in the absence of 
an external threat.  Rural Pashtuns are typically in a constant state of intra-ethnic strife 
when their customs or independence is not threatened.  What keeps the Pashtun from 
devolving into an intra-ethnic conflict that would ultimately cause their extinction is the 
presence and devotion to their tribal code of Pashtunwali.  The specifics of Pashtun 
culture and Pashtunwali will be discussed in Chapter II.  The important thing to note is 
that it has been nearly impossible for a central government to control them because of 
their social structure and their respect for their customary laws.  In addition, Pashtuns are 
an empirically important case given their geopolitical location at the heart of state 
struggles in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
                                                 
16 Both Olaf Caroe and Louis Dupree have stated that the Pashtuns have molded Islam to fit into 
Pashtun custom.  This does not mean that religion has no bearing on the relationship between a state and its 
people.  Olivier Roy states, “Islam has always recognized that there is such a thing as a de facto power 
based on force, which may bring into being the whole machinery of the state with its own legal system and 
its penal sanctions.”  For more information, reference: Olivier Roy.  Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan.  
2nd Edition.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990): 49; See Chapter 2 below. 
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The Pashtun represent one of the largest ethnic groups in the world with an 
estimated 25 million members.17  With a significant number of people living in both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the ethnic group wields a great deal of influence in both 
countries.  Yet, Pashtuns are not homogeneous.  As an ethnic group, Pashtuns are divided 
into several different tribes, which represent larger groupings such as the Ghilzais or 
Durranis in Afghanistan and the Wazirs or Mahsuds in Pakistan. All members share a 
common language (Pashto), a common culture (largely based on Pashtunwali), and can 
trace their lineage back to the tribe’s original founding father.   
 
Figure 1.   List of Pashtun Tribes18 
 
                                                 
17 Tribal population estimate from the CIA World Factbook.  Accessed on 7 Dec 05 at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
18 There are slight variations among different sources listing Pashtun tribes. This list excludes many 
clans that are now considered tribes.  While this list comes from a compilation of the research in this thesis, 
the primary source was the website: http://www.khyber.org/pashtotribes.shtml.  Accessed on 23 May 2006. 
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Each tribe is made up of different clans, which are also based on paternal lineage.  A sub-
clan is a smaller division of a clan, and represents a group of families that are co-located 
in a single village.  A section represents a single family living in several different houses 
(for example, five brothers living in five different houses, each with his family).  The 
smallest division is labeled as a sub-section, indicating a single house.19   
Respect for their well-established, long standing tribal code (Pashtunwali) binds 
the numerous Pashtun tribes, especially the rural tribes, and constitutes them as a 
distinctive ethnic group.  Palwasha Kakar characterized the role of Pashtunwali in 
Pashtun culture stating, “Through publicly enacting norms that fulfill the precepts of 
Pashtunwali, such as honor, hospitality, gender boundaries, and the institution of [the] 
jirgah (council), the Pashtun maintains a specific social order and furthermore sustains a 
religious-ethnic identity.”20  Several states have attempted to intervene in Pashtun society 
and supersede Pashtunwali with a more progressive central rule of law, yet Pashtunwali 
continues as the rule of law for tribes living in rural areas.  Pashtunwali also continues to 
serve as an important identifying trait for all Pashtuns, even though individuals living in 
different areas, urban or rural, choose to observe the traditions of the code somewhat 
differently.21  
Though the entire tribe’s observance and commitment to Pashtunwali has changed 
over the years, it has changed in varying degrees.  While urban Pashtuns have steadily 
become more progressive and relinquished their observance to Pashtunwali, those living 
in rural and mountainous areas tend to be more conservative.  In a broader sense there has 
been little change among the rural Pashtun in their observance of Pashtunwali since the 
early 19th century.    It is important to note that because of the diversity found among the 
rural Pashtun, it is impossible to specifically characterize Pashtun behavior in terms of  
 
                                                 
19 This is not a definitive break down of Pashtun tribal organization.  However, for the purpose of this 
thesis, the organizational structure discussed by Akbar Ahmed will be used.  For more information 
reference: Akbar S. Ahmed.  Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas: 1972-1976.  London: 
Oxford Universtiy Press (1977): 16; and Akbar S. Ahmed.  Pukhtun Economy and Society.  London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul (1980): 84. 
20 Palwasha Kakar.  Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative Authority. Islamic Legal 
Studies Program, Harvard Law School (2004).  www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/kakar.pdf Accessed on 
28 Oct 05 
21 Ibid, 1-2 
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their observance of Pashtunwali.  Therefore, the characteristics and behaviors ascribed to 
the rural Pashtun are somewhat generalized in order to more broadly encompass their 
affect on government authority.  
Because this thesis focuses on “ungoverned spaces”, an emphasis will be placed 
on rural Pashtuns and their response to government policies designed to establish its 
authority.  As stated above, there are different societies among the rural Pashtun, the most 
of which are nomadic tribes, sedentary hill tribes or sedentary plains tribes.  The role of 
the urban Pashtun really only plays a significant role in the case study concerning the 
Soviet Union because the British case takes place prior to significant Pashtun 
urbanization and the Pakistan case takes place in the predominantly rural Tribal Areas.   
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
By applying the proposed theoretical framework to the selected case studies 
(Great Britain, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union), this thesis seeks to answer the question, 
“Under what conditions can state authority successfully supersede tribal custom?”  The 
cases have been selected to allow comparisons among three very different types of 
governments and different government policies.  Great Britain represents a strongly 
democratic state with significant capacity to assist in establishing its authority.  Pakistan 
represents a fledgling Muslim government.  Though limited in its capacity, Pakistan’s 
leaders were more closely affiliated with Pashtuns suggesting Pakistan may more easily 
overcome ethnic and religious barriers to government authority.  Finally, the Soviet 
Union was another super power (counting Great Britain as a super power during the 19th 
century), but represent the efforts of a communist government to establish its authority 
over the Pashtun.  
The timeframe selected for these case studies represent policies directed by 
modern forms of government, which are intended to better reflect the challenges facing 
current governments in establishing their authority over “ungoverned spaces.”   
Each of the three case studies will lay out the different policies, look at the 
success or failure of each policy with respect to its ability to establish State authority, and 
determine what effects the structural constraints listed above had on those policies.  The 
sources used in researching the Pashtun and the three case studies were primarily 
secondary sources.  The majority of those sources did contain the authors’ personal 
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reports on their first-hand experiences and observations in the region as well as 
quotations from, or references to, historical accounts from primary sources. 
To determine what conditions allow a central government to supersede tribal 
custom, this thesis will focus on the efforts of the state to establish a rule of law super-
ordinate to Pashtunwali.  Each state’s policies will be measured along a spectrum marked 
at one end by suppression and at the other end by accommodation. The mid point is 
marked by a policy of cooptation.  Suppression is defined as a state policy aimed at 
imposing its rule of law with no consideration for tribal custom.  Co-optation refers to a 
policy aimed at combining or incorporating different forms of tribal custom into a rule of 
law in order to gain tribal legitimacy.  Lastly, accommodation is defined as a policy that 
allows the tribe to operate under its own rule of law. 
A tribe’s reaction to the state’s policy on a rule of law will be grouped into one of 
three categories: acceptance, compromise, or rejection.  Acceptance means the tribe 
considered the state’s authority to be legitimate and was willing to relinquish its devotion 
to tribal custom.  Compromise means the tribe elected to obey certain elements of law, 
but still adhered to some elements tribal custom.  This particular element will be closely 
studied since it encompasses a wide variety of options which prove vital to answering the 
questions about the legitimacy of state policy and the conditions which allow a State to 
influence tribal custom.  Finally, rejection means the tribe refuses to obey the central 
government’s rule of law. 
Though the application of this theoretical framework will not result in a 
definitive, generalized solution for understanding how a State can replace local practices 
with its own body of law, it will offer important specifics for establishing state authority 
among Pashtun tribes, and a framework that can be adapted to explain other cases. 
The next chapter of this thesis will outline the tenets of Pashtunwali, the role of 
Pashtunwali in Pashtun society, and the characteristics which affect the Pashtun’ response 
to central rule.  The subsequent three chapters contain the individual case studies.  
Chapter VI will compile the results from the different cases and provide an analysis of 
the different policies, draw conclusions based on their effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, 
discuss whether or not the structural barriers noted in the theoretical framework apply in 
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II. WHY PASHTUNS RESIST CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
The Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war. 
Pashtun Proverb 
The purpose of this chapter is first to familiarize the reader with the Pashtun by 
providing a brief overview of Pashtun culture and the main tenets of Pashtunwali.  
Second, this chapter will discuss Pashtun resistance in terms of the explanations used to 
develop this thesis’ theoretical framework in order to establish a basic understanding of 
what drives Pashtun behavior, especially in response to the actions of a state trying to 
establish its authority.   
As discussed in Chapter I, Section C, the normative and organizational structures 
of Pashtun society impede the state’s ability to exercise authority over these regions. 
However, these factors serve to do more than impede state efforts. They are also sources 
of Pashtun resistance. This chapter develops in detail the elements of Pashtun normative 
and organizational structures that cause Pashtuns to resist centralized, non-tribal authority 
and as a consequence impede government ability to extend its authority to Pashtun lands. 
Though there are numerous Pashtuns living in urban areas of both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, the vast majority live in rural areas, which include the “ungoverned spaces” 
that present such a challenge to states today.  Therefore, the discussion on Pashtuns 
contained in this chapter refers only to rural Pashtuns.  For simplicity rural Pashtuns, 
which include both nomadic and sedentary societies, will be referred to as simply 
“Pashtuns.”  In the instances where it is important to distinguish between the different 
sects of the rural Pashtun, specific references will be made. 
A. PASHTUNWALI AS A NORMATIVE STRUCTURE 
The home of the Pashtun is found in the region of what is now southeast 
Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan. This region has been a crossroads for countless 
conquerors and is an environment of stark contrasts with snow capped peaks, fertile river 
valleys, and barren plains.  As a tribal culture, they identify themselves in terms of 
familial ties and commitments.  Social, political, and economic activities exist within this 
sphere and prevent government oriented institutions from gaining a foothold in tribal 
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areas.22  Despite the fact that the Pashtun’s homeland is an easy area to invade, no 
country has been able to truly conquer it.23  During the period of the 19th century Great 
Game, both Great Britain and Russia struggled and failed to subject the Pashtun to State 
authority.24  Even today, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas which are 
predominantly inhabited by the Pashtun are exempt from Pakistani law.   
To understand the Pashtun, it is important to first understand their tribal code 
known as Pashtunwali, which translates as “the way of the Pashtun”.  First and foremost, 
Pashtunwali is about honor (nang).  The Pashtun’s concept of honor is not derived from a 
western society’s modern definition of honor which is based on morality or justice, but 
rather from a close, unquestionable observance of Pashtunwali.  In the past, this 
difference has created a great deal of tension between Pashtuns and those states 
attempting to establish their own rule of law.  The concept of justice is wrapped up in a 
Pashtun’s maintenance of his honor.  Action which must be taken to preserve honor, but 
contradicts or breaks the laws of a state would seem perfectly acceptable to a Pashtun.  In 
fact, his honor would demand it.25  “[Pashtunwali is] an uncompromising social code so 
profoundly at odds with Western mores that its application constantly brings one up with 
a jolt.”26  A Pashtun must maintain the code to maintain his honor and to maintain his 
identity as a Pashtun.27 
Though there are many elements that comprise this tribal code, the main tenets of 
Pashtunwali include badal, nanawatai, and melmastia.  Badal, often considered the 
strongest pillar of Pashtunwali, demands that a Pashtun seek revenge or retaliation for 
any slight against his stature, most often regarding his gold, woman and land (zar, zan, 
and zamin).  A blood feud ensues where the basic premise is similar to “an eye for an 
eye”, because the response is somewhat determined by the nature of the injury or insult.  
                                                 
22 Dupree, 415. 
23 Ibid, xiii. 
24 The Great Game entailed a battle for supremacy over Central Asia between England and Russia 
from 1813-1907.  For more information, read: Peter Hopkirk. The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in 
Central Asia.  New York: Kodansha America, Inc (1994). 
25 Charles Allen.  Soldier Sahibs.  New York, Carrol & Graf Publishers, Inc (2000): 119. 
26 Ibid, 13. 
27 Griffiths, 46-47. 
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However, in many segmentary societies (Pashtuns included) some form of restitution can 
be offered as a settlement to avoid bloodshed.28  In a situation where it is difficult or 
impossible to achieve badal, then a Pashtun will seek baramta, which refers to the idea of 
holding a person or possession hostage in order to obtain an acceptable form of 
restitution.  This practice proves most effective when the person seeking restitution is 
able to capture someone or something belonging to the same family that has done him 
injury.29  A man is much more likely to make restitution if his son is being held hostage 
than if it is his second or third cousin.  Nanawatai requires the individual to risk both life 
and property in order to shelter and protect any person, friend or enemy, who asks for 
sanctuary.  Seeking nanawatai from an enemy is considered to be “the ultimate 
humiliation” requiring the individual to present himself “with his women unveiled 
carrying the Koran upon their heads to offer a few sheep to his enemy to seek his 
pardon.”  Finally, melmastia demands that any Pashtun offer any traveler or guest food, 
shelter, and protection if it is requested.30  
Two other tenets which play a major role in Pashtunwali are namus and jirgah.  
Namus demands that a man’s property and his women’s honor be defended and jirgah 
refers to a council.  Under the latter tenet, the Pashtun use a truly Greek form of 
democracy giving all those entitled to participate in the jirgah an equal voice and an 
equal opportunity to be heard.  Though it is true that more eloquent or more passionate 
individuals are more likely to influence the council, any action to be taken must consider 
the interests of the tribe or the clan first, and that of the individual second.31  
A Pashtun’s identity is strongly tied to his adherence to Pashtunwali.  “This is a 
stringent code, a tough code for tough men, who of necessity live tough lives,” according 
to Louis Dupree.  “Honor and hospitality, hostility and ambush, are paired in the 
[Pashtun] mind.  The values of [Pashtunwali] and of the Muslim religion, modified by 
local custom, permeate in varying degrees all [Pashtun] groups.”32  Dupree’s statement 
                                                 
28 Lindholm, 41-66. 
29 Caroe, 350. 
30 Spain, 47. 
31 Henry Bellew’s A General Report on the Yusufzais published in 1864, is outlined by George Allen, 
94-97. 
32 Dupree, 126-127. 
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neatly sums up the relationship between a Pashtun and Pashtunwali.  It establishes the 
importance of the code by explaining how the values it creates within Pashtun society are 
encompassed in nearly every aspect of an individual Pashtun’s life and how its 
observance gives the individual his identity.  Pashtunwali defines both action and 
reaction to most circumstances of social interaction.     
However, it is very important to capture the significance of the phrase “modified 
by local custom” with respect to Islam.  Both Dupree and Caroe acknowledge that a 
Pashtun is committed to being a Pashtun first and a Muslim second.  This indicates that 
the code of Pashtunwali and the religion of Islam have an important connection among 
Pashtuns.  One may either be influenced or altered by the other, but Pashtunwali still 
plays the dominant role between the two.  For example, the way Pashtuns carry out the 
tenet regarding the protection of a woman’s honor reflects Muslim tradition, but the 
concept of blood revenge is a clear contradiction of Islam.  The Koran, Sura 4:92-93 
states that “it is not for a believer to kill a believer unless it be by mistake.  He who hath 
killed a believer by mistake must set free a believing slave, and pay the blood-money to 
the family of the slain, unless they remit it as a charity.”33  This possibly explains the fact 
that badal is often settled by restitution rather than by punishing the offender.  Yet 
despite Islamic prohibitions on the practice of blood feuds, badal is often practiced in 
segmentary societies like that of the Pashtun.  Whether this explains that the blood feud 
derived from Muslim tradition or was derived from the need to curb the destructive 
nature of the Pashtun’s segmentary societies is inconclusive. 
If a Pashtun breaks the code of Pashtunwali, he has only one of two options.  
Either the Pashtun is forced to declare nanawatai and be humiliated and stripped of his 
honor, or the Pashtun is ostracized by the tribe and forced to flee the tribal area.  This 
puts an individual Pashtun in a dangerous position because he no longer has familial ties 
to protect him from being robbed or killed.34  Therefore, all Pashtuns, especially those 
living in the rural and mountainous areas, take the observance of Pashtunwali very 
seriously. 
                                                 
33 Caroe, 397; Dupree, 104. 
34 Niloufer Qasim Mahdi.  “Pukhtunwali: Ostracism and Honor among the Pathan Hill Tribes,” in 
Ethology and Sociobiology, 7 (1986): 153. 
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B. PASHTUN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
A Pashtun tribe acts as one entity where every member shares collectively in the 
fortunes and failures of any individual.35  There are no taxes within the tribe.  As noted in 
the previous chapter, Charles Lindholm characterizes Pashtun tribes as segmentary or 
headless societies. However, the Pashtun differ from purely headless societies in that they 
do have some internal organization and stratification.  Henry Bellew, who spent more 
than a decade living among the Yusufzai Pashtun during the mid-nineteenth century, 
wrote that, “communities were governed by Maliks or elders, who were in turn 
subordinate to the tribal chief or Khan.  But the power of both Khans and Maliks was 
restricted by a remarkably democratic system of decision making based on the institution 
of the jirgah.”36 Olaf Caroe described the Waziri Pashtuns as “being subdivided into a 
number of branches, they do not acknowledge the authority of a hereditary or single 
chief, but have numerous Maliks who hold a little authority; and these are chosen with the 
consent of the branch to which they belong.”37 
Tribal hierarchy is based on familial ties and roles rather than political affiliation.  
The fact that Pashtun society is segmented into different levels of affiliation means that 
allegiance is determined in the following order: immediate family (sub-section), external 
family (section), sub-clan (village), clan, and tribe.  This also means that anyone outside 
the immediate family can possibly be considered an enemy.38  “As a result of 
Pashtunwali…most [Pashtun] males become acquainted with weapons in their early 
childhood and develop a keen sense of marksmanship.”39  The Pashtun’s affinity for 
weapons has plagued every state’s attempt to enforce its own rule of law over top of 
Pashtunwali. 
Though there are some slight differences in the internal organization of different 
tribes, the exception to the practice of ruling by consensus occurs when a tribe is 
threatened by an external force.  In such a case, the tribes combine their strength and 
                                                 
35 Caroe, 350. 
36 Henry Bellew is quoted in Allen, 96. 
37 Caroe, 395. 
38 Griffiths, 59. 
39 Jeffery J. Roberts.  The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan.  Westport: Praeger Publishing (2003): 
xiii. 
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appoint a leader whom they follow without question.  All grievances existing within the 
tribe are effectively put on hold, and a form of military-like order is established under a 
skilled and experienced leader allowing it to focus on fighting a common enemy.  This is 
true at all levels ranging from a section to an entire tribe.40  This tradition of unity in 
times of crisis, likely born out of the desire to survive, strengthens Pashtun resistance 
against state authority.   
Both the complex Pashtun tribal structure and the independent nature of the 
different levels within a Pashtun tribe increase the tribe’s inclination and ability to resist 
state authority.  A state does not have the luxury of having a specific individual, or even a 
small group of individuals, on whom it can focus its efforts.  Instead, a state intent on 
establishing its authority may have to embark upon a very broad and deeply penetrating 
process of engaging the vast majority of individuals making up the tribe.  This 
characteristic minimizes the effectiveness of attempts by the state’s to “divide and 
conquer”, which means an excessive amount of time and resources must be committed in 
order to integrate the Pashtun into the state.41   
Lindholm’s subsets of segmentary tribes, nomadic and sedentary, can be found 
within different Pashtun tribes.  Ahmed Akbar further defines these subsets stating, 
“Pashtun society may be divided into two categories: 1) acephelous, egalitarian groups, 
living in low production zones (nomadic tribes and sedentary hill tribes), and 2) those 
with a ranked society living on irrigated lands, usually within larger state systems 
(sedentary plains tribes).  Nang is the foremost symbol of the former society, as qalang 
(taxes) is of the latter.”42  Akbar indicates here that nang is not as important among plains 
Pashtuns which supports the notion that these Pashtuns are less strict in their observance 
of Pashtunwali. 
Typically, nomadic tribes and sedentary hill tribes are far more successful at 
resisting state authority.  These groups tend to live in relatively inaccessible terrain and 
are almost completely self-sufficient.  Nomadic tribes are highly mobile and have thus 
                                                 
40 Caroe, 395. 
41 Dupree, xiii. 
42 Ahmed Akbar.  Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and conflict in Pakistan.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1983): 8. 
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been able to escape punitive expeditions carried out by the state aimed at enforcing its 
rule of law.  Though sedentary hill tribes are often tied to their land, the inaccessibility of 
their land makes it difficult for the state to sufficiently coerce or influence them.  In both 
cases state authority is plagued by its lack of presence.43  Nomadic tribes and sedentary 
hill tribes remain passionately dedicated to Pashtunwali and typically reject any idea 
which suggests that some other form of law should apply.  
Sedentary plains tribes are similar to the sedentary hill tribes in that they are often 
tied to their land.  Because they are located in more accessible regions, and are unable—
or unwilling—to move, plains Pashtun are subjected to outside influences more often and 
more easily.  The presence of new ideas has somewhat permeated the plains Pashtun 
culture, which has softened their interpretation and adherence of Pashtunwali.  This also 
explains why states have had more success in engaging the plains Pashtun in the past—
they live in areas that do not allow them to escape the effects of state policies.   
Ultimately, it is the Pashtun themselves who determine the required level of 
dedication to Pashtunwali.  The isolation of nomadic and sedentary hill tribes supports 
strict adherence to Pashtunwali.  The circumstances surrounding the existence of 
sedentary plains tribes have led to a more relaxed observance of Pashtunwali, which 
explains why nomadic tribes and hill tribes often look down upon the plains tribes as 
lesser Pashtuns because of their more lenient views towards the code.44 
The characteristics of rural Pashtuns explain why the more isolated tribes tend to 
be more resistant to state authority.  The combination of mobility, inaccessibility and 
tightly knit social organization makes it difficult for the state to penetrate them.  This is 
not to say that plains Pashtun do not resist state authority, they do.  The next section will 
discuss the possible reasons for this resistance.  
C. RESISTANCE THEORIES IN THE PASHTUN CONTEXT 
It is easy to accept the notion that most people fear change.  History (including 
recent history) reveals that the Pashtun typically resist when a state or an occupying force 
use violence to compel them to submit to a central authority.  Any symbol representing 
change, such as an external rule of law or a reward in exchange for changes in behavior, 
                                                 
43 Lindholm, 43. 
44 Caroe, xiv-xv. 
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only serves as a rallying point for Pashtun resistance.  Chapter I developed several 
explanations for why normative and organizational structures can impede state efforts to 
exercise its authority over ethnic groups.  These theories also help explain why ethnic 
groups, particularly the Pashtun, resist such efforts.  This section develops these 
explanations, focusing first on normative structure then on organizational structure. 
Pashtuns highly value and have grown accustomed to their independence; they 
have preserved their way of life for centuries, despite the efforts of some very powerful 
forces to alter it.  Though there have been times when parts of Pashtun society has 
experienced short durations of subjugation by alien forces, Pashtuns were permitted to 
conduct their lives in accordance with Pashtunwali.  Independence is the historical norm 
for Pashtuns. 
Anthropologists have used the fear of change to construct a theory that claims that 
the presence of past norms makes it difficult to create or accept changes in behavior.  
Nina Swidler refers to this notion as “glue theory.”45  Therefore, a group should resist a 
change that is being imposed on it against its will.  If independence from external rule is 
the historical norm for the Pashtun, then efforts to change that norm should generate 
resistance. 
Prospect theory offers additional reasons at the level of individual cognitive 
psychology for why humans resist change.  Human beings assess their present situation 
against a cognitive reference point based on their past attainment of particular material 
possessions or normative standards.  In terms of prospect theory, independence from 
authority would represent the reference point for a Pashtun’s existence.  Tribal 
independence, with respect to the observance of Pashtunwali, is the point of reference 
that determines what constitutes a loss or gain.46  Prospect theory expects that individuals 
who suffer losses with respect to their reference point will undertake risky behavior to 
regain what has been lost or to prevent future losses.  Put into context, the risk of losing 
tribal independence should outweigh the possibility of improving tribal social welfare or 
increasing economic opportunities that would be gained by accepting state authority, and 
thereby sacrificing some element of Pashtunwali.  Any concession in tribal independence 
                                                 
45 Swidler, 109. 
46 Caroe, 403. 
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should exceed any compensation offered in return for submission to state authority.  If 
the state forces the Pashtun to submit to its authority through overwhelming force, any 
amount of independence the state returns to the Pashtun that still leaves the purity of 
Pashtunwali in question, will not likely satisfy their desire for independence. 
Prospect theory also expects that a gain that an individual acquires with respect to 
his or her reference point immediately is internalized as a new, higher reference point.  
Therefore, any state reward, such as new roads or improved protection, aimed at helping 
the Pashtun perceive the possible benefits of ceding further control to state authority 
should instantly become a new reference point.  Per Prospect theory, the Pashtun should 
expect roads and protection but not accept diminished autonomy or accept them as a 
reward for increased support of the state.  The state should only find it a waste of 
resources to offer such an incentive without requiring some kind of exchange—
preferably towards interdependence or integration—eventually leading to an expansion of 
state authority. 
With respect to understanding the impact of organizational structure on Pashtun 
motivations to resist, Charles Lindholm’s theory of segmentary societies is particularly 
helpful.   Segmentary societies differ form other forms of society in that they do not unite 
in response to a stagnant economy or society (which is actually the goal of a segmentary 
society), but when they feel they are losing influence over their own way of life.47  This 
characteristic explains why Pashtuns are so difficult to co-opt.  They are willing to take 
money or benefits in exchange for promises to alter their behavior and to be more in line 
with the state’s rule of law, but will not hesitate to break the contract if it contradicts 
Pashtunwali.  Pashtuns refuse to change their way of life, because it means they would no 
longer be honorable and would no longer have an identity.48  Though these elements of 
segmentary societies appear to be strengths, there are also negative elements at work. 
A segmentary society becomes destructive when it lacks a common enemy.  
Because segmentary societies often have an evenly distributed amount of wealth among 
the different sub-levels, power and influence are evenly spread within the society.  This 
often means that any conflict between two groups typically ends in a stalemate with no 
                                                 
47 Lindholm, 60. 
48 Griffiths, 1967: 59; Spain, 1963: 46-47. 
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logical conclusion because they are so evenly matched.  The lack of an empowered leader 
within the society, who can legitimately decide a conflict’s outcome, means the tribe 
faces the possibility of being weakened by internal strife and bloodletting.  This is one 
explanation why tribes permit restitution rather than revenge to settle a conflict in order 
to avoid weakening the tribe through constant infighting.49     
The normative and organizational structural factors present in Pashtun society 
have presented states with similar strategic and tactical problems for over a century.   
Now that a basic foundation of Pashtun social behavior and organization has been 
established, the goal of the next three chapters is to document the affect they have had on 
state authority and identify the causal factors of Pashtun resistance.  Each case study will 
provide sufficient background information on the circumstances surrounding the 
relationship between the Pashtun and the state, and then list the significant policies used 
by the state to establish its authority.  Finally, each case study will analyze the policies in 
the context of the theoretical framework listed in Chapter I in order to determine the 
relevance of the framework’s propositions and possibly determine conditions which 
allow state authority to supersede tribal custom. 
 
                                                 
49 Lindholm, 41-66. 
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III. BRITISH CASE STUDY 
First comes one Englishman, as a traveler or for shikar; then come two 
and make a map; then comes an army and takes the country.  Therefore 
it is better to kill the first Englishman. 
       Pashtun Proverb 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case study lays out the policies of a modern, western, democratic 
government which aimed to establish its authority among the Pashtun.  The first section 
provides an overview of why the British became involved with the Pashtun and quickly 
details the circumstances under which the British and the Pashtun were operating.  The 
next section describes the various policies used by the British to establish their authority 
over the Pashtun and their results.  These policies, listed in chronological order, 
demonstrate the experimental evolution of British policy motivated by the desire to 
protect their interests in the region and the challenges in dealing with the Pashtun.  The 
third section evaluates the effects of normative and organizational structural factors on 
British policies using the framework described in Chapter I.  Though history reveals that 
the British were ultimately forced out of what today is called the Northwest Frontier 
Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, when the British left the Indian sub-continent in 1947, 
they struggled for over 100 years to establish their authority on the Northwest Frontier 
(NWF). 
B. BACKGROUND 
By the 19th century, the British economy had become dependent on its markets in 
India.  Because the money Great Britain generated from its trade with India surpassed all 
other sources of revenue, British interests in India shaped England’s strategic planning 
for nearly 200 years.50  Great Britain desired control the Indian sub-continent so that the 
resources and markets found there could be maximized.     
As early as 1717, Russia began looking for ways to expand its interests and 
influence in Central and South Asia in hopes of tapping into the markets of India.51  The 
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British, fearful of losing their hold on the Indian sub-continent, began to push outwards in 
order to secure their interests in India.  Because India is well protected from invasion by 
natural barriers—the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean—the primary invasion route comes 
from the northwest, through modern day Afghanistan.  It was this desire to create a 
“buffer” from the advancing Russians that forced Great Britain to engage the fierce, often 
un-yielding people they called “the Pathans”.52 
Politically, British efforts on the NWF were designed to counter Russian 
diplomatic advances in western Afghanistan.  When it appeared the Russians began to 
gain a foothold in the court of the Afghan Emir, Dost Muhammad, in the 1830s, the 
British removed him from the power and replaced him with the former Afghan ruler and 
British sympathizer, Shah Shuja.  Once the change was complete, the British signed a tri-
partite treaty with the Sikhs (the current ruling tribe in India) and the Afghans in hopes of 
keeping the Russians out of Kabul.  Unfortunately, Shah Shuja had no popular support 
and the Afghans’ disdain was only increased by the British who put him in power.53  
When the Afghan people revolted against Shah Shuja, the British were unable to protect 
his position having failed to install sufficient forces in Kabul.  As a result, British soldiers 
(including their wives and children) living in Kabul—16,000 in all—were forced to 
retreat.  Of those 16,000, only one man succeeded in escaping to the British compound in 
Jalalabad.54  The slaughter of so many British triggered the first Anglo-Afghan war and 
demonstrated the ruthless and tenacious behavior of the Pashtun.  The British, having 
been forced to pull back from the NWF, were determined to return and bring order to the 
NWF and protect their interests in India.  
C. BRITISH TRIBAL POLICIES 
British concern over the defense of India created a period of administrative 
experimentation on the NWF.  Although the British were initially welcomed by the 
Pashtun as liberators freeing them from the cruel oppression of the Sikhs, stabilizing 
British authority on the NWF proved to be very difficult.  The people living on the NWF 
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had never been subjected to any true form of central authority, they had always been left 
to govern as they saw fit.  The British encountered a society that was quite different from 
the tribes they had encountered in the Punjab.  The structural organization and normative 
behavior of the Pashtun—especially the fierce, trans-border hill tribes—were far more 
resistant to British authority than the ethnic groups living in the Punjab.  Therefore, the 
British were forced to create new administrative policies in order to persuade the Pashtun 
to recognize British authority.  
Fortunately for the British, the men initially charged to bring order to this 
“lawless” region were British officers who proved to be exceptionally qualified for the 
job.  These early leaders, known to the British as “the Paladins”, were both fierce 
warriors and shrewd diplomats.  The Paladins commanded the respect of the Pashtun, 
especially those from the hill tribes, due to their skill in combat and their understanding 
of Pashto (the language of the Pashtun) and Pashtunwali.  Having spent ample time 
among the Pashtun prior to the establishment of settled areas, these British officers built 
reputations as fierce warriors during the First Sikh War (the war that freed the Pashtun 
from Sikh domination) while becoming accustomed to Pashtun culture.  Armed with 
these two invaluable tools, the Paladins accomplished what no others had—to penetrate 
Pashtun society and gaining its respect. The following sub-sections list the major policies 
used by the British in their effort to bring the Pashtun of the NWF under their authority 
and the outcomes associated with those policies.   
1. Indian Penal Code 
The rule of law in British India, known as the Indian Penal Code, was created 
under a European concept of justice.  The Code, consisting primarily of laws determined 
by Western values, aimed to enforce a British rule of law on the inhabitants of the Indian 
sub-continent and suppress any other form of law or custom that did not comply.  The 
people living in the areas that had been under British influence for over 200 years 
recognized the Code as legitimate.  However, in the more remote areas of British India, 
the Indian Penal Code was vastly different than the existing rule of law.  This was 
especially the case on the NWF, a tribal area inhabited mostly by Pashtuns where 
Pashtunwali represented the legitimate law of the land.   
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In 1848, the British moved back into Peshawar intent on regaining control of the 
NWF.  The “Punjab Commission”, made up of both civilians and military officers, was 
created to administrate the region.  The Punjab Commission operated in the same manner 
as any other provincial administration in India and assumed responsibility for all legal 
matters, law enforcement, tax collection, and public service projects.   
British authorities in India offered no exception to the Punjab Commission, 
assuming that the current policies were sufficient to extend British authority to all regions 
and ethnic groups.  They were to govern the NWF under the same guidelines as the other 
provinces on the sub-continent, regardless of organization or customs associated with any 
specific ethnic group.  “A Chief Court was set up in Lahore and, equally with all the 
others, the Pathans of the Frontier were expected to bring a society which sought redress 
through blood-feud within the smug formalisms of the British Indian law.”55  The only 
concession, if it can be counted, was that the leadership in India consented to assign 
many of its best officers into the region. 
a. Policy Results 
Though the British encountered only minor resistance over the paying of 
taxes, the Pashtun sternly resisted the enforcement of the Indian Penal Code.  Because the 
Pashtun did not perceive the Code as a fair representation of the law, they would either 
ignore it or evade it.  “The law frequently outraged strongly held convictions”, especially 
when the penalties for breaking a law was not justified by Pashtunwali.56  What the 
British failed to understand initially was that Pashtunwali typically demands 
compensation for the victim rather than the punishment of the offender.57  The British, 
realizing the Indian Penal Code would not work in the Pashtun tribal area, began to 
experiment with different policies aimed at achieving some form of compromise. 
2. The Close Border Policy 
In 1849, Sir John Lawrence advised the British government in India that the 
occupation of Afghanistan would be far too costly an endeavor.  Lawrence believed that 
Afghanistan was a quagmire and that letting the Russians get bogged down there would 
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only protect British interests in India.58  As a result, the British initiated the “Close 
Border” policy.   Initially designed as a containment strategy, the Close Border policy 
sought to avoid the potentially costly operation of extending British presence into 
Afghanistan by establishing borders where they had never existed, segregating the plain 
tribes from the hill tribes, and creating settlements in areas of strategic or economic 
value.  Administratively, the policy focused on bringing the inhabitants of the settled 
areas of the NWF under the existing Indian Penal Code.   
The first order of business was to create “settled areas” on the plains of the NWF, 
where its fertile valleys would bring revenue in the form of taxes and the geography 
would make it easier to enforce British authority.  The Pashtun living on the plains 
initially welcomed the British, seeing them as liberators from the oppressive and cruel 
Sikhs.  As the British began to establish cantonments (military compounds) and establish 
lines of communication, the plains Pashtuns were relatively accepting of British 
penetration into their lands.  Because the plains Pashtuns gained greater independence 
relative to their existence under the Sikhs, saw opportunities to increase trade, and were 
subjected to less suppressive administrative policies after Sikh domination had been 
eliminated by the British, British presence on the NWF initially seemed advantageous.   
Within these settled areas, the British required the Pashtun to pay taxes in 
exchange for the construction of the roads, forts, and towns which would offer these 
Pashtuns better economic opportunities.  Of course, the improvements in infrastructure 
were intended to expand British control of the NWF.  Though the British were welcomed 
at first, when the British began to exert their authority in the region in ways that 
contradicted Pashtunwali, Pashtun resistance began to increase.  Some tribes began to 
refuse to pay taxes and Pashtuns charged by the British with crimes would never be 
turned over to the authorities.59   
The Close Border Policy focused solely on the plains and sought to segregate the 
settled areas from the pastoral Pashtun communities found in the surrounding hills.60  
“No attempt was made to advance into the highlands, or even to secure the main passages 
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through the mountains such as the Khyber Pass.”61  These Pashtuns were deemed too 
difficult to bring under British authority.   
In cases where tribes refused to fully submit to British administration, individuals 
were either fined or charged with a crime in accordance with the Indian Penal Code.  If 
the individual refused to pay the fines or surrender to British authorities, the British 
would confiscate money or goods from the offender or his family.  If this course of action 
failed, the British would bypass the Indian Penal Code and adopt customary Pashtun 
practices such as rivaj or baramta.  Rivaj was typically the first option and involved 
holding the entire tribe responsible for any individual offenses.  If this failed, then 
baramta, the act of taking a male member of the tribe hostage, was used to gain 
compliance with the Code.  If these actions proved unsuccessful, the British would either 
launch a punitive expedition against the tribe or blockade the tribe’s location until the 
tribe made restitution.62   
Another aspect of the Close Border Policy, often used on the more resistant hill 
tribes, called for British officers to contract services from different tribes in an attempt to 
co-opt them.  One example, led by Major Thomas Macaulay, involved contracting a 
Mahsud and Wazir militia to police the Gumal Pass.  In exchange for their cooperation, 
the tribes would receive a stipend for their services based on the amount of traffic 
through the Pass and the release of a number of Mahsud and Wazir hostages being held to 
guarantee restitution for tribal offenses under the tradition of baramta. 
The resistance to British authority on the NWF stemmed mostly from the tribes 
living in the hills surrounding the settled areas.  The hill tribes were skilled warriors who 
were unaccustomed to the idea of central authority.63  They were often in conflict with 
neighboring tribes, which began to involve the British when their exploits pushed the 
establishment of order in the settled areas.  Occurrences which would have been 
understandable under Pashtunwali, such as theft or murder, were seen by the British as 
lawlessness.64 
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The British also encountered problems when members of the hill tribes began to 
farm areas that were deemed “settled” but refused to acknowledge British authority or 
pay taxes on the land.  The hill tribes were especially troublesome because they were so 
inaccessible that it was nearly impossible to bring them to justice. 
a. Policy Results 
Pashtuns continued to resist the use of the Indian Penal Code as the rule of 
law, but the use of Pashtun customs such as rivaj and baramta made British efforts to 
enforce the law appear more in line with customary law. This policy delegated the task of 
settling a dispute from British administrators to the tribe itself and used tribal custom to 
inflict punitive measures on the Pashtun.  Though these tactics often proved successful, 
they did not promote legitimate British authority among the Pashtun tribes.65  Though it 
would appear that the Pashtun demonstrated some level of acceptance of the policy due to 
its success, the threat of a punitive expedition or a British blockade on the tribe was the 
primary motivator for the tribe to settle the dispute through its customs.  The British had 
to constantly offer rewards or punishments in order to maintain order which indicates 
they did not possess authority.   
However, certain aspects of the Close Border Policy did have some 
success.  The contract extended to the Mahsud and Wazir tribes for policing the Gumal 
Pass (mentioned above) gave Major Macaulay the authority to deal with those tribes.  He 
instituted a blockade of the entire Mahsud tribe when some its members kidnapped a 
single Hindu child from a nearby settlement under British control.  The blockade lasted 
for six months until the leading Malik of the Mahsud tribe personally found the child and 
returned it, saying, “For God’s sake take this curse away from us.” The absence of attacks 
on the blockade suggests that the Mahsud tribe fully acknowledged the British right to 
exert such authority under the circumstances.66   
The years under the Close Border Policy witnessed a steady escalation of 
tribal violence on the NWF.  In the first twenty years, the British had to launch 11 
punitive expeditions on the NWF to enforce their authority.  In the following five years, 
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12 punitive expeditions were required.67  Because the Close Border Policy did not bring 
order to the NWF, it did not adequately protect British interests from Russian invasion 
and forced the British to consider other options. Though the British recognized the need 
for various adaptations along the way, they accepted the lack of centralized authority and 
continued to apply the Close Border Policy for over 30 years. 
3. Frontier Crimes Regulation 
A significant change to the Close Border Policy occurred in 1872 when the 
British decided to modify the application of the Indian Penal Code by introducing a new 
policy called the Frontier Crimes Regulation.  This policy sought to address the nearly 
impossible task of holding Pashtuns accountable for their actions under the Indian Penal 
Code.  Frontier Crimes Regulation shifted British policy from a more suppression 
oriented form of co-optation to a more accommodating form of co-optation.  Criminal or 
civil cases occurring in the settled areas were subjected to a hybrid system of British law 
and tribal custom.  British administrators would appoint a jury of several tribal elders for 
adjudication.  “[The jury] was not bound by law of evidence, and was expected to arrive 
at its decision through its own methods.”  The jury improved the legitimacy of British 
authority by incorporating Pashtunwali into its decisions and the requirement that all 
parties involved approve the members selected to sit on the jury.  Because of this policy, 
many more individuals were brought to justice and order in the settled areas improved.68       
a. Policy Results 
After over 20 years of administration, the British realized that their 
understanding and interpretation of justice differed greatly from that of the Pashtun.  In 
order to improve tribal support of British authority, the Frontier Crimes Regulation was 
enacted.  By integrating British law and Pashtun custom, the Pashtun demonstrated some 
degree of acceptance of the Regulation, indicated by the fact that it dramatically 
increased the number of individuals being brought to justice.69  Despite the fact that it 
was not a true jirgah, the policy gained legitimacy from the fact that the elders selected to 
adjudicate the case had to be approved by both sides of the dispute.  Though it appears 
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that this policy was a success on the surface, Olaf Caroe labeled it a failure stating, “The 
Regulation satisfied neither the law nor the custom.  It became merely an easy means of 
punishing crime as from the state, with being a recognition of the [Pashtun] idea.  It failed 
to administer custom on the basis of tradition, and it fell between the two stools.”70   
4. The Forward Policy 
When Russian diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan appeared to be gaining strength 
in 1879, the British felt the need to expand their influence beyond the existing settled 
areas in order to create a stronger buffer against Russian invasion.  The British 
government in London was unwilling to enter into any defensive alliances with the 
Afghan government and did not want to escalate the situation by responding to Russian 
aggression in Persia and northeast Afghanistan.  The only message the British 
government wished to send the Afghan leadership was that it respected Afghan 
independence and that it had no intention of interfering in matters within Afghan borders.  
British administrators in India needed a new policy that would inspire Afghan confidence 
in Britain by demonstrating that the British intended to permanently occupy the territory 
on the NWF.71   
To strengthen the buffer between India and Afghanistan, the British began to 
expand their influence along the Afghan border, focusing primarily in Baluchistan, under 
the new Forward Policy.  Designed by Sir Henry Rawlinson ten years earlier, it had three 
main objectives: 1) to occupy Quetta, 2) to gain control of the Afghan area east of the 
Hindu Kush mountain range (see Figure 1 below), and 3) to establish permanent relations 
with the government in Kabul.72  To accomplish this, the Forward Policy sought to 
increase the infrastructure of the NWF, facilitate the mobilization of British troops, and 
speed reaction to areas where British control was weak.     
Based on the previous success of the Forward Policy in Baluchistan, under the 
direction of Major Robert Sandeman, the British elected to extend the use of this policy 
into the NWF.   The Policy specifically aimed to co-opt the tribes within designated 
                                                 
70 Caroe, 354. 
71 Sarvepalli Gopal. British Policy in India: 1858-1905.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1965): 215. 
72 Dupree, 404. 
34 
settlement areas.  Tribes accepted responsibility for border security as assigned by British 
authorities and agreed to deny sanctuary to tribal members deemed as outlaws by British 
law.  As in Baluchistan, the British promised an annual allowance based on the tribe’s 
adherence to these agreements.  In later years, this allowance (money) was replaced by 
appointments for tribal members in the British-India Army, the local militia, or tribal 
police.73  
 
Figure 2.   Northwest Frontier of British India 
(http://www.khyber.org/images/places/swatstate/5b.jp.  Accessed on 30 May 06) 
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In 1893, London demanded that punitive expeditions in Afghanistan be cancelled 
and emphasized that the Forward Policy only applied to the region east of the border 
agreed upon by Sir Mortimer Durand and the Afghan Emir, Abdur Rahman (see Figure 
3).74  British troops were not to be used in Afghanistan unless the Emir agreed that 
British forces were necessary to instill or restore order.  Annexation was to be abandoned 
in order to guarantee that the treaties signed by the Afghan and Russian governments 
promising to respect the borders and sovereign territories of each respective country 
would remain in effect.75  
 
Figure 3.   Durand Line 
(http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/afghan_pak_border_map.htm.  Accessed on 30 
May 06) 
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a. Policy Results 
When the British opted for the Forward Policy, they did not adequately 
consider the reasons for its success in Baluchistan.  First, the tame nature of the terrain 
allowed British forces to establish dependable networks for transporting both goods and 
soldiers.  Second, Major Sandeman had an advantage working in Baluchistan because the 
introduction of the Forward Policy was the first administrative contact between the 
British and the tribes of Baluchistan.  The British had already learned that the local 
administrative policies utilized in the Close Border policy were ineffective.  “Sandeman 
had a clean slate on which to write; [on the NWF] there were many scribblings on the 
board recording [British] dealings with the Yusufzais, Mohmands, or Wazirs, and they 
could not be wiped out overnight.”76  And third, the tribes in Baluchistan were neither as 
fierce nor as war-like as the hill tribes on the NWF and they had an existing, recognized 
hierarchy in the tribe, which meant that the Baluchistan tribes were less effective in their 
resistance and would follow the tribal leader if he was co-opted by the British.  
Therefore, the successes of the Forward Policy in Baluchistan could not be repeated on 
the NWF.77  The British learned that the Forward Policy was only effective when British 
forces could penetrate the tribal areas in order put down any group that challenged its 
authority. 
Though the British did have some measure of success in establishing order 
among the plains tribes, they still were unable to establish their authority in the region.  
Because the plains tribes were clearly outmatched by British forces and did not have the 
luxury of being able to relocate, they were forced to accept British authority and resist in 
a more subversive manner.78 
As the Forward Policy pulled the British deeper into the NWF, resistance 
increased among Pashtun tribes.  The establishment of the Durand line, settled areas, and 
permanent lines of communication were all signals perceived as “a deliberate menace to a 
long cherished independence.”79  After over 60 years of engaging the Pashtun on the 
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NWF, and almost 30 years under the Forward Policy, recorded raids increased from 56 in 
1907, to 99 in 1908, to 159 in 1909.80 Open resistance was steadily increasing and 
requiring more active pacification.  What little legitimacy British authority maintained 
over the Pashtun living on the NWF slowly waned as the years of living under British 
authority passed. 
5. Indirect Rule and the Maliki System 
The policy of Indirect Rule was enacted at the same time as the Forward Policy.  
Indirect Rule allowed tribes to manage their own affairs and directed British 
administrators to settle any official grievances through tribal custom.81  The British also 
created the Maliki System, modeled after the Sikh tradition of working through selected 
Pashtun agents within the settled areas to communicate with trans-border tribes.  Under 
this policy, agreements acknowledging British authority were signed by tribal elders or 
Maliks.  Declarations of good will and friendship were signed by both parties.  It 
involved British agents administering their respective tribal regions through the Maliks 
and was intended to improve the legitimacy of British authority by delegating 
administrative duties to tribal Maliks. The British would pay out allowances for good 
behavior or demand reparations for deviant behavior directly to or from the Maliks.  This 
allowed Maliks to distribute rewards or to collect fines according to the Pashtun custom 
of nikat.82 
The success of this policy in Baluchistan under Major Robert Sandeman inspired 
the Punjab Commission to switch to Indirect Rule and the Maliki System in cooperation 
with the Forward Policy—the fusion of the two would later be known as the Sandeman 
System.   
b. Policy Results 
The British underestimated Pashtun commitment to independence.  Hill 
tribes viewed Indirect Rule as the first step in ceding permanent authority to the British.  
Even in situations where a tribe was theoretically better off under the British system with 
respect to economic opportunity or quality of life (from a Westerner’s perspective), the 
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hill tribes still resisted.  As described by Olaf Caroe, “the effort was inspired by a deep-
seated instinct which drove the tribe at all costs to resist subjection and to preserve their 
own peculiar way of life.”83  Fueled by the strong distrust of outsiders and their fierce 
commitment to independence, the hill tribes viewed any acceptance of a change pushed 
on them from an external source was “the beginning of the end of their licensed freedom 
and were determined such things should not be.”84  Therefore, the Pashtun would simply 
take the allowances promised under the Forward Policy, accept British authority in 
situations where it did not challenge Pashtun independence and resist when they felt their 
customs were at risk. 
Though the Maliki System enabled the British to maintain a somewhat 
acceptable level of order on the NWF, it ultimately failed to establish legitimate British 
authority.  In 1900, Major D.L.R. Lorimer, an officer in the Khyber Rifles, advised the 
Punjab government that “the Maliki system imported from Baluchistan would not work 
among the democratic Wazir tribes.”85  Though Mr. W.R.H. Merk, Chief Secretary of the 
Punjab government, was initially in favor of the policy, he later recanted when he 
observed that the policy was “unsuited to Waziristan…that the main feature of the of the 
Sandeman system—penetration and occupation—had never been introduced, and that the 
whole attempt to secure control through the Maliks had really broken down, when in 
1894 nothing was done to those who killed the Maliks by whom the murderers of Mr. 
Kelly were handed up to justice.”86   
Indirect rule required British support and protection of the Maliks 
responsible for enforcing order on the NWF, but the British failed to do so.  In 
Baluchistan, the infrastructure and geography made it easier to protect the Maliks, 
whereas in Waziristan, the lack of infrastructure and British influence made it nearly 
impossible to protect them.87   
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The Maliki system also failed because it allowed the Maliks responsible 
for coordinating between the British and the hill tribes living in the trans-border area to 
subvert British efforts to expand their influence and coordinate resistance efforts against 
British authority.88  British officers in charge of administering the different regions did 
not have enough manpower to accomplish their bureaucratic duties and spend enough 
time with the people inhabiting their particular settled area.  Therefore, the Maliks, 
appointed by the British, were often unsupervised in their dealings with the trans-border 
tribes and were allowed to cause trouble for the British to further their own interests.89   
Because of their connection to the British, the Maliks had a tremendous 
amount of influence among the tribes.  Maliks often served as a conduit of resistance, 
organizing disturbances in one area in order to help tribes being pressured by the British 
in another.  Though the British later realized this was happening, they continued to use 
the Maliki system to make contact with remote trans-border tribes.90  The British 
dependence on the Maliki System prevented the British from directly engaging the tribes 
in the ways initially used by the Paladins that allowed them to establish the beginnings of 
authority over the Pashtun. 
Though the British ultimately failed to establish their authority on the 
Indian sub-continent, demonstrated by the release of the colony in 1947, the British 
policies listed above did show some varying signs of success.  Most often, the British 
were able to establish an adequate sense of order, defined as a manageable amount of 
violence, when the following three elements were present: 1) outstanding and committed 
leadership, 2) passable terrain, and 3) the incorporation of Pashtunwali into the rule of 
law.  As the British struggled to find a policy that would transform order into authority, 
they moved incrementally away from suppression and more towards accommodation, 
allowing the Pashtun tribes to govern themselves under the supervision of a British 
administrator. 
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D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO BRITISH POLICIES 
The objective of this section is to apply the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter I to the collection of British policies in the Tribal Areas in order to clarify the 
sources of Pashtun resistance and to judge the validity of the framework.  Success, in 
terms of policy, is defined as state action which promotes state authority over the tribes.  
The end result should enable the state to establish a common rule of law for all its 
citizens and to gain/maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its 
borders. 
1. Organizational Factors 
a. Government Tribal Policy should be based on the Tribe’s Social 
Organization 
The British policy of using the Maliki System violated this proposition.  
When the British sought out tribal Maliks (or appointed them) and had them sign 
documents which indicated the tribe would submit to British authority, the British clearly 
demonstrated they did not understand the social organization at work in Pashtun tribes.  
The practice only frustrated the British due to the Pashtun’ lack of respect for the 
contract.   Even though tribal Maliks were more than willing to enter agreements and 
accept incentives from British agents, none of the Pashtun felt obligated to respect British 
authority.  “Being subdivided into a number of branches, they do not acknowledge the 
authority of a hereditary or single chief, but have numerous Maliks who hold a little 
authority; and these are chosen with the consent of the branch to which they belong.”91  
When the British tried to empower these Maliks, the effort only succeeded so long as 
each Malik acted in the interest of the tribe.   
The British overestimated the ability of the Maliks to speak for the tribe as 
a whole.  Because a Pashtun’s honor comes from his observance of Pashtunwali, there 
was no shame or dishonor for breaking such a contract under convenient circumstances.92  
No Pashtun accepted the notion that a Malik had the authority to enter into a contract on 
behalf of anyone other than himself.  The concept of central authority was viewed as 
restrictive to tribal independence and was thus to be avoided.  
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When the British tried to directly apportion out gifts to individuals based 
on behavior or performance rather than hereditary status, the policy failed because it 
violated the tribe’s social organization based on the custom of nikat.  Nikat required that 
the gifts be given to the tribe rather to an individual.  This made it nearly impossible for 
the British to engage Pashtuns on an individual level using Western style bargaining 
techniques.  The gifts being offered were either rejected or caused the receiving member 
more grief than the gift was worth.  Appointments to positions of responsibility or honor, 
such as the British army, tribal militia, or the tribal police were often rejected by the 
individuals selected by the British due to rank or status within the tribe. Nikat prevented 
the British from cultivating certain behaviors based on incentives.  “So fixed is this tribal 
notion of direct shares according to their hereditary system that it has usually been found 
impractical to go around it, for instance matters of promotion, reward for good service or 
penalties for misconduct.  Any attempt to issue rewards or penalties without respect to 
nikat would be met with sullen resentment, ending perhaps in the desertion of the 
aggrieved, or even bloodshed.”93  The complex nature of this custom isolated the Pashtun 
from British efforts to instill trust and confidence and served only to highlight the 
differences between the two cultures. In the end, the use of monetary incentives or 
appointments to positions of respect or influence provided no encouragement for the 
Pashtun to accept British authority. 
b. Government Tribal Policy aimed at Segregating or Isolating 
Tribes undermines State Authority 
The Close Border policy was a deliberate attempt to segregate tribes living 
in the areas that were deemed strategically or geographically unimportant.  
Unfortunately, this policy continued, even during the Forward Policy to an extent.  By 
segregating the nomadic and sedentary hill tribes living on the NWF from the 
administration of the tribes living within designated settlement areas, the British created 
pockets of resistance within the territory they were attempting to govern.  Though the 
British tried to co-opt the hill tribes by giving contracts for certain duties, they expected 
nothing in regards to order outside the settled areas.  The lack of penetration and the 
strong sense of custom and tradition among the hill tribes made it easier for them to resist 
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British authority.  The hill tribes were mostly undeterred from raiding the villages on the 
plains, despite the fact that the British had claimed responsibility for their protection.  
Each raid that escaped punishment only demonstrated the lack of British authority.    
The Pashtun living on the plains were inspired by the resistance of the hill 
tribes, which further challenged British authority in the settled areas.94   
2. Normative Factors 
a. Government Tribal Policy should consider the Tribe’s Perception 
of Justice in the Establishment of State Authority 
The British use of the Indian Penal Code was a failure with respect to this 
proposition.  The British were unable to force their value system on the Pashtun. An 
excellent example was the common pursuit of badal in accordance with Pashtunwali.  
Throughout their occupation of the NWF, the British struggled against this Pashtun 
custom which acknowledged that it was perfectly legal to murder an individual in the 
pursuit of revenge.95  The British definition of authority did not allow for random 
murders to occur throughout the NWF.  If the British did not have a monopoly on 
violence, then by Western standards, their authority would have been in question.  The 
British also struggled with the idea that “blood money” being given to the victim’s family 
would be preferable to punishment.  These notions did not resemble justice in a Western 
sense.  Yet, any other form of justice only undermined British efforts to gain authority. 
It took the British 20 years to realize that their definition of justice did not 
fit in Pashtun society.  One Pashtun Malik told the British administrator that the aim of 
any social or political system should be to produce “a fine type of man, therefore, let us 
keep our independence and have none of your law and order and your other institutions 
but stick to our customs and be men like our fathers before us.”96  Only a life lived in 
accordance with Pashtunwali could produce a fine Pashtun.  
Eventually, the British began to shape their policies to appeal to the 
Pashtun sense of justice.  The introduction of a more co-optative policy like the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation, and a more accommodating policy like Indirect Rule demonstrated 
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the British had changed their priorities from establishing a legitimate rule of law by 
Western standards to a legitimate rule of law by Pashtun standards.   
Though the legitimacy of British authority improved under the Forward 
Policy and Indirect Rule, the British had other obstacles to overcome.  Tribes were still 
reluctant to hand over a Pashtun to face punishment, not because it would be unjust, but 
because it would violate the principles of melmastia and nanawatai.  The British had to 
be careful to ensure the punishment fit the crime under tribal law.  In the instances when 
this did not occur, the elders or Maliks responsible for delivering the sentence would face 
serious consequences from their own tribe (as described earlier).   
These additional barriers to British authority suggest why British attempts 
to co-opt the Pashtun justice system under Pashtunwali ultimately failed.97  The 
complexity of Pashtun custom made it difficult for the British to know for certain 
whether the barriers were due to Pashtun resistance to British authority or dedication to 
Pashtunwali. 
In the few instances when the British did manage to establish temporary 
authority, it was due to the actions of British agents who had previously earned the 
respect of influential, tribal elders.  Each occasion involved an exceptional leader with a 
reputation for prowess in combat and strong cultural awareness.98  Most importantly, by 
subscribing to the Pashtun’ definition of justice, the British were able to achieve some 
level of authority by the Pashtun.  Guided by their sense of honor and justice, the Pashtun 
were compelled to submit when faced with a situation where British policy was 
conducted in accordance with Pashtunwali.99 
Over time, the British did subscribe to more accommodating policies with 
regards to this proposition, but ultimately failed to establish their authority.  The failure 
can be attributed to Prospect theory, which explains that any concession by one side is 
considered a loss.  The British had to face the fact that resources were limited and that 
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they needed to hold onto what they had because they did not have what was needed to 
expand their control by force or to sufficiently engage the Pashtun on a level that would 
cultivate the acceptance of British authority at the grass roots level.100  Sedentary plains 
tribes living in the settled areas received compensation from British authority in the form 
of increased security from raiding tribes, which suggests one reason why they resisted 
less than those tribes living outside the settled areas.  Tribes living outside the settled 
areas viewed British authority purely as a concession because their freedoms had been 
reduced without compensation.   
In the 98 year process (1849-1947), the British never fully relinquished 
authority back to the Pashtun.  Instead, they steadily modified their administration of the 
region just enough to maintain some semblance of order.  Both the sedentary and 
nomadic tribes cherished their independence because it allowed them to follow their 
customs.  The compromises required by the British contradicted those customs and failed 
to offer a way of life that was recognizably better than what they had experienced in the 
past.  Because the sedentary tribes had been used to the cruel treatment and subjugation 
of the Sikhs, the concessions required by the British were initially accepted.  British 
concessions were less oppressive than those of the Sikhs.  However, sedentary Pashtuns 
later resisted British authority because it failed to provide a way of life that seemed better 
than life under Pashtunwali. 
Prospect theory also explains why the Pashtun were unsatisfied with each 
concession the British made with respect to Pashtunwali.  Per Instant Endowment Effect 
(the near instantaneous normalization of any compensation), compensation offered by the 
British was immediately accepted as the new norm, while the loss of Pashtun 
independence (the Pashtun concession) drove them to resist British authority.101   This is 
why situations such as this rarely find a happy medium.  Compensation offered by the 
British would have had to provide sufficient and sustained improvements in Pashtun 
society in order to counter the Instant Endowment Effect and begin the process of 
recognizing British authority.  The advantages enjoyed by the Pashtun under British 
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authority were not sufficient to overcome their feeling of loss.  The Pashtun wanted their 
independence back and the British wanted to protect their interests in India by 
establishing British authority on the NWF.     
The British decided to attempt to instill order on the NWF, which would 
lead to the expansion of their authority.  As the British became more flexible in their 
application of law, the establishment of order on the NWF steadily improved.  Almost 
immediately, the British learned that the suppression of tribal customs would not promote 
order on the NWF.  By shifting the responsibility, and more importantly, the 
interpretation of justice onto tribal elders, the number of individuals being brought before 
civil and criminal courts increased.102  From the British perspective, this meant that 
British authority was expanding and that social order was improving.  However, as the 
tribes adjusted to each new policy instituted by the British, similar problems continued to 
arise.  This suggests that the Pashtun never acknowledged British authority on the NWF.  
Therefore, British experiences on the NWF demonstrate that authority cannot be gained 
solely through a process of law.   
b. Customary Norms, not Religious Norms are what impede State 
Authority 
Pashtuns are better characterized by their dedication to tribal custom than 
to Islam.103  In particular, the British interaction with the Mahsud tribe (regarded as one 
of the most resistant to authority) supports this argument.  Often times, the Mahsuds 
respected British agents more when they were tough in the implementation of their 
policies.  Olaf Caroe noted that the Mahsuds were more attached to tribal custom than to 
Islam.  “I do not think any Mahsud would regard it as other than truthful, and even 
flattering to be told that he was a Mahsud first and a Muslim afterwards.”104  Honor, 
prowess in combat, and justice with respect to Pashtunwali were far more important 
qualities in a leader than his being a Muslim.105 
The British did not consider the tribes to be fanatical, and there was no 
evidence that the Pashtun hated the British because they were foreigners or non-Muslim.  
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The bottom line was that the Pashtun were being forced to alter their way of life due to 
British presence and that the Pashtun were fiercely determined to resist British 
subjugation in order to preserve their independence.106   
E. CONCLUSION 
Prior to 1839, the Pashtun had relatively little contact with Europeans.  When the 
British arrived on the Northwest Frontier of British India, the Pashtun welcomed them, 
offering them traditional Pashtun hospitality and showing respect for their Christian 
beliefs and practices.  However, once it was understood that the British not only intended 
to stay, but also to change Pashtun social customs in order to instill a British form of 
order, the Pashtun changed their opinion.  “By the end of the 19th century, Europeans 
[were] considered not only infidels, but also enemies who threatened [Pashtun] 
independence.”107  This reaction suggests that the Pashtun did not initially associate the 
British with other groups that had previously attempted to exert their authority over them.  
It was only after the British began to establish their permanence and their authority in the 
region that the Pashtun began to employ tactics aimed at resisting British control and 
preserving their traditional way of life.   
Pashtun resistance to the Indian Penal Code proved to the British that a policy 
involving suppression would fail to gain both order and authority on the NWF.  This 
began an evolutionary process designed to produce a policy that would first bring order to 
the NWF, and later expand British authority.  However, what the British found in their 
experiences with the Pashtun was that the establishment of order did not easily lead to the 
establishment of authority.   
From a normative perspective, British policies rewarded the Pashtun for 
minimizing the amount of violence directed against the settled areas.  These policies did 
not seek to integrate or co-opt the Pashtun, creating a situation of interdependence.  
Therefore, the Pashtun were comfortable receiving subsidies for not being violent and 
were given more and more freedom to exist under their own rule of law.  The increase in 
violent acts over time indicates that many Pashtun tribesmen considered the arrangement 
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too large a sacrifice with respect to their way of life.  Faced with limited capacity, the 
British were forced to sacrifice the pursuit of authority for order. 
From an organizational perspective, British policies were not nearly broad enough 
to allow them to adequately influence the Pashtun.  Again, limited by their capacity, the 
British were unable to engage the number of people necessary to convince the Pashtun of 
the benefits of accepting British authority.  The use of the Maliki System corrupted the 
message being spread by the British and allowed the Maliks to use the resources, 
intended by the British to convince the Pashtun to accept British authority, for their own 
benefit.   
The next chapter offers a similar case study with a significant change addressing 
the possibility that the cultural divide between the British and the Pashtun could have 
been somewhat responsible for Pashtun resistance of British authority.  The next chapter 
also offers a case of a state—Pakistan—attempting to bring the Pashtun under its own 
















































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
49 
IV. PAKISTAN CASE STUDY 
You want to know whether I am first a Pashtun, a Muslim, or a 
Pakistani.  I have been a Pashtun for 2,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 
years, and a Pakistani for 30 years.  Therefore, I will always be a 
Pashtun first. 
      Wali Khan 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The following case study addresses the policies associated with a fledgling, 
Muslim state trying to establish its authority over the areas within its borders inhabited by 
the Pashtun.  Bent on integration and the establishment of a national identity, Pakistan 
has had the advantage of identifying with the Pashtun on the grounds of common 
religion.   
Similar to the previous chapter, this case study is broken down into three main 
sections: a historical background establishing the context for the case, a description of 
Pakistan’s policies and their outcomes, and an analysis of Pakistan’s policies using the 
theoretical framework.  The lack of permanent government presence in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA-the primary location of rural Pashtuns in Pakistan) 
prior to Pakistan’s current military operations (a result of the intense international 
pressure caused by Al Qaeda’s attacks on the US in 2001) indicates the lack of success of 
Pakistan’s past policies.  However, the current concern of the International Community 
over “ungoverned spaces” is likely to inspire broader and more dedicated attempts to 
establish Pakistan’s authority over the FATA.  Therefore, it is likely the policies outlined 
in this chapter may be changing rapidly over the next decade. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Since partition from India in 1947, Pakistan has been plagued by three main 
issues: the threat from India on its eastern border, especially in the Kashmir region; 
Pashtun nationalism stemming from the cleavage of the ethnic group by the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border; and Afghanistan’s attempts to recover its Pashtun brethren and gain 
access to a sea port on the Indian Ocean.  The focus of this chapter is to look at the 
policies Pakistan’s central government has directed towards establishing authority in the 
Tribal Areas of western Pakistan, why they succeeded or failed, and what conditions 
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prevented the establishment of state authority.  Though this case study reveals several 
different explanations for Pashtun resistance, Pashtun nationalism represents a central 
theme in the Pashtun’ opposition to Pakistan’s central government. 
 
Figure 4.   Pakistan-Afghanistan Border 
(http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/pakistanbordercartoon.jpg.  Accessed on 30 May 
06) 
From the beginning, the Government of Pakistan realized the need for order and 
stability in the Tribal Areas.  It re-established the 1901 version of the British Frontier 
Crimes Regulation as the primary rule of law, which is still in effect today.108  Up until 
1976, Pakistan’s policies regarding its administration of the Tribal Areas mostly modeled 
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British policy in the region.109  Pakistan’s first president, Mohammad Ali Jinnah—“the 
father of the nation”—strongly disliked the British policies used to keep the Tribal Areas 
in check and felt that the Pashtun must be integrated into Pakistan’s society.  Instead, 
Pakistan’s leaders (after Jinnah’s death in 1948) followed the British example by keeping 
the Pashtun dependent on state allowances and subsidies, failing to commit to Jinnah’s 
vision of integration.110  However, the Government did make some subtle, yet important, 
changes to its tribal policy.  Though the Government of Pakistan has always understood it 
could only establish state authority through development rather than subjugation or 
pacification, concerns about national security would continually distract or subvert efforts 
aimed at incorporating the Pashtun people into modern Pakistani society.   
Though the continuous threat from India shaped many of Pakistan’s domestic 
policies, Afghanistan was often equally responsible for shaping state policy by inciting 
unrest and discontentment in the Tribal Areas.  Because the Durand Line separated the 
Pashtun living in Afghanistan and Pakistan politically rather than geographically, the 
Pashtun living in the Tribal Areas were still closely connected.  A land-locked 
Afghanistan constantly fanned the flames of Pashtun nationalism in hopes of gaining 
access to the Indian Ocean from a sympathetic and independent Pashtunistan (see Figure 
4).111  In the 1960s and 1970s, the unrest in Afghanistan caused by tribal politics and the 
rise of communism convinced Pakistan’s government that the Tribal Areas could not be 
left to their own way of life.  Yet, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the puppet 
Afghan government again appealed to Pashtun nationalism, Pakistan was forced to 
sacrifice its policies aimed at incorporating the Tribal Areas in favor of state security.  
During this period, the land of the Pashtun would once again become a buffer, much like 
the buffer between Great Britain and Russia in the Great Game, to protect Pakistan from 
Soviet expansionism.   
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Unfortunately, the damage to Pashtun society in the Tribal Areas from over a 
decade of war with the Soviets completely destroyed the progress made earlier by 
Pakistan’s government.  Once the Soviet threat disappeared, Pakistan’s capacity to begin 
the slow process of developing the Tribal Areas was further hampered by a nuclear arms 
race with India and a major cutback in funding by the United States.  Pakistan’s 
government practically ignored the Tribal Areas until the terrorist attack of 11 September 
2001 sparked new American and international interest in the Tribal Areas.  As of today, 
Pakistan is currently involved in what could still be described as a Forward Policy.  
Focusing on regaining control and establishing order in the Tribal Areas, Pakistan has 
been moved to center stage in the U.S. war on terrorism. 
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Figure 5.   Pashtunistan.  
(http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/pashtunistan.gif.  Accessed on 30 May 06) 
 
Building on this short, historical overview of Pakistan’s involvement in its tribal 
areas, the next section details the policies used to establish the government’s authority.  
Several of Pakistan’s policies are simply derivatives of British policies.  Like the 
previous chapter, the policies are laid out in chronological order, with the exception of 
the last two (Frontier Crimes Regulation and the Maliki System).  These two policies 
were enacted at partition and still remain in effect today.   
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C. PAKISTAN’S TRIBAL POLICIES 
1. The Close Border Policy 
When British rule ended in 1947, all the previous agreements and treaties between 
the British government in Delhi and the people of Tribal Areas came to an end.  Under 
Pakistan’s new constitution the Tribal Areas were given their independence, which 
required the Government of Pakistan to create new treaties and agreements with the 
tribes.  The new Government of Pakistan recognized its weakness as a fledgling 
government and therefore elected to continue the British Maliki system and pursue a 
policy of accommodation.  In exchange for continuing the British program of allowances 
and subsidies, the Maliks declared the Tribal Areas part of Pakistan, promised to aid 
Pakistan in a time of need, and “to be law abiding and to maintain friendly relations with 
the people of the settlement districts.”   President Jinnah withdrew Pakistan’s armed 
forces from the Tribal Areas and allowed the Pashtun to handle their own affairs.  On 15 
August 1947, the Governor General of Pakistan gained jurisdiction over the Tribal 
Areas.112  Pashtuns honored their promise to support Pakistan in a time of need by 
sending a lashkar (tribal militia) of Pashtun tribesmen from Waziristan rushed to 
Kashmir to fight against India in support of Pakistan’s interests.113 
Pakistan’s initial policy in the Tribal Areas was almost an exact copy of the 
British Close Border Policy.114  Pakistan would extend its rule of law into the settled 
areas of the NWFP and Baluchistan, but the people living in the Tribal Areas were 
allowed to follow Pashtunwali.115  One significant difference was the role of the Political 
Agent (PA).  Under the Pakistan’s administration, the focus for the PA no longer centered 
on maintaining order.  The PA’s primary job was to promote and facilitate development 
projects—health, water, education, communication—in the Tribal Areas.116   
In 1951, the Government of Pakistan pressed the Maliks for a new agreement that 
reflected Pakistan’s desire to change its policy in the Tribal Areas to include a minimum 
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amount of co-optation.  The new policy included two important changes: 1) the Tribal 
Areas cease any interaction with Afghanistan, and 2) the people in the Tribal Areas 
facilitate the building of infrastructure.117  This was only a small change aimed at an 
incremental increase in the scope of the state’s role in the Tribal Areas.   
a. Policy Results 
President Jinnah recognized the need for a methodical process—
integration would not happen overnight.  Jinnah’s adoption of the former British policy 
allowed Pakistan to gain Pashtun support.  However, the use of the Maliki system was 
not intended to be a permanent solution.  Jinnah had intended for the PA to engage the 
tribes living in the tribal area on a much wider and more individual basis.118  Jinnah 
sought a policy of “peaceful penetration” and began the development of schools and 
hospitals.  Despite the small scale of the original program, the development sparked some 
tribal integration allowing the incorporation of some of the tribal areas into the NWFP.119  
However, the Pashtun likely accepted this policy because it did not require a change in 
their customs or social structure. 
Unfortunately, Jinnah died within the first year of his Presidency.  The 
political leaders who succeeded him did not have the same fundamental understanding as 
Jinnah and therefore elected to continue paying the allowances and subsidies to the 
people living in the Tribal Areas.  Jinnah was right, as history shows the Close Border 
policy only ignored the ideal of socially integrating Pashtuns with the rest of Pakistan.  
The change of policy in 1951 was designed to curb cooperation between 
the Pashtun in Pakistan with Kabul and accelerate the integration of the Pashtun.  The 
enactment of this policy, which offered nothing to the Pashtun in return, led to increased 
tension between the Pashtun and Islamabad, further stirring the notion of Pashtunistan 
and eventually led Pakistan to close the border between the two countries in 1955.120 
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2. One Unit Plan 
A dramatic change in Government policy, leaning further towards the suppression 
side of co-optation, came in 1955 with the enactment of the One Unit Plan.  This policy 
combined the NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh, and the Tribal Areas into one province called 
West Pakistan.   
 
 
Figure 6.   West Pakistan’s Provinces and Ethnic Groups 
(http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/pakistanethnolinguisticmap.jpg.   Accessed 
on 30 May 06) 
 
The Government of Pakistan enacted the One Unit Plan in hopes of accomplishing three 
things: 1) to promote a stronger, Punjabi dominated, central government; 2) to create a 
common identity for the people living in the newly formed West Pakistan; and 3) to 
appease the people of East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh) by creating the appearance 
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of more balanced representation between East and West Pakistan.121  In order to achieve 
this, the policy placed the responsibility for the administration of all three areas on the 
Governor of West Pakistan, acting as the Agent to Pakistan’s President.   
The Government of Pakistan delegated much of the responsibility for the 
administration of West Pakistan to its new Governor to allow the Government to focus on 
domestic issues such as the growing unrest in East Pakistan, and international issues such 
as the dispute with India over Kashmir.122 
a. Policy Results 
Pakistan’s attempt to consolidate the three main provinces of Sindh, 
Baluchistan, and the NWFP into West Pakistan failed to inspire a sense of unity among 
the different ethnic groups living in their respective regions.  Each ethnic group resisted 
this policy and continuously fought to regain its previous administrative system, fearing 
that the state was trying to force a new, single political identity on all the different ethnic 
groups in the region.   
The Pashtun felt that the One Unit Plan threatened their identity which 
inspired a renewed sense of Pashtun nationalism.  The Afghan Pashtuns again began 
raising the notion of Pashtunistan, pressing the Pakistani Pashtuns by saying that their 
identity, values, and customs would be destroyed under the One Unit Plan.123   
In the former NWFP, the Government of Pakistan responded by 
suppressing any individual openly advocating Pashtun autonomy.  This action deepened 
the resentment and the resistance of the Pashtun living in the area.  The men being jailed 
for their opposition to the Government were seen by the people as “the true advocates of 
Pashtun interests”.  The One Unit Plan polarized the different ethnic groups in West 
Pakistan—the Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pashtuns—and gave them a common enemy, the 
state, to unite against.124 
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In 1969, the Government of Pakistan yielded to the movements against the 
One Unit Plan and allowed the people to decide whether or not it should continue.  The 
vote was overwhelmingly in favor of returning to the former provincial administration.  
Ethnicity and regionalism were re-emphasized as strong, deterministic factors within 
Pakistan, and are still extremely prevalent in Pakistani politics today.125 
3. The Forward Policy 
Around 1960, Pakistan’s policy in the Tribal Areas began to take on the 
appearance of the British Forward Policy.  Until 1970, Government policy shifted away 
from suppressing the political identity of Pashtuns and began to offer limited co-optation.  
Pakistani troops were sent back into the Tribal Areas along with teachers and medical 
services.  Punitive expeditions were still being conducted, but by aircraft rather than 
soldiers on the ground.126  Roads were improved to facilitate troop movements and to 
develop settlements.  The Government of Pakistan sought to engage the Pashtun on a 
broader level, reducing their alienation from the Government and offering modest 
improvements to their welfare and economy.127   
The Government of Pakistan has always understood that it would be difficult to 
elevate the standard of living in the Pashtun tribal areas to match those in the more 
modern areas of Pakistan.  Though previous policies had been directed at integrating 
Pashtuns with the other areas of Pakistan by elevating the standard of living in the Tribal 
Areas, the Government of Pakistan instituted another policy around this same time to 
further encourage integration.  The Government purposefully set out to co-opt certain 
Pashtun individuals by offering them opportunities for advancement in military and 
bureaucratic positions.  The state also began to relocate Pashtuns, placing them in areas 
or jobs to create a situation where the Pashtun individual would begin to identify more 
with the state than with his ethnic group.128  This action reflected a near-suppression 
policy, allowing only a small bit of co-optation from the fact that the individuals were not 
jailed but were re-introduced to societies in other regions. 
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After 15 years under the One Unit Plan, the Government of Pakistan fully shifted 
its actions in the Tribal Areas to reflect the Forward Policy.  It reinstated the former 
provincial administrations due to strong opposition throughout Western Pakistan.  
Returning more towards the accommodation side of co-optation, the territory of the 
NWFP was expanded, including Dir, Swat, Chitral, Malakand, and Hazara.  The Tribal 
Areas were converted into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a collection 
of seven agencies including Mohmand, Kurram, Khyber, Bajaur, Orakzai, North and 
South Waziristan.   
60 
 
Figure 7.   District Map of NWFP and FATA 
(http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/nwfpmap01.gif.  Accessed on 30 May 06) 
 
Each Agency was again assigned a Political Agent who was responsible for its 
administration.129  Both Baluchistan and the NWFP became Provincially Administered 
Tribal Areas (PATAs), each with its own administration, while the responsibility for 
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administering the FATA would fall directly upon the Federal Government.  Though the 
President delegated the administration of the FATA to the Governor of the NWFP, it 
desired to establish a direct link to the Federal Government for two reasons: 1) the 
significant security implications of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and 2) 
the severe state of underdevelopment in the FATA would exceed the ability of the NWFP 
to modernize the region.130   
The state sought to penetrate the FATA in order to elevate the standard of living 
there to match the rest of Pakistan.  New projects providing water, education, roads, 
electricity, and industry were springing up throughout the FATA.  The FATA had the 
attention of all the high ranking government officials.  Between 1972 and 1977, the 
development in the FATA and the NWFP began to marginalize the repeated attempts by 
Afghanistan to gain supporters for Pashtun nationalism.  However, all these development 
programs were being supplied by the state with no demand on the Pashtun to change their 
customs.  Pashtunwali was still the recognized law of the land and jirgahs were allowed 
to maintain order without interference from the Government.131 
a. Policy Results 
The Government’s development programs in the Tribal Areas showed 
early signs of success under the Forward Policy, especially between 1972 and 1977.  
Pashtun life in general saw many improvements: improved economy, better health 
programs, and better education.  Once the Government dissolved the One Unit Plan, 
relations with the Pashtun became much more amicable.  The Pashtun accepted this 
policy whole heartedly because it provided them with social benefits and required 
nothing in return.  The idea of Pashtunistan began to fade as Pashtuns realized that their 
lives were significantly better with the support of the state of Pakistan.132  This possibly 
suggests that the Pashtun were beginning to see the Government of Pakistan as their 
government, which would have been an incredible achievement for Pakistan. 
The Forward Policy also had success in co-opting Pashtun individuals.  
The tradition of incorporating Pashtuns into society still continues today.  As a result, the 
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Pashtun have gained a great deal of influence in Pakistan’s Army, holding between 30% 
and 40% of the senior officer positions.  Pashtuns also hold approximately ten percent of 
Pakistan’s top bureaucratic jobs—which is an accurate representation based on their 
percentage of the population.133  This aspect of the Forward Policy achieved a certain 
amount of compromise from the Pashtun and demonstrated that it was possible to create 
an atmosphere where a Pashtun was willing to forsake certain elements of Pashtunwali in 
exchange for integration. 
Today, Pashtuns taking an active role in the Government provide a source 
of credibility among those living in the FATA and offer a deeper understanding of the 
cultural divide between the Pashtun and the Government.134  These men, as well as those 
involved in other aspects of society, also provide a source of inspiration for individuals 
who are unsatisfied with their current lot in life.  Providing an example that demonstrates 
one has options outside tribal life is a powerful instrument of change.  However, this 
requires widespread, lateral engagement to ensure Pashtuns are aware of these 
opportunities and the individuals who have taken advantage of them.  However, the 
continued use of the Maliki system as the conduit between the state and the tribes 
insulates the majority of Pashtuns from these examples of successful compromise. 
One failure of the Forward Policy is that it did not succeed, or even make 
an attempt at establishing the state’s rule of law for the FATA in accordance with the 
other provinces.  Though it did bring the people of the FATA closer to the state, the 
Government made no demand on the Pashtun to change their rule of law.  Pashtunwali 
continued to serve as the law of the land.135  However, the failure of this policy must be 
qualified in that it was only in place for a short period of time before Pakistan’s national 
security demanded a policy shift that would undermine the progress made under this 
policy. 
4. Policies to Address the Communist Threat in Afghanistan 
In April of 1978, the Communist sponsored Khalqi faction successfully overthrew 
the sitting ruler of Afghanistan.  As a result, Pakistan was forced to alter its policies in the 
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Pashtun tribal areas.  Development programs were cut to support a growing need for state 
security.  The new Afghan regime sought legitimacy under the guise of Pashtun 
nationalism sensing a loss of support from conservative Pashtuns.  By supporting another 
push for an independent state of Pashtunistan, the Khalqi government hoped to mobilize 
the Pashtun on both sides of the border in order to solidify its hold of the Afghan 
government.136 
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan shifted its policy 
in the FATA to one of pure accommodation in order to maximize state security.  
Pakistan’s new policy had two objectives: 1) to cultivate an effective, asymmetric 
fighting force capable of engaging Soviet forces, and 2) to do so in a covert manner that 
would prevent the Soviet Union from perceiving Pakistan as an aggressor.  In order to 
accomplish this, Pakistan began to funnel weapons and money to the Pashtun fighting in 
the trans-border region.  Though illicit activities had always been present in the virtually 
lawless border region, Pakistan’s tacit support of “smuggling, drug trafficking and gun 
running” in the Tribal Areas allowed these practices to become highly profitable.137  
Pakistan’s few social programs in the FATA were overwhelmed as nearly 3.5 million 
Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan sought refuge in Pakistan.138  Keeping the border 
open was in Pakistan’s best interest, because it allowed the Afghan resistance to find 
sanctuary within Pakistan’s borders, protecting them from Soviet attacks. 
a. Policy Results 
Pakistan’s decision to sacrifice the development strategy of its Forward 
Policy in the FATA to protect itself from Soviet invasion proved to be successful.  The 
Government of Pakistan played a key role in the victory of the Afghan resistance against 
the Soviet Union.  The Pashtun accepted this policy since it demanded nothing in return 
and only offered them more independence.  However, it led to two long term problems 
that Pakistan is still dealing with today. 
First, the open border and the acceptance of Afghan refugees led to 
problems of over-population, unemployment, pressure on grazing land, and reduced law 
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and order leading to a rise in militancy and terrorism.139  Because Pakistan did not have 
the capacity to provide for the social welfare of the Pashtun living in the FATA, the 
Pashtun were less inclined to look to the state for support.  As a result, the Pashtun no 
longer associated the Government of Pakistan as having any power or influence in the 
region.   
Second, because “jihad, drugs, and gun running became the main source 
of livelihood for the local people”, an alternate economy grew out of the FATA and 
reduced the Pashtun’ dependence on government subsidies and allowances.  The 
resistance fighters and their supporters were able to carve up the region into fiefdoms and 
further alienate the Pashtun’ recognition of Government authority.140  It also provided the 
Pashtun with a cache of weapons that could later be used in support of Pashtun interests 
rather than state interests. 
5. Post Soviet Invasion Policy 
Once the Soviets left Afghanistan, Pakistan returned to a form of the Forward 
Policy.  Where the previous Forward Policy had focused on co-optation through 
penetration and integration, the Post-Soviet Forward Policy focused on accommodation 
in hopes of gaining more influence in Afghanistan and preserving Pakistan’s strategic 
depth with India.141  A friendly neighbor on Pakistan’s western border would allow 
Pakistan to focus its instruments of national power on its eastern border.  The rise of the 
predominantly Pashtun-led Taliban movement gave Pakistan confidence that 
Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, would allow Pakistan greater strategic depth.142  This 
led to Pakistan becoming one of only three states recognizing the Taliban regime in 
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Afghanistan.143  The Pakistan-Afghanistan border remained open, which further fused the 
connection between the Pashtun living along the Durand Line. 
During this period, Pakistan purposefully elected not to reign in the Afghan 
resistance fighters living in the FATA.  The momentum of the resistance force had 
reached such a level that it would require a significant amount of effort to demobilize it.  
Though the money which dried up after the Soviets retreated, the alternate economy 
continued to exist.  One speculation is that Pakistan recognized the power and 
effectiveness of the resistance fighters and had hoped to harness that force to use as 
weapon in support of other state interests.  Therefore, the state did nothing to slow it 
down or to stop it.144  Instead, Pakistan used the state intelligence service, ISI, to 
manipulate the different factions of the Afghan resistance, through the apportionment of 
money or weapons, to ensure one sect did not gain too much power.  By keeping the 
different resistance groups from joining into one powerful entity, Pakistan’s government 
felt it could avoid the “Palestiniazation” of the resistance camped within its border.145 
In December of 1996, the President of Pakistan implemented a significant policy 
change with regard to representation and voting rights for the people of the FATA.  The 
President declared that the right of universal adult franchise would be extended to the 
people living in the FATA.  This change reflected a further shift in policy towards co-
optation.  It was hoped that Pashtuns would be more inclined to participate in government 
and begin to identify with the other people of Pakistan by getting the right to vote for 
Pakistani legislation and government candidates.  This policy also increased the 
representation and influence of the people from the FATA in Pakistan’s National 
Assembly.  Pashtuns were given a say in the laws being created for and applied to 
Pakistan’s population outside the FATA, but those laws had no effect on those people 
living within the FATA.   
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a. Policy Results 
Pakistan’s desire to influence the politics in Afghanistan in order to gain 
strategic depth on its western border caused Pakistan to lose sight of its goal of 
integrating the Pashtun of the FATA into Pakistan’s mainstream society.  Leaders from 
the Afghan resistance were able to increase their power and authority under this policy 
due to the absence of the state in the FATA.   
The unregulated border between Pakistan and Afghanistan allowed 
extremist groups, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda, to expand their networks of support 
and increase their influence among the Pashtun.  The rise of the Pashtun dominated 
Taliban in Afghanistan did in fact reduce Pakistan’s concerns about strategic depth, but 
proved to be a short-sighted policy with respect to the overall security of Pakistan.   
Some experts believe the Government of Pakistan hoped to harness the 
resistance fighters in order to use them as a weapon—an instrument of state power.146  
Therefore, Pakistan continued to cultivate the resistance group in the FATA by 
minimizing the state’s presence, but ultimately failed to control it.  The Taliban, which 
was mostly comprised of Pashtun orphans who were educated in the madrasas 
(seminaries) in the FATA during the Afghan jihad, sympathized with Pakistan, but were 
not beholden to Pakistan.  The Taliban continued to administer to the religious needs of 
the Pashtun communities in the FATA, providing them with an excellent source of 
recruitment and allowed them to expand their influence throughout the region.147   
The Government’s decision to sacrifice the integration of the Pashtun 
living in the FATA in exchange for increased influence in Afghanistan created a vacuum 
in the region that was filled by other individuals and organizations.  Pashtuns ended up 
focusing their allegiance regionally, which likely reinforced Pashtun identity rather than 
Pakistani identity. 
On the positive side, the introduction of Adult Franchise did serve to 
better connect the state with the people living in the FATA.  Over 2 million voters 
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registered to partake in the elections of 1997.  This policy succeeded in the sense that it 
demonstrated to the people that they had some say in the Government and that their vote 
counted.  Unfortunately, this right has very little meaning in the FATA because the laws 
of Pakistan do not extend into the FATA.  It did lay the ground work for getting people 
involved in the process being used in the rest of Pakistan, but there will not likely be a 
sense of ownership until the Pashtun are faced with consequences or benefits from their 
participation. 
6. Post 9/11 Policy 
The next major change in Pakistan’s policy towards the FATA came after 11 
September 2001.  Because the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the 
United States was linked to a terrorist organization operating in the border areas between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the United States made it clear that Pakistan would either alter 
its policy regarding its control of the FATA or be labeled a threat.  As expected, the 
Government of Pakistan sided with the United States and allowed U.S. forces to set up 
forward operating locations inside Pakistan.  The Government of Pakistan also began a 
campaign of suppression to establish Government authority in the FATA by force.  On 
the domestic front, President Musharraf publicly stated three tasks to improve Pakistan’s 
national security: 1) the FATA must be absorbed by the state—the divisions in law and 
order must become the same as the rest of Pakistan, 2) Al Qaeda’s operations must be 
forced out of the FATA, and 3) Pakistan must prevent the U.S. from having to take direct 
action against the trans-national terrorist networks operating in Pakistan.148 
To achieve President Musharraf’s current national security objectives, Pakistan 
has begun the process of permanently establishing authority within the FATA.  President 
Musharraf has declared that the tribal custom of melmastia will not be extended to 
terrorists.149  The Pakistani Army has begun to close the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, making it more difficult to cross.  Pashtuns are no longer allowed to simply 
come and go as they please.  Though this does not mean the border is no longer porous, it 
has slowed the number of border crossings significantly.  Pakistan has also instituted 
“search and screening” operations with the objective of flushing out the terrorist networks 
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in Pakistan.  These operations mostly involve Pakistan’s Regular Army, but lashkars 
consisting of different Pashtun clans have been formed throughout the FATA.  The 
Government of Pakistan has begun to play one Pashtun tribe off another in order to 
establish order and authority.     
a. Policy Results 
The success of the current policy in the FATA under President Musharraf 
cannot yet be judged as a success or failure.  Pashtun reaction varies widely across the 
scale between resistance and acceptance.  The source of the resistance stems mostly from 
Pashtun tribes with deep connections to Afghan tribes or the Taliban.  Some resistance 
also stems from anti-U.S. sentiment in the region over the current situation in 
Afghanistan.  However, Pakistan has recommitted itself to gaining order in the FATA.  
President Musharraf’s agenda is specifically designed to re-establish the authority of the 
state within the FATA and bring the people living there into modern Pakistani society.   
To date, the Government of Pakistan has over 70,000 troops deployed 
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.  Military operations, aimed at rooting out Al 
Qaeda operatives and establishing order, have been ongoing since January 2004.  Some 
Pakistani experts fear that these operations will weaken the Government’s credibility and 
slow development projects.  However, the Pakistani military has only met stern resistance 
from the Pashtun living in North and South Waziristan.  The operations that have been 
conducted in the other areas of the FATA have been met with the tacit cooperation of the 
Pashtun tribes living in those areas.150 
7. Frontier Crimes Regulation 
The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), as revised in 1901 by the British, was 
adopted in 1947 by Pakistan’s new government and (with only minor modifications) is 
still in effect today.  This is a contradictory policy since it has elements of both 
accommodation and suppression with regards to government policy.  At one end, it 
reflects accommodation because it allows Pashtunwali to exist as the primary rule of law 
in the FATA.  However, it also reflects suppression because of the enormous power it 
affords to the PA to punish and administrate the people of his political district without 
regard for the civil rights afforded to other Pakistanis.   
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Though the FCR is an expansive document, this section will only highlight certain 
elements that are relevant to this thesis.  With respect to the Pashtun themselves, the FCR 
has three important and empowering aspects.  First, the FCR made it legal to kill an 
individual if it is in accordance with Pashtunwali.  Second, the Government is allowed to 
ban political demonstrations.  Third, it used to be legal for a private citizen of the FATA 
to accuse an individual of breaking the law, to have him arrested under the authority of 
the FCR, and to be imprisoned for up to five years—all based solely on suspicion.  The 
last practice was outlawed in 1963 due to its abuse by Khans and Maliks who used the 
law to increase their wealth and land.151 
The FCR also gives the Political Agent (PA) a tremendous amount of latitude in 
dealing with the tribes living within the FATA.  The PA administers the tribes living 
within his designated Political Agency “in accordance with tribal customs”.  For the most 
part, the PA does not interfere with domestic issues; those are left to the tribes and their 
code of Pashtunwali.  Under the provisions of the FCR, the PA gains an enormous 
amount of power over the tribes.  First, the PA is authorized to use the tribal custom of 
baramta when dealing with hostile tribe members, which includes seizing any amount of 
property or arresting any number of individuals he suspects are responsible for illegal 
acts.  Second, the PA may confiscate the property of any individual arrested.  Third, the 
PA can prevent an individual, or even an entire clan/sub-clan, from communicating or 
interacting with any other individual or clan/sub-clan.  Fourth, if the PA determines that a 
settlement presents a threat to the state, he can order it to be destroyed and force the 
people living there to move.  Fifth, the PA can order any person in the FATA to prevent 
the murder of an individual it perceives to be in danger or to prevent any act of sedition.  
If the individual appointed fails, he can be imprisoned for three to six years.  The PA is 
also allowed to determine the conditions under which the individual will be imprisoned 
(whether it is to be hard labor or not).   
The FCR also empowers the PA in a judicial capacity.  Though it is true that a 
jirgah, whose members are typically Maliks or prominent elders selected by the PA, is 
given the responsibility to investigate both criminal and civil cases in order to deliver a 
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judgment, this judgment is only a recommendation that must be approved by the PA.  
Once the PA has made a decision, no appeal can be made.152 
a. Policy Results 
The FCR was never a policy for promoting integration.  The broad scope 
of power given to the PA combined with the relatively small amount of government 
oversight was designed to pacify Pashtun tribes rather than establish state authority.  
However, the fact that the majority of cases handled by the FCR are adjudicated in 
accordance with Pashtunwali allows a sense of ownership for the Pashtun.  Therefore, the 
state plays upon Pashtun dedication to “this code of honor whose sanctity and 
inviolability the tribesmen cherish above everything.”153  Pashtuns accept the FCR 
because it exists under the auspices of Pashtunwali.  The power of the state allows it to 
continue using the FCR despite some Pashtun resistance, but it does not improve the 
authority of the state’s rule of law.   
The FCR prevents the Government of Pakistan from making any progress 
towards integrating the Pashtun of the FATA into Pakistan’s primary rule of law.  The 
FCR was created to be a “powerful weapon in the hands of the administration to show its 
efficiency and effectiveness and to bowing the heads of the tribesmen.”  It is an accepted 
tool of subjugation because it preserves some elements of Pashtunwali.  Any action that 
does not appear to be in accordance with Pashtunwali is simply perceived as an unjust 
action made by the state.  “A former advocate general of Pakistan once said on the floor 
of the Senate that in the tribal system there is no [lawyer], no [argument] and no 
[appeal].”154  Most often, the PA is required to carefully administrate his area using a 
combination diplomacy and force.  Although it does not happen often, the indiscriminate 
use of the FCR by the PA does not portray the state as a just administrator and only 
serves to further delineate the state’s definition of justice from the Pashtun’s definition 
under Pashtunwali. 
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8. The Maliki System 
A second policy the new Government of Pakistan adopted from the British and 
still uses today is the Maliki System.  As previously stated, the new Government was 
eager to ensure the people living in the Tribal Areas were going to willingly join the new 
state.  Therefore, the Government accommodated the tribes by continuing the Maliki 
System because it provided a method of connecting the state to the tribes without the 
requirement of new agencies and new administrations aimed directly at penetrating the 
Tribal Areas to make contact with the people there.155  The Maliki System gave Agency 
administrators the ability to engage an entire tribe through one single individual.  The 
title of Malik has always been bestowed on a family and handed down from generation to 
generation.  A second title, called a Lungi has the same function as a Malik, but the 
position has never been hereditary. 
a. Policy Results 
The Maliki System separates the state from its people in the FATA.  The 
state selects Maliks and Lungis; they are not representative of the people.  This system 
enabled tribal Maliks to put their interests first and created a barrier between the Pashtun 
(the beneficiaries) and the Government (the benefactor).  Allowances and subsidies were 
still apportioned in accordance with each individual’s hereditary standing within the tribe.  
An individual could count on receiving a specified amount, regardless of whether he was 
a model citizen or a delinquent.  Therefore, the program offered no incentive to change or 
progress which is why the Pashtun accepted the policy.   
Pakistan’s decision to continue its use of the Maliki system following 
President Jinnah’s death was reinforced by the use of the same system in Afghanistan.  
Leaders in the Government of Pakistan perceived that the Afghan government was 
successfully using the Maliki system to enforce its authority.156  What the Government of 
Pakistan failed to realize was that the Afghan government was not concerned with 
elevating the other tribes to the same level as the Pashtun living in Kabul.  The Afghan 
government, which was dominated by Pashtuns at the time, wanted to solidify Pashtun 
power while keeping the other tribes pacified. 
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“Even after five decades of independence the tribal population remains 
largely disenfranchised with the Maliks playing the role of intermediaries in the politics 
of patronage.”  The Maliki System failed (and still fails today) to bridge the gap between 
the state and the people of the FATA for two reasons.  First, because these individuals are 
not elected representatives, it separates the people from their Government and inhibits 
integration.  Second, the Maliki System only motivates and inspires cooperation among 
the Maliks and Lungis, because it allows them to exploit the system for their own 
benefit.157 
When looking at the social and administrative policies of Pakistan, two 
obvious points come to mind.  First, Pakistan’s ability to establish state authority has 
been a function of state capacity, and second, Pakistan must commit to engaging the 
tribes at the “grass roots” level.  This level of engagement was the vision of Pakistan’s 
first President, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.  Jinnah understood that subsidies and allowances 
paid out in exchange for good behavior would never bring about change or integration.158  
Though isolating the Pashtun tribes and allowing them to govern themselves independent 
of the laws of the state minimized the violence originating from the Tribal Areas, it also 
solidified Pakistan’s ethnically fragmented society.  Though the Pashtun living in the 
Tribal Areas were residing within Pakistan’s borders, their isolation meant that they 
would never identify themselves as Pakistanis instead of Pashtuns.   
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO PAKISTAN’S POLICIES 
The objective of this section is to apply the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter I to the collection of Pakistan’s policies in the Tribal Areas in order to clarify the 
sources of Pashtun resistance and to judge the validity of the framework.  Success, in 
terms of policy, is defined as state action which promotes the state’s authority over the 
tribes.  The end result should enable the state to establish a common rule of law for all its 
citizens and to gain/maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its 
borders. 
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1. Organizational Factors 
a. Government Tribal Policy should be based on the Tribe’s Social     
Organization 
The Maliki System violates this proposition.  As stated in Chapter III, 
Pashtun tribes have a horizontal hierarchical structure.  The custom of using a jirgah to 
decide important tribal business indicates a democratic tradition and that the Pashtun 
value a society based on the equality of men within the society.   
This is not to say that certain individuals do not have more influence than 
others during a jirgah.  Eloquence, heroism, and status (defined as wealth, influence in 
other areas, or even a representative status with the central government) can all be 
characteristics that increase the value of a man’s advice and strengthen his position 
during a jirgah.159  Despite such men being selected by the tribe as a Malik or Khan, it 
did not grant them the authority to make decisions on the tribe’s behalf.  The Maliki 
system suggests that the British, and later the Pakistanis, misinterpreted this influence as 
authority.   
At a broader level, the One Unit Plan also violated this proposition.  The 
independent nature of the Pashtun tribes caused them to resist this policy because it was 
perceived as an attempt by the state to marginalize the Pashtun identity under the 
auspices of eliminating regional and political identity.  From a Pashtun perspective, the 
regional government of West Pakistan indicated that the central government regarded 
Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pashtuns as a whole.  What little connection the Pashtun had with 
the Government of Pakistan was being diffused by the addition of two other ethnic 
groups.  Pashtuns were incapable of thinking in terms of “West Pakistani” interests.  The 
social structure of the Pashtun could only consider Pashtun interests.  This suggests that a 
government would have to achieve a high level of integration, allowing an ethnic group 
to identify with the state before instituting a policy like the One Unit Plan. 
b. Government Tribal Policy aimed at segregating or isolating 
Tribes undermines State’s Authority 
The Government of Pakistan has had predictable successes and failures 
based on this proposition.  First, the decision to remove the state’s soldiers from the 
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Tribal Areas immediately following Partition and the formal request by President Jinnah 
that the Tribal Areas join the new state of Pakistan—indicating that the Tribal Areas 
actually had a choice—both conveyed that the Government considered the people living 
there to be on an equal footing with the rest of the people of the state.  No other province 
would have soldiers actively deployed to keep the peace, and the people were being 
asked to decide their own fate.  Both of these actions were deliberately aimed at including 
the Tribal Areas, and therefore resulted in reasonable successes. 
A second predictable success—though it was limited—came with the 
institution of the Forward Policy.  Government presence was reinstated in the Tribal 
Areas in two ways: 1) soldiers to signify the state’s monopoly on violence, and 2) 
teachers and medical services to elevate the social welfare of the people.  The violence 
that was common in the Tribal Areas demanded that the state step up the amount of 
security within the region.  If a state does not have a monopoly on violence, people are 
forced to submit to the most powerful actor in the area which essentially erases the 
legitimacy of the central government.   The increase in social programs during the early 
to mid 1970s strengthened the link between the state and the people and allowed the 
people to recognize the benefits of state integration.  Proof of this policy’s success was 
found in the fact that Afghanistan’s efforts to inspire Pashtun nationalism during the 
1970s failed due to the Pashtun’ perception that life in Pakistan was better than in 
Afghanistan.160  Unfortunately, the rise of the Soviet threat curtailed this policy. 
A third success relating to this proposition was the policy of relocating 
Pashtuns to other locations within the State of Pakistan.  Co-optation was willingly 
accepted in cases where Pashtuns were being appointed to key political and military 
positions within the state.  Those individuals who were geographically re-located also 
demonstrated less resistance because they were being re-located against their will and did 
not have their traditional support network available.   Being distanced from their families, 
the state became the primary source of the individuals’ social support and welfare.  The 
individuals were forced to interact with other ethnic groups both socially and 
professionally which further encouraged integration. 
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A major failure, with respect to this proposition is the continued use of the 
FCR.  The FCR, by design, segregates and isolates the people living in the FATA from 
the rest of the people in Pakistan by placing Pashtuns under a vastly different rule of law.  
Certainly, the Pashtun believe that it is better to live in a world where Pashtunwali 
governs people’s behavior, but it undermines the authority of the state by reinforcing the 
notion that Pashtunwali supersedes Pakistani law.  The use of the FCR also solidifies the 
Pashtun identity and socially isolates Pashtuns from the people living in the other 
provinces of Pakistan. 
A second policy that violated this proposition occurred when the 
Government of Pakistan withdrew from the FATA and began to support resistance 
groups fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  The effect was that authority was 
ceded by the Government to the leaders of the resistance that were physically present and 
gained a monopoly on violence in the region.  The economy built on guns and drugs 
further distanced the connection between the state and the people, allowing resistance 
leaders to become the region’s benefactors rather than the state.  Religious needs were 
being fulfilled by schools cultivating extremist behavior with the tacit support of the 
Government.  Without state regulation or monitoring, terrorist training camps were able 
to spring up and flourish in the FATA.  Though the initial policy was selected due to the 
need to prioritize state security, the continued support of this policy after the Soviets left 
Afghanistan suggests it was either a policy based on short term rather than long term 
goals or a gross miscalculation of the state’s ability to control the resistance groups. 
2. Normative Factors 
a. Government Tribal Policy should consider the Tribe’s Perception 
of Justice on the establishment of State Authority 
The use of the PA in the administration of the FATA fails to satisfy this 
proposition.  The PA’s ability to appoint Maliks or Lungis, recommend increases or 
decreases in individual allowances, pay large sums of money to individuals to help him 
pursue his own interests, and grant contracts for services to certain tribes or families gave 
the PA an enormous amount of leverage in the FATA.161  Because Pashtun society 
operates on the custom of nikat (the apportionment of entitlements based on hereditary 
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standing within the tribe, clan, or family), any appointment, contract or reward that was 
granted outside this custom creates resentment.  Though these powers, granted by the 
state, greatly expand the PA’s ability to maintain order and peace in his political district, 
their use often casts an unfavorable light on the actions of the Government.   
Pashtuns have no influence on who is appointed as a PA.  Therefore, there 
is no sense of representation.  Though the PA is supposed to govern in accordance with 
tribal custom under the FCR, the PA is not accountable under Pashtunwali—he is not a 
member of the tribe, and his judgments are not the result of a jirgah.  Though the PA 
maintains power over the tribes through the use of his broad administrative and punitive 
powers, these powers work against his ability to gain authority.   
The One Unit Plan also violated this proposition.  This policy, created by 
the state without the participation of the people of West Pakistan, attempted to establish a 
common administrative identity among three different ethnic groups.  To the people 
living in the newly formed province of West Pakistan, the One Unit Plan was simply a 
case of the state using its authority over its people to strengthen the state’s control over 
them.  Because the three affected ethnic groups were all opposed to the policy, it worked 
against the state’s desire to establish its authority.   
A final case that opposes this proposition stems from Pashtun concern 
about what is driving current Pakistani policy in the FATA regarding border security.  
Pakistani political opposition groups on the NWFP and the FATA perceive the current 
government policy of closing off the border with Afghanistan and removing Taliban and 
Al Qaeda forces from the FATA are being driven by U.S. policy.  Pakistan’s efforts to 
change the Pashtun norms in the FATA, norms that were once tacitly supported by the 
Government of Pakistan, have led to growing anti-American sentiment.  The severe anti-
American sentiment spreading throughout the region only makes it more difficult for the 
Government of Pakistan to accomplish its goal of rooting out terrorist networks and re-
integrating the FATA with the state.162  Because Pashtuns see the Government’s actions 
as American policy, they resist state efforts to establish order in the FATA and are less 
likely to give legitimacy to state authority in the region. 
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b. Customary Norms, not Religious Norms are what impede State 
Authority 
Because Pakistan is a Muslim state, there have been few instances of 
resistance towards policy based on religious norms.  The current situation in the 
Government has forced President Musharraf to engage the religious right in order to 
marginalize the externally controlled liberal movements in Pakistan.163  Because the two 
primary liberal parties in Pakistan (the Pakistan People’s Party under Benazir Bhutto and 
the Muslim League under Nawaz Sharif) have essentially been frozen due to their leaders 
exile, President Musharraf’s party (the Kings party) must deal with the political groups 
like the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA—United Action Front—is a religiously 
motivated political group made up of Pashtuns and concentrated on the NWFP) to gain a 
sufficient majority for getting things done in the Government.  Though there has been 
some opposition to Government actions, the Government of Pakistan has been able to 
maintain its authority over the MMA.   
In the FATA, the primary problems between Pashtuns and the 
Government are based on customary norms.  As is clearly evident from the case study in 
the previous section, Pashtun commitment to Pashtunwali and Pashtun desire to maintain 
independence are clearly responsible for the barriers to Government authority. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s policy decisions regarding the Tribal Areas appear to reflect a choice 
between what the state wants to accomplish—the establishment of its authority through 
integration—and what the state must do to maintain its national security.  In the past, the 
decision of whether or not to use the FATA as a security buffer or to integrate the people 
living there into mainstream society has been a conscious choice made at the domestic 
level.  However, the events of September 11th, 2001, suggest that this decision is no 
longer domestic.  The concerns of the West (principally the United States) suggest that 
Pakistan’s policies aimed at segregation and isolation may no longer be an option.  The 
United States’ support of Pakistan’s operations in the tribal areas, reflected in its $3 
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billion aid package, indicates the United States’ willingness to help Pakistan ensure it has 
the capacity necessary to deal with this monumental task. 
Looking at the history of Pakistani policy in the FATA, many of the challenges 
faced by the British have also affected Pakistan’s policies.  From a normative 
perspective, the Pashtun were used to receiving government subsidies in exchange for 
order.  Despite the realization of President Jinnah that it would ultimately prove to be 
counter-productive, Pakistan, due to its limited capacity, had to continue to supply the 
same subsidies to avoid conflict with the Pashtun.  In terms of Prospect theory, 
government subsidies had been incorporated as a societal norm, and taking it away would 
be considered a loss, and a probable cause for resistance.   
History has shown Jinnah was right about the destructive results of such a policy.  
Though Pakistan has succeeded in minimizing the amount of violence in the FATA using 
subsidies, those payments have failed to inspire integration and state authority.  Pakistan 
still does not enforce its laws on the people in the FATA because of past resistance, a 
lack of capacity in view of its external threats, and its desire to avoid conflict on its 
northwestern border.  Instead, Pakistan has chosen to isolate the Pashtun in the FATA in 
hopes of protecting the rest of its citizens.  From an organizational perspective, Pakistan, 
like the British, has relied on the Maliki System to connect the Pashtun to the state.  The 
Maliki System violates Pashtun social organization by attempting to engage a society 
without a hierarchical power structure through a single individual.  The maliks typically 
pursue their own interests rather than serving in the interest of the state. 
In many ways, British policies have created difficult barriers for Pakistan to 
overcome.  Being a new state with very little capacity, Pakistan had to rely more on its 
abilities to influence the Pashtun through diplomacy than military forces or money.  The 
one thing Pakistan did have was a common ground rooted in Islam.  However, when state 
policy called for changes in tribal customs, the Pashtun resisted, much like they did with 
the British.   
The next chapter looks at the interaction between the Pashtun and a communist 
government.  The Soviet Union, much like the British, had more resources available for 
establishing its authority over the Pashtun.  The Soviets’ typical emphasis of the poorer, 
working class, its proclaimed commitment to atheism, and its desire to expand Soviet 
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culture to its satellite states provided three very different approaches to the same 
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V. SOVIET CASE STUDY 
My spirit will remain in Afghanistan, though my soul will go to God.  
My last words to you, my son and successor, are: Never trust the 
Russians. 
Abdur Rahman Khan 
Amir of Afghanistan, 1880-1901 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This case study provides an analysis of the policies used by the Soviet-sponsored 
communist government in Kabul between 1979 and 1989.  Though technically the ruling 
regime in Afghanistan was the communist party in Kabul, the Kremlin was ultimately 
directing its policy.  Like the previous two case studies, this chapter discusses the specific 
policies used by the ruling regime in Kabul to establish its authority, their outcomes, and 
presents an analysis of those policies using this thesis’ theoretical framework.   
This particular case study is different from the others because Soviet policy was 
directed at almost all of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan.  Though the Soviets did not 
specifically direct policy to counter Pashtun resistance, this case study remains relevant 
because the Pashtun made up a significant majority of the population and the resistance 
movement on the eastern frontier primarily consisted of Pashtun tribesmen.  Therefore, 
the purpose of this chapter remains the same as the previous two: to lay out the different 
Soviet policies, explain their successes and failures, and determine the relevance of the 
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter I. 
Because the Soviet case takes place in fairly recent history, and the policies were 
so different than those of the British or the Pakistanis, it becomes a valuable addition to 
this thesis.  It is important to note that very few Soviet policies were ethnically based.  
Most Soviet policies were very broad in scope and similarly threatened each ethnic 
group’s way of life.  Because the Pashtun constituted the majority of the population—
40% is a common estimate—and headed six of the seven primary resistance parties, an 
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assumption will be made that the Pashtun taking part in different resistance groups 
responded to Soviet policy in a manner commensurate with Pashtun custom.164 
B. BACKGROUND 
A review of the literature reveals that most scholars of the Soviet invasion and 
occupation of Afghanistan agree about the events that took place between 1979 and 1989.  
These experts agree it is almost impossible to determine exactly why the Soviet Union 
decided to invade Afghanistan.  The offense minded argument is that the Soviet Union 
wanted a port on the Indian Ocean, near the oil rich countries of the Persian Gulf.  The 
defense minded argument stems from the desire to curb the rise of Islamic ideology in 
Central Asia.  This argument also supports the notion that the Soviets feared that Islamic 
Fundamentalism could successfully rival or even usurp the spread of Marxist ideologies.  
A third argument claims the invasion was simply Moscow’s attempt to seize an 
opportunity to expand Soviet influence in South Asia based on the weak standing of the 
Afghan government and the relative little regard for the State in the West.  Finally, a 
fourth argument suggests that it was an attempt to honor the Brezhnev Doctrine, the 
obligation of all Communist parties to support and sustain one another.165    However, 
one thing that is certain is that the Soviets understood the Communist government in 
Kabul was failing.166 
Regardless of Moscow’s true motives for invading Afghanistan, there is no doubt 
that the Soviets (Russians) were no stranger to this particular part of the world.  Unlike 
the British, the Soviets had been involved with the Afghan people for nearly two 
centuries.  “The Soviet leadership badly miscalculated Afghanistan’s potential for 
sustained tribal rebellion.  Soviet academics warned against the invasion, and Moscow’s 
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special advisor in Kabul was highly skeptical, but these were a minority.”167  Instead, 
Soviet leadership decided the benefits of occupying and annexing Afghanistan would 
eventually outweigh the costs.  This decision set in motion a campaign the Soviet Union 
was unprepared to win. 
The communist government’s position in Kabul was tenuous in 1979.  Moscow 
recognized the regime’s vulnerability and decided to intervene to prop up a new 
communist regime under its control.  Afghanistan’s ruling party (a communist party), the 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was becoming more and more 
unpopular.168  The PDPA was split into two factions: the Khalqis, who were in power at 
the time of invasion, mostly came from the rural areas of Afghanistan and consisted of a 
number of minority ethnic groups integrated in with the Pashtun majority, and the 
Parchamis, who were predominantly non-Pashtun and represented the wealthier, urban 
Afghans.  Throughout Afghan history, the rural Afghans have been more influential.  The 
Khalqis were far more nationalistic than the Parchamis and far more rebellious.  
Therefore, when the Soviets decided to intervene, they backed the Parchami faction 
because it was easier to control.169 
After the invasion, the Soviets set up a puppet regime in Kabul headed by Babrak 
Karmal.  Karmal played no part in the coup d’ etat that unseated the sitting president, 
Hafizullah Amin, from power, arriving from Central Asia the day after the invasion of 
Kabul ended.  This emphasized the fact that Karmal was merely the mouthpiece for 
Moscow and that the Kremlin was in charge of the Afghan government.170 
At the time of the Soviet invasion, the Soviet military had two primary objectives: 
1) to gain and maintain control of Kabul, while ensuring the line of supply and 
communication between the city and the Soviet Union remained open; and 2) to disrupt 
and destroy logistical support to Afghan resistance forces.171  Initially, the Soviets 
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succeeded in gaining control of Kabul, and other population centers, yet the majority of 
Afghan society lived in the rural areas.   
To establish their role as the central authority in Afghanistan, the Soviets used a 
number of different policies ranging from suppression to accommodation.  Initially, the 
Soviets used three policies: the suppression of Afghan resistance in the cities, the 
“Sovietization” of the urban areas in Afghanistan, and the creation of a Soviet controlled 
Afghan army.  These policies were characterized in a speech by Louis Dupree at the 
annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association where he said, “the 
Russians are not trying to control Afghanistan, but to destroy it; their aim is not to kill the 
Afghans, but to drive them out of the country.”  Dupree later coined the term “migratory 
genocide” to describe Soviet actions.172 
All three of these policies failed to establish the Soviet-sponsored regime’s 
authority and resulted in the mass exodus of non-communist Afghans out of Afghanistan.  
At the same time, a migration of most communist Afghans to the Soviet-controlled urban 
areas, especially Kabul, took place.  These failures motivated the Soviets to later use 
policies directed at accommodation and co-optation, but the brutal nature of the invasion 
and occupation soured many relationships and made it difficult to change course.  These 
attempts were further complicated by the fact that the Afghan resistance, the majority of 
who were Pashtuns, were fiercely committed to their independence and were not readily 
willing to submit to Soviet authority, regardless of whether it was achieved through 
suppression or accommodation. 
C. SOVIET TRIBAL POLICIES 
1. Infiltration and Suppression of Resistance in Major Cities 
The Soviet plan for taking control of Afghanistan first focused on gaining control 
of the Afghan government and Afghan urban areas.  The Soviets used many of their 
Central Asian forces to gain control of the urban centers, hoping the Afghans would more 
readily identify with soldiers from their northern borders, seeing them as fellow Asians 
rather than Soviet invaders. 
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The Soviets gained almost immediate control of Afghanistan’s major cities—
Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat.  Shortly after the invasion, the Soviets began to infiltrate 
existing national and local governments to aid in the suppression of any uprisings or 
resistance in urban areas.  Using the Khidamat-e-Atla’t Daulati (KhAD), the Soviet-
sponsored Afghan secret police, the Soviets began to root out resistance sympathizers 
through the use of “arbitrary arrest, torture, imprisonment, and execution.”173 
KhAD forces penetrated every level of government and established a presence in 
every residential area.  This enabled the Soviets to begin randomly picking up individuals 
suspected of opposing the government and “to destroy the life of anyone suspected of 
resistance.”  Through the use of torture and the threat of violence to families, KhAD 
forced individuals to admit their ‘guilt’, and then used those confessions to publicly 
justify its actions.174  The depth of KhAD’s penetration into the Afghan government 
meant that “no Afghan, with the exception of Karmal, was beyond its reach.”  Serving as 
both judge and jury, KhAD rarely acquitted people arrested for crimes against the 
government.175 
In addition to the KhAD forces working within society, the Soviet forces set up 
roadblocks to keep resistance fighters out of the cities and established curfews to make it 
more difficult to conduct resistance operations at night.176  All forms of resistance were 
discouraged.  Any efforts to demonstrate against the Karmal regime were met with harsh 
consequences.  Even demonstrations led by school children were suppressed by KhAD 
forces firing into the crowd.  When business owners attempted to go on strike in 
opposition to the government, KhAD forced them to re-open under the threat of being 
taken to jail.  Determined to rid Afghanistan of resistance fighters, the Soviets continued 
to use this policy in urban areas throughout the occupation. 
The Soviets, continually plagued by strong resistance forces in Kandahar and 
Herat, resorted to bombing and shelling resistance strongholds in these two cities.  When 
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these efforts failed, Soviet forces conducted “a brutal, block by block, WWII style 
assault”, but still failed to rid the cities of resistance.177  Finally, in 1987 and 1988, the 
Soviets began political assassinations, “the sort of tactic usually chosen by the weaker 
side in an irregular conflict.”178 
An exception to this policy of suppression was made shortly after the Soviet’s 
solidified their position in Afghanistan’s urban areas.  Though initially, the Soviets 
wanted to get rid of the mullahs, they later realized that these men could promote the 
Karmal regime.  Karmal portrayed himself as a religious man, going daily to prayers at 
the mosque in Kabul.  Karmal also invited all the mullahs in Afghanistan to a conference 
in July 1980 in an attempt to gain their support.  Ultimately, Moscow wanted to control 
the mullahs and to “obtain the appearance of religious sanction for government policies, 
including quoting the Koran to contend that fighting for the Karmal regime was 
accomplishing the injunction of God.”179  This policy demonstrated a movement from 
pure suppression to co-optation and showed that the Soviets did not believe the people of 
Afghanistan could be conquered through military force alone. 
a. Policy Results 
While the Soviet infiltration of the Afghan government succeeded in 
completely penetrating every level of administration, the Soviet decision to place Babrak 
Karmal at the head of the government failed to produce a legitimate government.  Elected 
by the people to serve two terms in parliament, he was an important and respected 
individual prior to the invasion (and a Durrani Pashtun).  However, the Soviets attempted 
to simply install him as the leader of Afghanistan without any process of legitimation.  
After killing Amin and taking control of the government, Karmal was flown into the 
country from the Soviet Union to assume control.  Because there was no attempt by the 
Soviets to gain the political support of the Afghan people and because Karmal did not 
arrive in country until four days after the coup took place, Afghans saw him as a puppet 
of Moscow.180  “[Karmal’s] presence alongside the Red Army is so small that it attracts 
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no attention.”181  Outside Karmal’s political faction, the Parchamis, he had no authority, 
and without Soviet protection and the Soviet army, Karmal had no control of the country.  
Resistance to Karmal’s regime began immediately. 
The decision to use Soviet soldiers from Central Asia backfired.  The 
Afghans did not perceive the Soviet invasion as any less hostile because there were a 
significant number of Central Asian soldiers.  In fact, this plan actually worked against 
the Soviets.  The Soviet Central Asians identified with the Afghans due to their ethnic 
and religious ties, and came to respect the Afghans for struggling so hard to accomplish 
what they themselves had failed to do.182 
The policy of suppression in Afghan urban areas had mixed results.  The 
heavy-handed tactics used by the Soviets and the KhAD quickly minimized the amount 
of resistance by the urban Afghans.  The policy managed to rid the major cities of 
resistance sympathizers by driving them out, imprisoning them, or killing them.  Though 
the ruthlessness of this particular policy enabled the Soviets to gain some measure of 
control in the urban areas, it did not inspire the people to accept the authority of Karmal’s 
regime.  Instead, such brutal tactics inspired those of questionable loyalty to the Karmal 
regime and those with no political affiliation to sympathize and aid resistance forces 
when possible.183  In addition, the flood of Afghan communist refugees coming from the 
countryside into the more protected cities made it easy for resistance fighters to gain 
entrance into the cities.184 
The mass movement of resistance sympathizers from urban areas to the 
rural areas of Afghanistan also had consequences for the Soviets.  Though the Soviets 
were initially successful in their efforts to subdue the Afghan resistance outside urban 
areas, largely due to the decision to strike early before the passes into Pakistan were 
open, it was only a matter of weeks before resistance forces regained control of the 
countryside.  The flight of resistance sympathizers into the countryside bolstered their  
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numbers.  This allowed resistance forces to establish footholds in the areas surrounding 
Kabul.  Because of this, PDPA members were under a constant threat of attack, even 
inside Kabul.185   
The persecution of Afghan religious leaders (ulema) between 1978 and 
1979 made it impossible for the Soviet controlled regime to re-establish the trust of the 
ulema.  The Soviets failed to control legitimate Afghan religious leaders (those who 
couldn’t be bought), and the majority of the ulema openly denounced the Soviet 
occupation, branded Karmal an atheist, and refused to submit their services to the 
Soviets.186  The Soviets’ successful policy of co-opting the ulema in Central Asia would 
not be available in Afghanistan.  Though the Soviets managed to co-opt a few mullahs, 
the majority of them spread the message of jihad against the Soviets.187 
2. Sovietization of Afghan Society 
The second of the initial three Soviet policies involved the “Sovietization” of 
Afghan society, which attempted to move away from the initial policy of suppression.  
This policy was directed exclusively at urban areas where the Soviets maintained more 
control over the people.  The intention of this policy was to co-opt Afghans by exposing 
them to the advantages of Soviet culture.  Children’s organizations were used to train and 
indoctrinate Afghan children in communist principles.  Government-controlled unions 
were instituted for all ordinary workers to expose them to the Soviet system and to allow 
the government to keep a firmer hold on Afghanistan’s labor force.  Women’s 
organizations were also started to teach and indoctrinate them about the advantages of 
Soviet society.  Significant bonuses, including chauffeur driven cars, rapid promotions, 
housing benefits, higher salaries, and travel opportunities to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, were offered to those partaking in these programs.  In addition to these measures, 
the Afghan media was put under the control of the Soviet Union.  Sixty percent of the 
broadcasts on Radio Kabul originated in the Soviet Union during the occupation.188 
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Under this policy, the Soviets also directed changes in Afghanistan’s educational 
system.  Afghan textbooks were replaced with books printed in the Soviet Union that re-
wrote Afghan history.  Religious studies were replaced with Marxist/Leninist ideologies.  
Many young children between the ages of six and ten were taken from their homes and 
sent to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc for educational opportunities and further 
exposure to Soviet culture.  At the university level, grants and scholarships to schools in 
the Soviet Union were awarded to students.  By 1981, “Afghanistan represented the 
largest contingent of students in the Eastern Bloc from any developing country.”  The 
only way for children or young adults to escape Soviet indoctrination and continue their 
education was to seek out religious schools, madrasas, in Pakistan.189  “By mid 1983, 
roughly 90% of the students at Kabul University were women, [and] only 10% were 
members of the PDPA.  Most of the anti-communist males had either escaped or had 
been drafted.”190  The majority of Afghans supporting the Sovietization policy were 
PDPA members, and those opposed to Sovietization had been forced to leave to escape 
persecution. 
The Soviets instituted massive reforms in the distribution of land.  The intention 
of this part of the policy was to gain the support of the peasants and thereby gain a 
foothold in the rural areas of Afghanistan.  Initially planned as a co-optive policy, land 
was taken from the Khans—or tribal leaders—and given to the younger, poorer men of 
the rural tribes in hopes of fostering trust for the government and separating these 
individuals from tribal customs.  When the younger farmers resisted the distribution, the 
Soviets changed to a more suppressive policy, forcing their changes on society through 
physical intimidation and attacking certain elements of Afghan custom such as “burning 
religious books, tearing the veils off women and mocking villagers at prayer.”191  
a. Policy Results 
Initially designed as a co-optive policy, Sovietization demonstrated Soviet 
understanding that a policy of pure suppression would not succeed in establishing Soviet 
authority in Afghanistan.  However, the Soviets grossly misjudged the effect 
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Sovietization would have on the Afghans.  To a Pashtun, Sovietization was an attempt by 
the central government to change the Pashtun way of life.  One example is illustrated by 
the fact that Pashtuns were unwilling to accept the redistribution of land.  The Soviets’ 
hoped that taking the land from the wealthier, often older, members of the tribe and 
giving it to the poorer, younger members would inspire cooperation and support for the 
communist regime.192  However, this violated the tribal custom of nikat, which 
established that all things are apportioned according to heredity and the tribe’s social 
order.  A second example was the fear that the Sovietization of the school systems would 
brainwash their children.  Therefore, both resistance sympathizers and neutral families 
took their children out of public schools.193   
Because Sovietization was seen as a method of forcing the Afghan people 
to change their customs in favor of Soviet social order, the policy failed to create 
legitimacy for the regime.  In addition, any Afghan seen taking favors or participating in 
the new social programs instituted under this policy, including the significant number of 
Afghan youth sent to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, were only seen as traitors or 
collaborators.194 
3. Creation of a Soviet-Afghan Army 
The third of the three initial Soviet policies was driven by the Khalqi domination 
of the Afghan army.  The Soviets did not trust those loyal to the Khalqi party, feeling 
they were too nationalistic.  Therefore, the Soviets disbanded the Afghan army and began 
to recruit its own Afghan army.  The intention of this policy was to allow the Soviet 
forces in theater to provide security for the regime and to enforce Soviet policy in the 
urban areas while the Afghan forces pursued resistance fighters in the countryside in 
order to drive them from Afghanistan.  Initially, this policy appeared be an effort to co-
opt Afghan men; including them in the occupation would give them a stake in the new 
government’s success.   
When the Soviets began to recruit men for the Afghan army, very few Afghans 
volunteered.  This drove the Soviets to change their recruiting methods from a co-optive 
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strategy to a suppressive policy.  “The method of recruitment resembled more a system of 
kidnapping.  Since the draftees were unwilling to join, the authorities dispatched army 
units to search houses for them.  Units of the army roamed the cities for that purpose.  
Conscription also became a purpose of the military expeditions in the countryside.  Draft 
dodgers were fired upon when they attempted to flee conscription.”195   
Failing to generate the numbers desired for their Afghan army, the Soviets 
instituted new policies which called for the return of any soldier that served in the armed 
forces between 1968 and 1978, increased the conscription period from two years to three, 
and broadened the scope of acceptable recruits to include boys as young as 14 years of 
age.196  These policies only added to the exodus of Afghan men to Pakistan and Iran. 
a. Policy Results 
This Soviet policy ultimately strengthened the Afghan resistance.  When 
the invasion occurred, many Afghan Army units, previously loyal to the PDPA, actually 
fought against the invasion and then later deserted to join the resistance, taking their 
weapons with them.  These desertions caused the Soviet commanders to stop issuing 
powerful tactical weapons such as anti-tank rockets and anti-aircraft missiles to the 
Afghan units to ensure they would not be used against Soviet tanks and aircraft.197 
Forced conscription led Afghan families to encourage their young men to 
flee.  These young men were driven to the folds of the Afghan resistance or to the refugee 
camps in Pakistan where they attended the madrasas—the primary recruiting ground for 
the resistance.  Recalled reservists either left the cities, much as the younger men had 
done, or they reported for duty in order to get their issued weapon and then deserted to 
join the resistance.198   
The failures of this policy were accentuated by the Soviets’ move from co-
optation to suppression.  This move only worsened the relationship between the Soviet-
sponsored regime in Kabul and those Afghans that were initially neither supportive nor 
resistant to the Soviet occupation.    
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4. Provincial Division 
In August of 1980, the Soviets created a new policy to better administrate and 
control the regions outside Kabul.  This policy also suggested a move from suppression 
to co-optation.  Afghanistan’s 28 provinces were divided into eight administrative 
districts.  An Afghan PDPA official was put in charge of each district and given 
command of the provincial governors.  In addition, a Soviet military commander was 
assigned to each district to serve as an advisor to the district chief.   
Although the head of each zone was given special power to resolve 
administrative, political, and security issues, his real job was that of a 
social liaison officer.  By spending money and exerting pressure, the 
regime was able to summon community elders to meet with him.  The 
program was a resort to conventions according to which rulers in time of 
crisis would seek the cooperation of community elders in repairing the 
broken chains of social order.  The heads of the zones would lecture the 
elders on the goodwill of the regime and the advantages that would be 
theirs once peace and security were restored.199 
Though this policy suggests that the Soviets believed gaining the support of 
village elders would improve their legitimacy among the tribes, the Soviets continued to 
use harsh, suppressive policies under the guise of an attempt to improve social relations 
with the tribes in each district.200   
a. Policy Results 
The administrative policy of dividing Afghanistan’s 28 provinces into 8 
administrative districts under a Zone Chief and a military adviser failed.  These districts 
were designed as military districts rather than civil districts.  The focus became the 
security of the district and civil affairs were pushed aside.  Ultimately, this policy was 
designed to “pacify the country.”  However, because the Soviet military advisor was not 
bound to support the efforts of the Afghan district chief, the people did not respond to the 
chief’s attempts to mend the widening gap between the people and the government.201  
Tribes continued to resist overtures made by the representatives of the Karmal regime.   
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By 1982, many Soviet officials acknowledged that Kabul had a very tentative hold on 
Afghanistan and that at least 18 of the 28 provinces were predominantly under the control 
of the resistance.202 
5. Forceful Pacification 
While the Soviets consolidated their hold of the urban areas in Afghanistan during 
the early stages of the invasion, they also made an attempt to gain control of the eastern 
region of Afghanistan.  By striking in the East in the spring of 1980, before the snow in 
the mountain passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan had melted, the Soviets hoped to 
prevent resistance fighters from escaping into Pakistan and isolate them in the hills 
surrounding the cities and villages from which they fled.203  The Soviets were intent on 
either suppressing or eliminating the Afghan resistance in the countryside from the start 
of the invasion. 
Because their plan for using the Afghan army to suppress the resistance outside 
the urban areas failed, the Soviets were unable to maintain their initial momentum in 
rural Afghanistan.  By the early summer of 1980, Afghan resistance fighters were making 
gains in the countryside.204  This led to a steady increase of violence being used against 
the resistance.  When resistance fighters attacked the outposts, Soviet-sponsored forces 
retaliated by randomly firing on the surrounding villages.  Farming or any other outdoor 
activity became extremely dangerous.  The intent of this coercive strategy was to create 
tension between the resistance and local Afghans.205   
The Soviets set up military posts in strategic areas in order to penetrate the 
Afghan frontier in the east.  This particular aspect of Soviet policy combined elements of 
suppression with co-optation.  Afghan mercenaries were hired by the Soviets to man the 
outposts.  These mercenaries were highly paid and were allowed to steal from the nearby 
towns and villages.  The Soviets also enlisted the support of Pashtun tribal militias in the 
eastern region.  Previous Afghan regimes had a tradition of contracting out security to 
tribal militias.  Because they were such good marksmen and tacticians, these militias 
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were often better than the regular army units.  This tradition was especially successful 
when Afghanistan’s leader possessed authority in the eyes of the tribes.  However, 
Karmal’s regime had no credibility or respect.  Therefore, Karmal had to pay the tribal 
militias for their services and was not guaranteed of their loyalty.206 
By December 1980, the Soviets had built 40 outposts between Kabul and 
Jalalabad.  The Soviets shifted their focus to the eastern frontier, hoping to cut off the 
main supply routes from Pakistan.  “Hoping to reduce the number of attacks on the posts, 
the Soviets nearly abandoned their practice of unprovoked shelling of the inhabited areas.  
But if the mujahideen fired at either the military posts or Soviet troops elsewhere, the 
invading forces adopted scorched earth tactics.  Tanks and helicopter gunships would 
furiously shell targets in regions from which shots had been fired.”   Using less direct 
methods, the Soviets continued to pressure villagers in the region to stop supporting the 
resistance fighters.207 
Main supply routes from Pakistan located in regions that made them difficult to 
secure were bombed and cleared.  Buildings and vegetation within 150 meters of the road 
on either side was removed.  This made it easier for Soviet forces to patrol these roads.  
The rules of engagement were not restrictive; patrols were given the authority to kill any 
individual found inside the 150 meter buffer area.208   
Understanding that the primary source of resistance was coming from Pakistan, 
and that the border area was far too large to control with the number of soldiers deployed 
to Afghanistan, the Soviets attempted to create a “no-man’s land” along the Durand Line.  
This strategy had two objectives: first, to rid the border area of resistance fighters, and 
second, to intimidate Pakistan into stopping its support for the resistance.  The Soviets 
used aerial deployed mines and patrols by helicopter gunships to slow the traffic along 
the border.  This had drastic effects because these measures did not differentiate between 
those individuals going to the NWFP in search of asylum from resistance forces coming 
back into Afghanistan.209 
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However, much like the urban areas, the less suppressive strategies were all 
created after the suppressive strategies had been put in place. 
a. Policy Results 
The Soviets’ pursuit of subjugating the people on the Afghan frontier 
proved to be short-sighted.  What the Soviets initially considered a success, driving out 
those who were not willing to yield to Soviet authority, ended up only contributing to the 
support of the Afghan resistance.  Consistently, the Soviets made choices that would only 
pacify the frontier in the short term.   
Though the construction and manning of outposts throughout the frontier 
signaled a longer term strategy, the random shelling of innocent villagers to stop 
resistance attacks on the outposts did not contribute to Soviet legitimacy.  Soviet doctrine 
which directed forces to retaliate against attacks by the mujahideen by randomly 
attacking nearby Afghan villagers succeeded in persuading the mujahideen not to attack 
Soviet outposts from the nearby villages, but the attacks continued and later became more 
cautious and more difficult to effectively retaliate against.210  In addition, the policy only 
served to emphasize the ruthlessness of the Soviet invaders and inspired villages, who 
may have been neutral towards the occupation, to actively seek badal (revenge) against 
the Soviets. 
The Soviets managed to successfully co-opt many poor, disenfranchised 
Afghans by making them mercenaries and using them to man the outposts along the 
eastern frontier.  The posts where the mercenaries were based were successful in 
countering overt attacks by the mujahideen, so the mujahideen infiltrated them covertly 
and destroyed them from within.  Each time this occurred the Soviets simply re-installed 
new forces and the whole process started over.   
The Soviets’ brutal methods to pacify the frontier by gaining control over 
the roads and main supply routes also failed to convince neutral Afghans to accept Soviet 
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often closed, starving the city of food and fuel.  The mujahideen slowly gained control of 
many of the roads, and the Soviets had to simply accept the fact due to a lack of capacity 
to respond.211   
By the third year of occupation, the Soviets had almost completely lost 
control of the supply routes.  Though the Soviets managed to establish a “no man’s land” 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, they did not have the capacity to monitor the entire 
border sufficiently to prevent the mujahideen from crossing.  Supply caravans were able 
to move throughout the countryside with little to no resistance.212  Though the Soviet 
army, with its tanks and helicopters, demonstrated the ability to successfully engage the 
mujahideen forces in virtually any location, the duration of Soviet presence was so short 
that it was nearly meaningless.  It was the mujahideen that were in control of the 
countryside.213 
The Soviet strategy to pacify the frontier through the use of force only 
served to enrage the population.  Though it seems that burning crops and villages, 
intimidating the people, and occasionally engaging the mujahideen (when they could find 
them) would possibly have weakened the resistance over time, the mujahideen continued 
to grow in strength because of the collateral damage inflicted on those who were not 
directly involved in the resistance.214 
6. Divide and Conquer Pacification 
When the Soviets realized they could not defeat the resistance militarily, they 
decided to revert to a flexible policy of subversion, co-optation, and accommodation.  
Because the Kremlin had decided that a significant increase of Soviet troops was not an 
option, “the systematic application of KGB-style subversion—the use of psychological 
and economic pressures, informers, agents, financial pay-offs, imprisonment, threats and 
privileges—[represented] an increasingly effective weapon in the government’s efforts to 
attract or split loyalties among the tribes, ethnic groups, exiled political parties and 
resistance fronts.”  The Soviets focused on using existing rivalries between the Pashtun 
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tribes located on the eastern frontier, in hopes of playing one tribe or clan off another.215  
One practice involved empowering one tribal or clan faction over another by offering the 
one side the money and weapons necessary to defeat the other.216   
The Soviets also began to play upon the rivalries between Afghanistan’s 
numerous ethnic groups.  The Soviets formed a coalition of different ethnic groups to 
oppose Pashtun domination.  The Soviets also tried to engage the minority Shi’a sect 
found among the Hazaras by appealing to Iran for support.217   
Ultimately, the Soviets intended to replace the enmity felt by the vast majority of 
Afghans towards the Soviet invaders by stirring up the long-established rivalries already 
present in Afghanistan. 
a. Policy Results 
Frustrated with their failures to establish control of the Afghan 
countryside, Soviet efforts to adopt more co-optive and accommodative policies on the 
Afghan frontier were met with mixed results.  The first major attempt by the Soviets was 
to send the new Minister of Tribal Affairs, Fayz Mohammad (a Pashtun), out into the 
Afghan frontier to make use of his knowledge of common cultural and tribal customs and 
mores to convince tribal elders to stop their support of the mujahideen and to allow the 
Soviets access to their military outposts.  Though Mohammad managed to get many of 
the Pashtun elders to agree to allow Soviet forces to gain access to their outposts, 
Mohammad was killed by the tribal police force.  The Soviets and the PDPA only 
responded by claiming that the murderers violated Pashtunwali by failing to grant 
Mohammad melmastia.  The tribes responded by stating that Mohammad “abandoned 
Pashtunwali when he sided with the invaders and distributed money.  The code, therefore, 
did not apply.”218 
In another instance, the Soviets successfully convinced some tribes in the 
Paktia province not to join the mujahideen by promising them that Soviet forces would 
not intrude on their tribal territories.  However, when the Soviets later found themselves 
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pursuing or engaging mujahideen forces in the agreed neutral areas, the tribes joined the 
mujahideen in fighting the Soviets.219 
When the Soviets successfully co-opted Afghan leaders, those leaders 
typically lost the support of their followers when they tried to convince them to help the 
Soviets.220  When the Soviets tried to play on the divisions in tribal or ethnic factions, 
many of these groups would often pledge their loyalty to the Soviets in exchange for 
money and weapons and then later desert to support the mujahideen.221   
The Soviets failed to grasp the common practice of segmentary societies 
to put aside internal enmity towards a collective enemy.  Therefore, most Soviet 
successes in gaining the support of tribes on the Afghan frontier were only temporary and 
only valid until it no longer served the tribe’s interest. 
7. Reverse Forward Policy 
By the end of 1984, the Soviets had managed to establish a 50 kilometer wide 
“no-man’s land” along the Durand Line.  However, the flow of supplies and resistance 
fighters from Pakistan continued to plague Soviet efforts to gain control of Afghanistan.  
Realizing that the true strength of the resistance was found across the border in Pakistan, 
the Soviets began attacking targets on both sides of the border in order to intimidate 
Islamabad and to suppress resistance efforts to fight inside Afghanistan.  The Soviets also 
began to conduct covert operations inside Pakistan, including terrorist bombings in 
Peshawar and infiltrating Soviet agents into the refugee camps.  
By 1987, the Soviets had regained some control over the Durand Line, but the 
effectiveness of the resistance had become more lethal.  Frustrated, the Soviets began 
attacking civilian areas in the NWFP and continued to support terrorist activities inside 
Pakistan.  This policy was intended to influence the political leadership of Pakistan.  
Without Pakistan, the Soviet’s believed the Afghan resistance would dry up.222 
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a. Policy Results 
The use of collaborators to penetrate resistance groups based in the 
refugee camps and to either inform the Soviets about their plans or to kill powerful 
resistance leaders proved to be quite effective.  Because so many young men were fleeing 
conscription, it was easy for the Soviet agents to penetrate these groups.223   
The overt attacks on refugee areas in Pakistan, however, failed to hinder 
Pakistani support and only served to stiffen the resistance.  External support in the form 
of military training and the distribution of more sophisticated weapons (most notably 
anti-aircraft missiles) were provided to the mujahideen because of these attacks.224    
Though Islamabad was deeply concerned about the presence of Soviet 
agents operating inside its northwestern border and some of Pakistan’s urban areas, the 
popular support for the jihad against the Soviet invaders was strong.  In addition, the 
support of the United States and Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with the ability to 
counter Soviet efforts under this policy.  Therefore, this Soviet strategy really lacked the 
teeth it needed to sufficiently convince Pakistan to withdraw its support of the 
mujahideen, and provoked a response which ultimately doomed Soviet efforts to stamp 
out the resistance. 
8. Migratory Genocide 
The policy of “migratory genocide” focused on pushing Afghans opposed to 
Soviet occupation out of the country.  This policy reflected pure suppression and left 
Afghans with only one of two choices: to accept Soviet occupation, or to flee to one of 
the neighboring countries.225  This particular policy reflects the greater objective sought 
by most of the other suppressive Soviet policies mentioned above. 
In the beginning, the Soviets pushed out the opposition through terror tactics such 
as torture, imprisonment, random violence, and execution.  Once the cities were 
somewhat under control and the majority of the Afghan opposition was pushed out into 
the countryside, the Soviets expanded operations from the urban areas to the countryside.  
Ground operations supported by helicopter gunships attacked suspected locations of 
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resistance forces.  After the first year of occupation, Soviet policy changed to allow 
greater suppression of resistance forces.  Attacks were no longer responses to resistance 
operations.  Any village suspected of helping the resistance was burnt to the ground, had 
its crops razed and its livestock killed.  The Kremlin, it appeared, had decided that 
demoralizing the civilians capable of supporting the resistance would rid the countryside 
of resistance sympathizers.  Without food or shelter, these people were forced, like many 
others, to flee to Pakistan or Iran.226 
a. Policy Results 
Much like the observations regarding the Soviets’ attempt to pacify the 
Afghan frontier through the use of force, the Soviets elected to focus on short-term goals 
rather than successfully establishing Soviet authority over the people of Afghanistan.  It 
seems that the Soviets believed that the Afghans would simply leave their homeland, 
never to return, or accept Soviet domination and abandon their social and tribal customs 
that had dominated Afghan society for centuries.  Initially, it appeared that this specific 
Soviet policy, which provided the basis for most of the other policies used during the 
occupation, had spectacular results.  “Faced with a policy that offers little choice other 
than outright submission, five million Afghans or more have fled from their homeland to 
Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere in search of asylum.  That is nearly one Afghan in three.”227   
However, history reveals that this suppression-based policy failed.  
Although the Soviets managed to drive nearly five million Afghans out of Afghanistan, it 
did not stop the refugees from fighting back.  The mujahideen, trained and armed by 
foreign countries equally interested in causing the Soviets to fail in their mission to 
occupy Afghanistan, were better equipped and better trained due to their presence in 
Pakistan.  Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the Soviet policy of “migratory 
genocide” greatly contributed to the mujahideen’s success in making the war too costly 
(both politically and monetarily) for the Soviets to continue.   
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO SOVIET POLICIES 
The objective of this section is to apply the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter I to the collection of Soviet policies in the Tribal Areas in order to clarify the 
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sources of Pashtun resistance and to judge the validity of the framework.  Success, in 
terms of policy, is defined as state action which promotes the state’s authority over the 
tribes.  The end result should enable the state to establish a common rule of law for all its 
citizens and to gain/maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within its 
borders. 
1. Organizational Factors 
a. Government Tribal Policy should be based on the Tribe’s Social 
Organization 
Though the Soviets had the benefit of observing the successes and failures 
of different British policies for over 100 years in this area and different Pakistani policies 
for over 30 years, the Soviets failed to learn from others’ mistakes.  In many ways, the 
Soviets made the same mistakes as the British when they tried to make arrangements with 
tribal elders in exchange for their neutrality or submission.  Similar to the failures of the 
Maliki System in the previous two chapters, Pashtun tribal elders did not have the power 
to commit the entire tribe to any sort of arrangement without a general consensus. 
This fact was highlighted when Minister Fayz Mohammad was killed by 
members of a Pashtun tribal police.  The tribal police (arobaki) “is authorized to undo a 
settlement that it believes its elders have negotiated against the interests of the tribe.  As 
it maintains other service groups—mullahs, shepherds, and millers—the tribe maintains 
the arobaki to enforce the decisions of the jirgahs and a host of other decisions affecting 
the community.  Supported by the community, the arobaki is a force against disorder.”228  
Therefore, the Soviets were doomed to make the same mistakes as the British and the 
Pakistanis by failing to understand Pashtun customs with respect to the tribe’s social 
organization, and that the acceptance of Soviet authority by any single individual did not 
guarantee that all would accept it. 
The Soviets also violated the proposition concerning the importance of 
tribal social organization, as well as the proposition demanding consideration for the 
tribe’s perception of justice (which will only be discussed in this section to avoid 
reiterating the point later), when they attempted to Sovietize Afghan farmers.  The poor 
peasant farmers resisted taking land from Khans or other wealthier landowners because it 
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violated the custom of nikat.  Per Pashtun custom, each individual had a specific lot in 
life and it would be against Pashtunwali to upset that balance.  Were one to accept the re-
apportionment of the land by the Soviets, it would likely have spawned a “blood feud” 
and demanded some reprisal under the custom of badal.  When the Soviets resorted to 
violently enforcing the new land distributions, it was clear they did not understand this 
particular aspect of Pashtun custom, or that they possibly believed they could simply 
erase the custom through suppression and violence.  In either case, such a policy would 
not likely have inspired Pashtuns to accept Soviet authority. 
b. Government Tribal Policy aimed at segregating or isolating tribes 
undermines State Authority 
The Soviet policy of “migratory genocide” was specifically designed to 
segregate and isolate individuals who were not supportive of Soviet authority.  The 
Soviet failure in terms of this proposition ended up strengthening the resistance of the 
mujahideen.  First, the Soviet attempt to close the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan failed.  The Soviets were not sufficiently manned to obtain such an objective 
and the result was the creation of a sanctuary and training ground for the mujahideen.  In 
addition, the increasing number of refugees that the Soviets pushed out of Afghan urban 
and rural areas only provided the mujahideen with greater numbers of recruits. 
Second, it was impossible for the Soviets to completely isolate the 
mujahideen from Afghan urban or rural areas.  The policy of concentrating on the urban 
areas suggests that the Soviets did not understand Afghan demographics.  The vast 
majority of the Afghan population lived outside the cities.  Therefore, by attempting to 
isolate the cities from the rural areas, the Soviets were focusing their efforts on the wrong 
area if their objective was to establish Soviet authority over Afghanistan.   
The relatively small force size of the Soviet invasion/occupation force 
suggests the Soviets understood they were undermanned and should therefore focus on 
gaining control of the urban areas.  This mindset appears to originate from a more 
European perspective that suggests that capturing a country’s capital and urban areas will 
cause the rest of the country to submit to the invasion force.  However, in a non-industrial 




succeed in establishing Soviet authority.  Instead, useless search and destroy missions 
aimed at the attrition of mujahideen forces in the rural areas of Afghanistan were 
conducted with little effect. 
In addition, the Soviets failed to completely isolate the urban areas under 
their control from the mujahideen.  Afghan urban dwellers that were secretly 
unsupportive of the Soviet invaders would assist the mujahideen in gaining access to 
urban areas and carrying out attacks against the Soviets or members of the PDPA.  
Outside the urban areas, the mujahideen controlled the vast majority of the rural areas, 
despite the Soviets’ advanced weapons and tactics.  By isolating the urban areas, the 
Soviets could never have expanded their control outside the cities on a permanent basis.  
Because of domestic political pressure, the Soviets were in a race against the clock to 
gain control of Afghanistan, and the mujahideen only had to continue to resist and force 
the Soviets to continue to operate from within the urban areas in order to ultimately re-
claim their homeland from the Soviets. 
The third failure of Soviet policy with respect to this proposition was the 
purge of all “anti-communist” government officials.  “One of the greatest problems in 
Afghanistan always had been a shortage of trained, capable administrators to run the 
government and the economy.”  Because there were so few capable members of the 
Parchami faction of the PDPA, the Soviets immediately ran into problems with 
government operation.  Capable individuals were replaced with young PDPA party 
members, lacking both the experience and the training to effectively manage the 
government.  In this sense, the isolation of capable individuals undermined Soviet 
authority because it prevented them from creating a credible government that could 
encourage support for the Soviet-sponsored regime. 
2. Normative Factors 
a. Government Tribal Policy should consider the Tribe’s Perception 
of Justice on the Establishment of State Authority 
Almost every Soviet policy that involved the use of suppression violated 
this proposition.  From the beginning it was clear that the Soviets had no intention of 
limiting their tactics and strategies to ensure they were perceived as just by the Afghans.  
Hassan Kakar, a prisoner of the Soviet regime in Afghanistan, accurately framed one 
aspect of Soviet policy that violated this proposition.  “The violence that the Soviets and 
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their compliant Afghans perpetrated could not remain unchallenged by a people whose 
value system demands that they take revenge.  The Afghans also considered it their right 
to use violence since the Soviets had left no alternative to change the regime they had 
imposed.”229  It appears that the Soviets believed that the use of overwhelming 
suppressive force would eventually lead the Pashtun, and the other Afghans, to submit to 
Soviet authority.  Though this may have proved to be true, the Soviets did not have the 
political will to sustain the Afghan occupation long enough for this policy to be 
effective.230 
The Soviet conversion to forced conscription is a specific example of how 
the Soviets violated the Pashtun sense of justice.  By 1982, this aspect of Soviet policy 
significantly damaged the already poor image of the Soviet invaders.  Many of the men 
who had joined the PDPA to avoid military service were being forced into the army.  
Schools were practically devoid of young males, and the Afghan people scorned the 
Soviets for the brutal tactics they used to enlist soldiers to fight the mujahideen.231 
The Soviet choice to pursue short-term goals, such as acquiring an army of 
sufficient size to either eliminate the mujahideen or to prevent them from conducting 
insurgency operations in Afghanistan, were consistently chosen over attempts to instill 
confidence and trust in the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul.  Soviet policies were 
typically short on co-optive or accommodating strategies that would be considered just 
and legitimate by the different tribes and ethnic groups of Afghanistan.  Instead, the 
Soviets favored suppressive strategies that would force Afghans to submit and at the 
same time foster hatred and distrust for other Soviet actions.  
The atrocities attributed to the Soviet invasion and occupation often 
countered Soviet efforts to pursue more co-optive or accommodative policies.  Soviet 
policies in Central Asia were working against Soviet forces as soon as the invasion 
began.  “Once the Russians were seen to be assuming direct control like a would-be 
conquering army—the collapse of the Afghan army was accelerated by massive refusals 
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to fight for a Russian-installed regime.”232  The majority of Afghan people did not trust 
the Soviets and viewed their actions as unjust.  Tribal elders were often over-ridden when 
they entered into agreements of support or neutrality for the Soviets.  The mullahs, for the 
most part, were also unwilling to accept Soviet or PDPA efforts to gain their support. 
The Soviet decision to predominantly use terror and intimidation tactics, 
even before the invasion began, meant that any policy the USSR would use in 
Afghanistan would struggle with regards to the Pashtun sense of justice.  The Russians 
already had a somewhat negative reputation from their exploits during the Great Game 
based on their efforts to conquer Central Asia and influence Afghan politics.  The bias 
against the Soviets was not necessarily anti-imperialism, it was due to the fate of Central 
Asia and the fact that Afghans did not want to see history repeat itself in their country.  
Therefore, it was likely that no Soviet policy, no matter how accommodating, could have 
established Soviet authority in a manner that would have been perceived as just by the 
Pashtun, or any other Afghan. 
b. Customary Norms, not Religious Norms are what impede State 
Authority 
In his book Revolution Unending, Dorronsoro makes the claim that the 
presence of religious norms is what binds the mujahideen together in their jihad against 
the Soviets.  However, he fails to note the norm surrounding segmentary societies that 
binds tribes, and even ethnic groups, together when facing a common threat to deeply 
entrenched social customs and mores.  Though it is possible that religious norms did 
indeed provide the glue between the different ethnic groups and tribes of Afghanistan 
during the anti-Soviet jihad, it is also important to consider the possibility that religion 
only provided a common ground that had the appearance of binding the mujahideen 
together as one fighting force.   
The most significant piece of evidence that counters this notion was the 
presence of in-fighting between the different mujahideen groups on the eastern frontier.  
These groups were predominantly all Sunni Muslims, and despite their common religious 
background, they were mostly divided along ethnic and regional boundaries, they mostly 
fought as separate units with little cooperation, they often fought amongst each other and 
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later engaged in a struggle for control of the state as Soviet domination waned.  When the 
Soviets retreated from Afghanistan, a bitter struggle for control of Kabul ensued.  Despite 
a common religion among the majority of Afghans, ethnicity and tribal affiliation once 
again became the binding force among the different groups fighting for control of the 
State. 
E. CONCLUSION 
From the beginning it appeared that the Soviets were intent on forcing the diverse, 
fragmented, multi-ethnic population to conform to the Soviet communist mold.  
Suppression became the primary tool for establishing Soviet authority.  Because the 
social practices of the Karmal regime, and later the Najibullah regime, were in stark 
contrast to the well established customs of the different ethnic groups, especially the 
independent Pashtuns, the Afghans resisted Soviet and PDPA efforts to establish their 
authority.  Though the rural population was indifferent to the ascension of the PDPA in 
1978, it was when the Soviets tried to establish their authority in the urban and rural areas 
that the real problems began. 
The Soviet plan to terrorize, imprison, or execute all non-conformers in 
Afghanistan caused many of those who were ambivalent about the Karmal regime were 
pushed to support the mujahideen.  Shortly after the invasion, the Soviets recognized the 
need for less suppressive tactics.  In some cases the Soviets attempted to institute more 
co-optative policies such as offering support to mullahs, land reforms to benefit the poor, 
and the Sovietization of Afghanistan’s civil society.  However, these policies were either 
instituted too late (support for the mullahs), or in direct contrast to local custom (land 
reforms and social programs). 
An important lesson to be learned from Soviet efforts to subdue resistance forces 
in Afghanistan is that suppression is not a policy that will allow a central government to 
legitimately dominate its people under what Weber characterizes as “charismatic 
domination” or “domination by virtue”.  This form of domination only can hope to gain 
legitimacy by existing so long that the leader of the central government gains legitimacy 
in the sense of “traditional domination.”233   
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The Soviet decision to focus on the urban areas was driven by the limited number 
of soldiers allocated for occupying Afghanistan.  The failure to recruit, train, and equip 
an indigenous force capable of either suppressing or eliminating the mujahideen and their 
supporters made it impossible for the Soviets to adequately control the countryside and 
slow or stop the spread of the insurgency.  Most Soviet failures were followed with 
harsher, more brutal suppression which only encouraged the insurgency.  Another lesson 
that can be learned from the Soviet experiences in Afghanistan is that limited 
geographical control, combined with ever-increasing suppressive tactics, stiffens 
resistance. 
In the end, the Soviets failed to conquer Afghanistan because Moscow and the 
Soviet people lost the political will to succeed.  The mujahideen, with the aid of the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran, succeeded in making the war too costly  
for the Soviets with too little benefit.  The Kremlin’s lack of desire to commit more 
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VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
My sons and successors should not try to introduce reforms of any kind 
in such a hurry as to set the people against their ruler…they must adopt 
all these gradually as the people become accustomed to the idea of 
modern innovation. 
    Abdur Rahman Khan 
    Amir of Afghanistan, 1880-1901 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The cases presented in the previous three chapters have provided detailed 
descriptions of the policies used by three different central governments to establish 
authority over a Pashtun society residing in “ungoverned spaces” within their territory or 
sphere of interest.  Though the government in each case study was significantly different 
from the other two, the one thing all three had in common was the ethnicity of the people 
living in the region. 
Chapter I posed the question, “Under what conditions can state authority 
successfully supersede tribal custom?”  This question led to the development of this 
thesis’ theoretical framework which is based on the existence of barriers that divide a 
tribal ethnic group from the state in which it lives.  A review of several different 
explanations for tribal resistance to state authority divides the causes of these barriers into 
two categories: organizational factors and normative factors.  Within each category there 
are two propositions that this thesis proposes a government should consider when 
engaging tribally-based ethnic societies:   
Organizational Structural Factors 
1. Government policy based on the tribe’s social organization is more likely 
to be considered legitimate than those that disregard it.  
2. Government policy aimed at segregating or isolating tribes is likely to 
undermine the state’s authority. 
Normative Structural Factors 
3. If the tribe’s perception of the state’s policy is unfair in terms of the tribe’s 
customs and culture, then the tribe will likely resist. 
4. Customary norms, not religious beliefs, are what impede state authority. 
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The purpose of these propositions has been to pose a set of considerations that 
would help define the conditions under which an ethnic group will either accept or reject 
government authority. 
Chapter II provided an in depth look at the organization and customs of the 
Pashtun.  The Pashtun have an established social hierarchy that extends from the family 
up to the tribal level.  Tribal leaders, Khans, do not possess enough authority to direct the 
tribe without a consensus.  In this sense, the Pashtun are quite democratic in the way they 
handle tribal affairs. 
The rural Pashtun are a segmentary society that can be divided into three separate 
groups: nomadic tribes, sedentary hill tribes and sedentary plains tribes.  Both nomadic 
tribes and sedentary hill tribes tend to be more isolated, more resistant to authority, and 
more dedicated in their observance of Pashtunwali—the Pashtun tribal code.  Sedentary 
plains Pashtun have traditionally been farmers who live on the highly accessible plains of 
the tribal areas.  Because of their location, they are typically less isolated, less resistant 
(yet still resistant), and less rigid in their interpretation of Pashtunwali. 
 Pashtunwali provides the normative and organizational structure for the majority 
of the Pashtun living in the rural areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  In this setting, a 
Pashtun’s life is governed by his observance of the code.  Pashtunwali gives a Pashtun his 
identity.  Without it, an individual is ostracized from the tribe (even his family), stripping 
him of his support network which provides for his welfare and security.   
Organizational and normative factors associated with the rural Pashtun society 
have been the source of friction between the Pashtun and any entity desiring to impose its 
own authority over them.  Chapters III, IV, and V presented three different case studies to 
analyze different policies used by three very different governments to establish its 
authority.   
B. CASE STUDY SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
1. Great Britain 
The British, motivated by the desire to protect their resources and profitable 
markets in British India from the Russians, extended their influence into the Indian sub-
continent’s northwest frontier.  This area, mostly inhabited by the Pashtun, was vital to 
the British because it was the most likely Russian invasion route.   
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For nearly 100 years the British directed a number of different policies intended 
to secure the northwest frontier by bringing the Pashtun living there under the control of 
British authority.  Almost immediately, the British realized they were faced with a 
daunting task that required some degree of flexibility in their policies.  The evolution of 
British policy in the region can best be characterized as a steady conversion from 
suppression to accommodation.  The outcomes of the different policies traced a similar 
path moving from total rejection to moderate forms of compromise and acceptance.  
Table 1 contains a summary of these policies, defining the type and outcome in terms of 
the scale discussed in Chapter I. 
 
Table 1. British Policy Summary. 
Despite their attempts to blend their administration of the region with tribal 
customs, the British were never able to establish their authority in a way that permitted 
the British to establish their rule of law or to gain a monopoly on the violence in the 
Pashtun areas. Though the British ultimately failed in their quest to successfully govern 
the Pashtun, there are a number of important lessons that can be learned from their 
experience. 
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Early British policies such as the extension of the Indian Penal Code and the 
Close Border policy to the NWF were forced on the British field commanders under the 
direction of the British government in India.  These actions suggest the political 
leadership wrongly assumed that the Pashtun would accept British laws using carrots and 
sticks–the carrots being improved infrastructure and personal protection from British 
troops, and the stick being the threat of violence from British soldiers for not complying 
with British laws.   
As indicated in the table above, suppressive policies failed to extend British 
authority into the NWF.    Though the Close Border policy managed to gain some 
cooperation from a number of the sedentary plains tribes, the British failed to 
successfully isolate or deter either the nomadic tribes or the sedentary hill tribes that were 
accustomed to raiding nearby villages in the settled areas.  The plains Pashtun saw little 
improvement in their personal security and were reluctant to sacrifice their commitment 
to Pashtunwali.  It was almost impossible for the British to bring unlawful individuals to 
justice under the Indian Penal Code because of the Pashtun customs of melmastia and 
nanawatai. 
The most significant failure of British policy was its consistent misperception of 
the importance of Pashtun social structure (Proposition 1).  Simply put, it appears the 
British continued to use a shoe that would not fit.  Culminating in the establishment of 
the Maliki System, British policy consistently sought out individuals that seemed to have 
enough influence within the tribe to facilitate the actions taken by the British.  These 
actions suggest the British were strongly influenced by the role certain Pashtun men 
played in the jirgah.  As stated in Chapter II, certain Pashtun men did have more 
influence over the tribe, but the British overestimated the ability of one, or even a few 
men, to direct the actions of the entire tribe.   
Also related to Proposition 1, the British failed to understand the importance of an 
individual’s social standing based on the custom of nikat (heredity).  British attempts to 
circumvent nikat and reward individuals for their performance or cooperation only 
caused friction within the tribe, which was most often directed at the individual receiving 
British favors.  Hoping to eventually gain the trust of individual Pashtun men, the British 
continued to engage in these actions throughout their time on the NWF.  Unfortunately, 
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these actions highlighted the differences between the two cultures and demonstrated that 
the British did not really understand, or care about, Pashtunwali.  Yet despite the British 
failings with the Maliki System and their attempts to circumvent nikat, there were some 
successes in British policy with respect to normative factors that provide important 
lessons.   
The steady evolution of British policy in terms of appealing to a Pashtun sense of 
justice (Proposition 3) provided the British with significant improvements in attaining 
order on the NWF.  British policy after 1872 made gains in this category.   The British 
steadily sought legitimacy for their policies through the use of Pashtun custom. 
The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was the first example which demonstrated 
the British understood the importance of creating a system which appealed to a Pashtun’s 
sense of justice.  By borrowing the legitimacy of village Maliks, the British created a 
hybrid system of justice to enforce their laws.  The second example was the expansion of 
this concept into the policy of Indirect Rule which allowed Pashtun tribes to settle both 
criminal and civil cases without interference from the British.  Although these policies 
increased the number of people being brought before tribal courts, the Pashtun were not 
afraid to intimidate the Maliks or seek revenge against them should they rule in a manner 
that either appeared to serve British interests over Pashtun interests or was deemed an 
unsuitable interpretation of justice under Pashtunwali.   
From the British perspective, both the FCR and Indirect Rule improved the level 
of civil order on the NWF.  The Pashtun participated in the imposed judicial system to a 
much higher degree, which was a positive sign, despite the increase in violent acts by 
Pashtun tribesmen and the subsequent British expeditions to punish them.  In the end, 
these policies ultimately failed to establish British authority.   
It appears the British used Indirect Rule in an attempt to minimize the violence 
directed at British symbols of authority.  Unfortunately, the use of subsidies in 
conjunction with the establishment of Indirect Rule created a scenario where the tribes 
became satisfied receiving money from the British in exchange for not engaging in 
violent behavior.  Per Prospect theory, once this practice became the new reference point 
for Pashtun dealings with the British, any concession of independence would be 
interpreted as a loss.  A second, and more important lesson that can be taken from this 
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failure is that bribes can backfire if they only ask an individual to refrain from doing 
something rather than ask an individual to change in a more proactive way, because the 
individual re-normalizes his reference point, making it more expensive and more difficult 
to bribe the same individual later.  The failure of the other policies in this particular 
category made it impossible for the British to succeed in gaining Pashtun recognition of 
British authority without significant changes in the resources allotted to accomplish the 
mission.      
With respect to Proposition 4, British experiences with the Pashtun prior to 1848 
allowed them to gain an understanding of the way Islam has been adopted into existing 
Pashtun customs.  This avoided the pursuit of policies designed to appeal to the religious 
aspect of Pashtun culture.    
2. Pakistan 
Pakistan has been in a constant struggle to establish itself as an autonomous, 
unified state since its partition from British India in 1947.  Its borders with India in 
Kashmir and with Afghanistan along the Durand Line are still under some contention 
today.  Pakistan’s security has been under constant threat both internally and externally.  
Pakistan’s rivalry with India over Kashmir and ethnic divisions, such as Pashtun 
nationalism, threaten Pakistan’s sovereignty.   
Looking at Pakistan’s policies to extend its authority over regions dominated by 
the Pashtun, state security and state capacity have been two considerations most 
responsible for directing Pakistan’s government.  From the beginning, Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah, the Father of the Nation, recognized the need to integrate the Pashtun with 
Pakistan’s other ethnic groups.  Unfortunately, Jinnah’s untimely death and a variety of 
externally imposed security considerations pushed this priority to the background.  Until 
the events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan had pretty much accepted the need to 
segregate the Pashtun from Pakistan’s mainstream society.  After it was discovered that 
Al Qaeda was responsible and that Osama Bin Laden was using the Pashtun tribal areas 
as his primary base for operations, Pakistan realized it no longer had the option of 
ignoring this area. 
Table 2 illustrates the different policies used by Pakistan’s government to 
establish its authority in the Pashtun areas which today are known as the Federally 
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Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA).  This table depicts the policies in chronological 
order, with the exception of the last two—the FCR and the Maliki System.  These two 
policies were enacted in 1947 and are still in use today. 
The legacy created by British policies and Pakistan’s delicate security situation 
have greatly affected the policies directed towards the Pashtun living in the Tribal Areas.  
With the exceptions of the Close Border Policy which helped convince the Pashtun to 
become a part of Pakistan and the Forward Policy which took place in the 1970s before 
the communist coup in Afghanistan, none of Pakistan’s policies have contributed to the 
establishment of state authority.  Because the post 9/11 policy is still being used by 
Pakistan’s government, it is impossible to say whether or not it is a success, but there has 
been some evidence that the Pashtun tribes are accepting state authority on some levels. 
 
Table 2. Pakistani Policy Summary 
Though the Pakistan case is still ongoing, Pakistan’s previous policies present some 
important lessons based on both success and failure.    
From an organizational perspective, Pakistan’s biggest policy failure, its use of 
the Maliki System, originated as a holdover policy from the British.  Maliks who served 
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as the ‘middle man’ between the state and the tribe prevented the state from engaging the 
Pashtun on a broad enough base to gain their support.  Instead, the Maliks have been able 
to use government incentives appropriated for gaining Pashtun support to further their 
own personal agenda.  The corruption of this system is further exacerbated by the 
presence of Political Agents (PAs) who are appointed government officials assigned the 
task of administering the political districts in the Tribal Areas.  Political Agents have 
little government oversight and a great deal of power with regards to both rewards and 
punishments.  The combination of these two policies suggest that Pakistan has, like the 
British, attempted to mold Pashtun organization into the government’s structure—a clear 
failure of Proposition 1.   
A second failure of Pakistani policy with respect to Proposition 1 was reflected in 
the One Unit Plan.  This particular policy attempted to force a new political structure on 
the Pashtun, as well as the other non-Punjabi ethnic groups of western Pakistan.  By 
appearing to incorporate the social structure of the different ethnic groups into one, at 
least in political terms, Pakistan seemed to neglect the importance of each ethnic group’s 
social structure.  The One Unit Plan resulted in stern resistance by all ethnic groups and 
ultimately forced the state to abandon the policy in 1970.  Though this policy ended in 
failure, it led to some significant reforms in state policy which produced the successful, 
yet short-lived, Forward Policy.  
For ten years the increase in education and medical facilities under the One Unit 
Plan hinted that the state understood the need for change.  With the enactment of the 
Forward Policy, Pakistan switched to a plan focused on integrating the Pashtun living in 
the Tribal Areas and ending the segregating policies of the past.   
Unfortunately, Pakistan’s government felt the need to abandon the Forward 
Policy when the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
successfully overthrew the sitting Afghan president.  Threatened first by the Afghans and 
later by the Soviets, Pakistan changed its policy to use the Pashtun as a foil against 
communism.  In this instance, Pakistan willingly overturned its integration policy in order 
to protect the state.  History shows that this decision succeeded in keeping the Soviets 
from invading Pakistan and preserved the state’s strategic depth with respect to India.   
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Though the decision to segregate the FATA from Pakistan represented a willful 
violation of Proposition 2 above, the decision to continue this policy up until 2001 
suggests Pakistan’s government felt the Pashtun were a better weapon if they were left 
alone.  As a result of this isolation, the Pashtun of the FATA drifted further away from 
mainstream society in Pakistan.  Despite limited efforts, such as granting the people of 
the FATA the right to vote on Pakistani laws and to elect representatives from the FATA 
to participate in the government, the Pashtun have not developed a sense of connection to 
the state or to the other people of Pakistan.  Therefore, the authority of the state over the 
FATA remains non-existent. 
From a normative perspective, the Pakistani government has undermined its 
authority through the use of Political Agents.  Mentioned earlier, the use of these agents 
demonstrated a lack of recognition for the importance of Pashtun social organization.  
The use of PAs also violated the Pashtun conception of justice, indicated in Proposition 3.  
Because the PAs have always been appointed, they have not been accepted as 
representatives of the Pashtun in their respective political districts.  Though the PAs are 
appointed to administrate their respective districts and represent the government, they are 
the representatives of the state.  Without some legitimacy with the Pashtun, actions by the 
PAs that contradict Pashtunwali or are perceived as acting in their own interests are 
associated with the state, which further undermines state authority. 
The current operations in the FATA are yielding mixed results.  The incorporation 
of medical services with the military forces assigned to establish order have been 
welcomed, and even aided, by some Pashtun tribes.  This indicates the state may be 
making gains with respect to establishing its authority.  However, there are still tribes that 
resist such actions and claim that the Pakistani government is only carrying out the will 
of the American government.  In addition, the unrest attributed to religious movements in 
Pakistan has been gaining momentum over the past few years.  Yet it is difficult to tell if 
these groups, many of which are made up of Pashtuns, are truly affiliated through 
religious ties or if they are bound by ethnic ties under the guise of religious unrest.  In 
this case, the results of the post 9/11 policy will have to be evaluated further in the future. 
A successful policy used by Pakistan that does not fall neatly within the four 
propositions has been the incorporation of the Pashtun into both the military and the 
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government.  In both cases, the state has gained a certain amount of ‘buy in’ from these 
individuals that inspires confidence in other Pashtuns and creates a level of connectivity 
between the state and the people.  However, the behavior of these individuals becomes 
critical, for if they are seen to be violating their observance of Pashtunwali their 
importance will be marginalized and they will be characterized as either weak or without 
honor. 
3. Soviet Union 
For ten years, the Soviet Union invested a significant amount of resources in its 
efforts to acquire Afghanistan as another satellite communist state.  Though the Soviets 
quickly gained control of the significant urban areas, they learned that the real threat was 
from the Afghan countryside.  Soviet forces armed with technologically superior 
weapons maintained a significant advantage over the Afghan mujahideen in all force-on-
force engagements.  However, the tenacity of the resistance fueled by countries such as 
the United States and Saudi Arabia evened the playing field and forced the Soviets into a 
bitter struggle that they eventually lost.   
 
Table 3. Soviet Policy Summary 
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Soviet policies were almost exclusively designed to suppress the Afghan people 
who did not support the communist regime.  Following a policy labeled as “migratory 
genocide”, the Soviets seemed to focus on pushing out all those opposed to a communist 
government.  Though there were a few exceptions, even these policies ended up being 
altered to become more suppressive than co-optive or accommodative.  The table below 
contains a list of the different policies.  Unlike the other two tables, these policies are not 
necessarily in chronological order because the Soviets used a variety of different policies 
at the same time. 
Despite the enormous technical advantage the Soviets had over the mujahideen, 
most of whom were rural Pashtuns, the Soviets eventually left Afghanistan in defeat.  At 
this point it is important to note that the mujahideen had an enormous amount of help 
from the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and that the introduction of Stinger 
missiles (man portable, surface-to-air missiles) severely hampered the Soviet use of 
helicopters.  With the exception of securing Afghan urban areas during the invasion, 
Soviet policy failed to establish even temporary authority.  Based almost solely on 
suppression, these policies violated each of the four propositions in almost every case.  
Though Soviet policies offer little in the way of positive examples that could be used by 
other states, these policies do offer excellent examples of what not to do when trying to 
establish state authority. 
Like both the British and the Pakistanis, the Soviets attempted, and failed, to 
negotiate specific arrangements with tribal elders.  Though there were a few instances 
where the agreements were upheld, in almost all cases the agreement was abrogated as 
soon as it no longer served the tribe’s interest.  In many cases, the tribes would feign 
support in order to acquire weapons or money.   
The Soviet policy to ‘Sovietize’ the rural farmers by establishing collective farms 
and taking land from the wealthy and giving it to the poor failed for the same reasons the 
British failed in their attempts to circumvent the custom of nikat.  Holding to their social 
structure, the Pashtun farmers refused to take land from the Khans.  Frustrated, the 
Soviets taunted, threatened, and eventually forced many poor Pashtun farmers to accept 
the land under threat of violence.   
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The Soviet policy of ‘migratory genocide” presents strong evidence in support of 
Proposition 2.  Initially aimed at Afghan urban areas and then later expanded to include 
much of the countryside, this Soviet policy sought isolation and segregation over 
integration.  Through brutal acts of terror and intimidation, the Soviets attempted to push 
out those they perceived to be against the communist regime.  Despite the fact that over 
five million Afghans left their country, the Soviets were incapable of maintaining any 
semblance of control over any areas other than a few major cities.   
The violently suppressive nature of the majority of Soviet policies violated the 
Pashtun sense of justice.  The Soviets, who attempted to disguise themselves under the 
puppet regime of Babrak Karmal—a well-known Durrani Pashtun—were seen as 
invaders by the majority of the Afghan people.  When the Soviets finally started to 
consider the importance of more co-optive policies, such as Sovietization, creating a 
Soviet-Afghan army, or approaching Pashtun tribes in hopes of playing one off another, 
the people were distrustful and unwilling to cooperate.  Due to the injustices committed 
during the invasion and the initial phase of the occupation, it was unlikely that the Soviets 
would ever gain authority over the Pashtun or any other Afghans. 
In an effort to appeal to the religious aspects of the resistance, the Soviets 
specifically set out to co-opt Muslim religious leaders.  In most Muslim societies, the 
state gains its legitimacy from the religious scholars, or ulema.  This concept fails in rural 
Pashtun society because the ulema are seen to oppose Pashtunwali.234  The policy also 
failed because very few members of the ulema and very few mullahs supported the 
Soviets—and those who did were immediately discredited.  The infighting among the 
different resistance groups during the war against the Soviets also demonstrates the 
importance of ethnic affiliation over religious affiliation.  Though the significant majority 
of resistance groups were Sunni Muslims, they fought one another based mostly on 
ethnicity and somewhat on regional alliances.  These divisions combine to illustrate the 
relevance of Proposition 4 on the establishment of state authority, that tribal custom 
trumps religion as a source of identity.   
Though their own policies severely hampered Soviet success, it must also be 
noted that the Soviets lacked the capacity to adequately accomplish their objectives under 
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the policies they had selected.  Whether or not the Soviets could ultimately have 
succeeded is impossible to know, but it is obvious that the Soviets were reluctant to 
change their approach because they continued to use suppressive policies up until their 
withdrawal in 1989. 
C. COMMON GROUND 
This section has two goals.  The first is to identify the policies that have apparent 
similarities in all three cases and determine why the particular policy failed or succeeded 
based on how each state pursued the particular policy or if there was another factor that 
came into play.  The second is to look at the relationship between each of the four 
propositions and the outcome of each policy and then to compare it across the three cases.  
This comparison will be used to determine which propositions are the most influential on 
state policy. 
1. Similar Policies 
Based on the findings from each of the cases, two similarities can be found: 1) the 
attempt by the state to expand its influence through the development of infrastructure in 
Pashtun tribal areas, and 2) the attempt to engage a single representative who each state 
believed could legitimately speak on behalf of the tribe. 
First, each state instituted a policy that expanded the infrastructure of Pashtun 
tribal areas.  All three regimes expanded infrastructure in order to improve troop 
movement, gain control over local violence, and increase security.  Yet this commonality 
aside, the three regimes differed in the other reasons for infrastructure improvement.  The 
Soviets had no other motive than security, whereas the British sought to appeal to the 
sedentary Pashtun through the prospect of improved commerce and protection.  Pakistan 
also developed infrastructure aimed at improving education and medical services.  This 
policy differed in the fact that it sought to integrate the Pashtun into Pakistan’s society, 
where the British policy sought only to provide services and the Soviet policy sought 
only to subjugate or eradicate the resistance. 
Second, all three states attempted to engage the Pashtun through tribal leaders.  In 
this example, all three states created a similar policy.  This suggests that each state 
misinterpreted Pashtun social structure, yet the reason for this misinterpretation is 
unclear.  Whether it occurred due to the state’s pre-determined bias that each tribe would 
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have a representative similar to the state’s representative who had the authority to speak 
for the tribe or because of the state’s lack of capacity to broadly engage the Pashtun is 
impossible to determine without further research.  The important point here is that 
engaging the Pashtun ethnic group in a way commensurate with its social organization is 
vital, verifying the validity of Proposition 1—that a state should engage a tribe based on 
its customary social organization.   
2. Correlations between Propositions and Outcomes 
By comparing the outcome of each policy—23 of which were measurable—with 
its adherence to the propositions in the theoretical framework, a positive correlation 
arises between Proposition 2 (states should not isolate or segregate) and Proposition 3 
(states should consider the tribe’s perception of justice).  Compliance with both 
propositions yielded an increase in state authority in every case.  Failure to comply with 
both propositions resulted in a failure to establish authority in all but four cases (see 
Table 4 below).  Though these four instances question the importance of the proposed 
correlation, each of these four instances have important considerations that explain their 
deviation. 
 
Table 4. Outcome Summary for Proposition 2 (states should not isolate or 
segregate)  and Proposition 3 (states should consider the tribe’s perception of justice) 
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The only policy that disregarded both of these propositions and still managed to 
establish temporary authority was the Soviet policy designed to secure the urban areas in 
Afghanistan.  Under this policy the Soviets were able to establish temporary authority in 
Kabul, and to a lesser degree in other urban areas.  However, this policy pushed a 
significant number of people out of the urban areas (those opposed to Sovietization or the 
occupation) and left mostly Soviet sympathizers behind.  This policy motivated many of 
the people who fled from the urban areas to either join or support the resistance, and 
contributed to the decrease of Soviet control (although it was already limited) in the rural 
areas. 
There were three instances where a state made a gain in expanding its authority 
without complying with both Proposition 2 and 3.  The first instance occurred under the 
British Frontier Crimes Regulation, a policy which had two outcomes.  Under this policy, 
the British continued to segregate the Pashtun living on the plains from the Pashtun living 
in the hills.  In the plains areas, the British managed to gain a small degree of authority 
over the plains Pashtun by offering sufficient compensation in the form of security and 
increased economic opportunities. The presence of the hill Pashtun, who were not offered 
any compensation or subjected to the Regulation, eventually undermined that authority, 
as the British were unable to provide security for the plains tribes against the hill tribes.  
This suggests that the British ultimately failed to establish their authority because of the 
continued segregation between the hill tribes living outside the settled areas from the 
plains tribes living within the settled areas.  Had the British expanded their efforts to 
include the hill tribes, it is possible that sufficient compensation could have been 
provided to convince the hill tribes to also begin to accept British authority. 
The second instance occurred under the British Maliki System.  Under this policy, 
the British were able to establish temporary state authority because the Maliki System—
the appointment of tribal Maliks by the British to facilitate in the administration of the 
tribes—created some degree of order over the Pashtun.  However, as stated in the British 
case study, this policy ultimately failed to establish more permanent authority because it 
did not allow the British (who were lacking the necessary resources) to engage the 
Pashtun on the level required to inspire their acceptance of British authority.  
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The third instance is found when the Pakistanis had to choose segregation to get 
the Pashtun to willingly accept the addition of their land into the new state of Pakistan.  
Pakistan’s president, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, understood that his fledgling state lacked 
the capacity to force the Pashtun living within Pakistan’s borders to submit to the new 
state’s authority.  Therefore, Jinnah directed the government to segregate the Pashtun 
under the Close Border Policy and allow them to exist under the authority of 
Pashtunwali.  This policy succeeded in temporarily establishing the state’s authority, but 
did not facilitate the state’s ability to expand its authority by superseding Pashtunwali 
with its own rule of law.  Ultimately, this policy failed to integrate the Pashtun with 
Pakistan’s mainstream society. 
Based on the policy outcomes and the considerations provided above, it is 
reasonable to suggest that there should be an emphasis on complying with Proposition 2 
and 3 when prescribing policy aiming to expand state authority.  The next section will 
build on this discussion by considering the importance and validity of the conclusions 
drawn above on cases outside the Pashtun ethnic group. 
D. BEYOND THE PASHTUN CASE 
This thesis has focused solely on identifying the barriers that impede the 
establishment of state authority in Pashtun areas.  However, four conclusions can be 
drawn from the case studies presented in the previous chapters that could be applied in 
any situation where a state desires to expand its authority into “ungoverned spaces.”  
First, suppression does not create an environment that contributes to the state’s authority.  
If the state has to continually suppress its people, it is not fostering its legitimacy among 
the people.  Under such a policy, the state remains outside society and will likely fail to 
supplant, in a positive way, local customs with state institutions or a central rule of law.  
Though suppression may allow the state to temporarily control the region and 
establish its own form of order, the length of that control will be dependent on the 
amount of resources the state is willing to commit to maintain it.  The span of that control 
becomes a function of the state’s capacity which in turn depends on both the resources 
available and the ability for the state to maintain its political will, characterized by both 
domestic and government support.  Such policies do not establish state authority; though 
they may, given sufficient capacity and will, establish state power. 
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Second, neither isolation nor accommodation creates authority.  In either case, the 
critical link between the people and the state is broken.  To establish and maintain its 
authority, the state must create an atmosphere that convinces its people that the state will 
provide for their personal security and welfare in a way that does not threaten their way 
of life.  At the same time, the state must promote a sense of representation and/or 
participation in the government.  By accomplishing this, the state extends its identity to 
its people which would allow for their acceptance of the state’s authority, though it is 
impossible to predict the time required. 
Third, if the state’s capacity is limited, either for fiscal or political reasons, its 
policies must lean more towards the accommodation side of co-optation (but not all the 
way to accommodation for reasons stated above) and the state must allow more time for 
establishing the policies that will lead to the expansion of state authority.  If the state 
pushes too hard or too fast, its people will likely resist or make larger demands.  In either 
case, the state’s limited capacity would cause such policies to fail.  
Fourth, a state needs to understand the difference between establishing order 
versus authority.  Prospect theory explains why any group would resist a different rule of 
law that is seen to entail a loss of cultural or political autonomy.  Therefore, allowing 
them to follow their own customs would likely minimize the friction between the group 
and the state.  However, the state must be willing to accept some resistance and unrest in 
order to achieve the adequate level of integration necessary to establish its authority.  
Policies designed only to establish order focus less on integration and could likely pursue 
a strategy that would lead to isolation, accommodation, or even suppression.   
Based on these points and the analysis of each case’s policies, the next section 
will discuss the validity of the theoretical framework used in this thesis and identify any 
shortfalls associated with it. 
E. VALIDITY OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the data presented in the three tables summarizing the successes and failures of 
each state, there is only one instance, the Forward Policy used by Pakistan, which 
managed to satisfy all four propositions of the framework.  At first glance, this appears to 
negate the validity of the framework.  However, the short duration of this particular 
policy presents a possible exception.  Pakistan was making significant gains at integrating 
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the Pashtun of the FATA under this policy, but it is impossible to say if it would have 
succeeded in establishing Pakistan’s authority if it had continued for more than six years.   
Outside of this example, none of the states’ policies satisfied all four propositions 
and none were able to establish their authority with any sort of permanence.  In the cases 
where there was only temporary authority, each example represents a situation where the 
state was able to establish some semblance of order or compromise.  There were no 
examples found in these three cases where the Pashtun accepted the state’s rule of law 
over their own customary laws.  The lack of a positive case which demonstrated a state 
policy that followed all four propositions and subsequently succeeded in establishing the 
state’s authority casts some doubt on the framework’s validity.  Because the rural Pashtun 
have never been successfully integrated into a state’s mainstream society, the only way to 
resolve this issue would be to apply this framework to other tribal ethnic groups. 
The last area of the framework that comes into doubt is the point made in 
Proposition 4.  Though many scholars agree that the Pashtun are more closely tied to their 
customs than to Islam (Roy, Caroe, Dupree), it is debatable whether the divide would 
simply be too great for a non-Muslim state to establish its authority over the Pashtun or 
any other Muslim tribal society.  Neither the British case nor the Soviet case provide an 
example of a non-Muslim state being able to sufficiently integrate the Pashtun into their 
society to the point where they would accept the state’s authority.  Yet, the failure of the 
Pakistani government to succeed in establishing its authority over the Pashtun leaves the 
point open for debate—the lack of a positive case for a state establishing its authority 
over the Pashtun raises the question of whether it was a failure of policy or a lack of 
religious commonality. 
F. CONSIDERATIONS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK 
The research used in developing this thesis also revealed two additional 
considerations that could greatly influence the state’s ability to establish its authority over 
an ethnic group.  The first point is attributed to the physical geography of the region.  
Though geography varies significantly across the different areas associated with 
“ungoverned spaces”, it represents a general concept that may affect the state’s ability to 
extend its influence into the region.  Such difficulties only aid the group’s resistance to 
state authority and increase the cost and time it will likely take for the state to succeed. 
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The second point centers on the quality of the agent that has been charged with 
executing the state’s policies.  An agent that understand the groups customs, has the 
authority to make adjustments to the policy based on cultural considerations, and has 
previously earned the group’s respect provides the state with a significant advantage.  
The Paladins, the British officers who were initially sent into the NWF to establish 
British authority, managed to succeed in establishing their authority over the Pashtun.  In 
each case, these men had previously established themselves as fierce, skilled warriors and 
gained an understanding of the intricacies of Pashtun culture and language.  This allowed 
them to take into account the importance of tribal norms and social structure, which 
supports the validity of the proposed theoretical framework presented in this thesis.  
However, this only represents one case and requires more research to flush out the actual 
implications of how the agent affects state authority. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify the factors which impede the 
establishment of a state’s authority over an ethnic group with deeply entrenched tribal 
customs.  Because it focused on the Pashtun ethnic group, many of the findings apply 
only to this region and this ethnic group.  The framework has been specifically designed 
to inductively evaluate cases of states involved in attempting to gain authority in rural 
Pashtun areas.  The theoretical framework offers a starting point in either the 
development or the evaluation of policy.   
Most importantly, the analysis of the three case studies produced the following 
four broad points that should strongly be considered by any state engaging a group living 
in an “ungoverned space”: 1) suppression fosters resistance instead of authority, 2) 
neither isolation nor accommodation generates state authority, 3) limited capacity 
requires more accommodative co-optation and more time, and 4) policies must focus on 
establishing authority and not only order.  Though these findings do not sufficiently 
encompass all the considerations necessary for creating a policy to extend state authority 
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GLOSSARY 
Badal A principle of Pashtunwali; it demands that a Pashtun seek revenge 
for any act considered offensive to the individual 
Baramta A principle of Pashtunwali; the act of taking goods or individuals 
hostage in order to gain restitution for a grievance 
Jirgah A principle of Pashtunwali; the requirement to settle tribal 
concerns through a democratic forum of Pashtun adult males 
KhAD Khidamat-e-Atla’t Daulati; Soviet administrated Secret Police in 
Afghanistan  
Khalqi Majority faction within the PDPA; tended to be more nationalistic; 
marginalized by the Soviets during the Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan; mostly rural Pashtun 
Khan   Pashtun tribal leader 
Lashkar  An armed tribal militia 
MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Front); a religiously 
motivated political group made up of Pashtuns and concentrated on 
the NWFP 
Madrasa  A religious school or seminary 
Malik A tribal elder given some authority to make decisions within the 
tribe; the title is hereditary and would be passed on from 
generation to generation 
Melmastia A principle of Pashtunwali; it demands that a Pashtun give 
hospitality to all who should ask for it 
Mujahideen  An Islamic resistance fighter engaged in jihad 
Mullah   A Muslim religious leader; head of a mosque 
NWF   Northwest Frontier (the Northwest region of modern day Pakistan) 
NWFP Northwest Frontier Province; created by Great Britain in 1901, it 
remains as one of the four provinces of modern-day Pakistan 
Namus A principle of Pashtunwali; it demands that one’s property and the 
honor of one’s women (both relatives and wives) be strictly 
guarded 
Nanawatai A principle of Pashtunwali; it demands that a Pashtun give 
sanctuary to all who should ask for it 
Nang Honor, obtained through the observance and adherence to 
Pashtunwali 
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Nikat Tribal custom which dictates rewards and punishments based on an 
individual’s hereditary standing within the tribe 
PA Political Agent; a government office, used by both the British and 
the Pakistani governments, to oversee and administer political 
districts 
PDPA  People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Communist Party) 
Parchami Minority faction within the PDPA; favored by the Soviets during 
the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan; mostly urban Pashtun 
Lungi  Similar to a Malik, but the title is not hereditary 
Qalang  Rents or land taxes paid to the State 
Rivaj A principle of Pashtunwali; places accountability on the tribe 
rather than the individual 
Sikh   Indian ethnic group who are often found in the Indian military 
Strategic Depth The proximity of a State’s strategic assets to its enemy 
Ulema   The Muslim clergy 
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